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Abstract
This thesis examines the claim that video games differ fundamentally from other
media in terms of fictional truth. Fictional truth has been treated extensively in the
field  of  philosophy of  fiction,  primarily in  relation  to  literature and,  to  a  certain
extent, film, but video games have been far too neglected. Truth in game fiction
has been discussed by game scholars, and one prevalent view is that fictional
truth  in  games  can  be  altered  through  the  interaction  of  the  player.  Scholars
support this claim with reference to the purportedly unique nature of games as a
medium in terms of temporality and authorial intentions, asserting that these two
factors determine truth differently in game fiction. 
Game scholars often argue that video game stories have other temporal
properties than novels and films, that game stories take place in the present and
that  this  makes  it  possible  for  players  to  alter  the  truth-value  of  fictional
propositions. They also argue that games have an interactive fictional truth, and
that  the  player  is  some  kind  of  author.  However,  by  applying  theories  from
philosophy of fiction, and with a methodology based in analytic philosophy, the
thesis refutes these claims. I show that there are fundamental issues with their
conception of time in fiction and that they fail to show why the arguments used to
defend this conception are applicable exclusively to games. I also show that they
fail to connect their claims regarding authorship to corresponding discussions in
philosophy of fiction, where there have been extensive debates surrounding the
importance of  authorial  intentions and to  what  extent  these can determine the
fictional truth of a given work; the same issues making it problematic to ascribe too
much authority to the creator of a fictional work are retained and/or exacerbated
when players  are seen as authors.  The thesis  thus refutes common claims in
game studies and expands the scope of philosophy of fiction.
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Introduction
How do we know what is true within a story? Works of fiction are about people who
never existed and events that never took place, and although opinions differ on
how to correctly interpret any given work, we often agree on basic tenets: Harry
Potter is a young wizard living in a world full of magic and supernatural creatures;
this is true both in the novels and their cinematic adaptations. Philosophers of
fiction have dealt more in detail with what it takes for something to be true in a
literary or a cinematic work, and although discussions are far from settled, the field
has advanced significantly in the last decades.
Video games, however, are a different matter. Although early discussions
may have concerned their status as narratives, it is hardly controversial nowadays
to analyse games as one would a literary or cinematic narrative. A new problem
that so far has not been addressed sufficiently is not their narrativity  per se, but
how they differ from other media in terms of fictional truth. Truth in fiction has been
treated extensively with reference to literature and, to a lesser extent, cinema, but
when it comes to video games this question has been far too neglected. Whilst
opinions vary, game scholars often agree that games are more interactive than
literature and film in the sense that the interpreter – that is, the player – can alter
the story. Although it feels as if one can interact with a video game’s story in a way
one  cannot  do  with  a  literary  or  cinematic  one,  it  is  debatable  whether  good
reasons have been presented as to why games should be any different from other
media.  This  thesis  shows  that  arguments  presented  so  far  are  either  too
undeveloped to offer a substantial defence of the view, or they are reminiscent of
arguments used in relation to literature and cinema, which suffer from flaws that
are  retained  and  sometimes  exacerbated  when  applied  to  games.  Common
arguments  used  to  defend  the  interactivity  of  video  game  stories  appeal  to
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temporal  properties  purportedly  unique  to  video  game  narratives,  without
explaining why games can be said to possess these properties, let alone why they
are the only medium to possess them. Others state that the player is some kind of
author or coauthor,  but fail  to connect this to debates in literary and cinematic
narratives  on authorship and the value of  authorial  intentions,  where so-called
‘intentionalism’ has been proven to be highly problematic, if not untenable.
Purpose and Research Questions
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the concept of truth in video game fiction.
The topic of fictional truth is too large and multifaceted to be covered in a single
thesis, so this thesis will consider to what extent the interpreter – that is, the player
– can interact with and actively influence the story of a given game. By truth in
fiction I mean that which the work in question prescribes the interpreter to imagine,
what  is  true  in  the  world  alluded  to  by  a  work  of  fiction. I  deliberately  use  a
comparatively vague definition which many philosophers of fiction can agree upon,
so as to avoid raising questions less germane to the thesis. An almost identical
definition has been presented by Kendall  Walton (1990)  and elaborated on by
Gregory Currie (1990), Alex Byrne (1993), Robin Le Poidevin (2007) and Kathleen
Stock (2017), but I have removed elements unique to their respective schools of
interpretation.  Hence,  fictional  truth  (the  way  the  thesis  uses  the  notion)  is
restricted  to  the  fictional  world  and  has  no  necessary  correlation  with  the
real/actual world. Thus, it is more appropriate to say that a given proposition p is
fictionally true, or F(p). To what extent (and how) a fictional work may convey truth
about the real world is outside the scope of the thesis. 
When I speak of interacting with the story, I mean the possibility of altering
the truth-value of a proposition in the fictional world by means of interaction with
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the narrative. One can certainly interact with the physical properties of a novel or a
film, but I do not refer to such actions when I speak of interactivity; if one pauses a
film, one does not imagine that time within the fictional world freezes, and if one
adds words to  or rips out  pages from a novel  it  would not count as changing
anything  in  the  story.  By  contrast,  when  playing  video  games  one  gets  the
impression that interaction with the narrative translates into interaction with the
story, so that an alteration of the representation entails a corresponding alteration
of something within the fictional world. The thesis shows that this is merely an
impression, there is no good reason to assume that the truth-value of a proposition
within  the  fictional  world  has been  altered.  Moreover,  one  could  say that  one
interacts with a story (in some sense of the word) when one interprets it, seeing
how one is  obliged to  ‘fill  in’ what  is  omitted,  but  nevertheless implied by the
narrative;  for  the  sake  of  clarity  I  will  refer  to  this  only  as  interpreting  and/or
reacting to the story.
Narratological  discussions  of  video  games  often  emphasize  the  unique
nature of the medium, with several scholars arguing that video game narratives
differ from literary and cinematic ones in how they allow the player to interact with
the story in a way a reader or spectator cannot (e.g. Pearce 2004a, 2004b; Min
Lee, Park, and Jin 2006; Davidson 2008; Ip 2011; Warkentin 2011; Holmes 2012;
Laurel  2014;  Ulas  2014;  Wendler  2014;  Haggis  2016;  Zarzycki  2016;  Hanson
2018; Mosselaer 2018; Whaley 2018; Wildman and Woodward 2018; Willis 2019).
One  endemic  deficiency  in  video  game  scholarship  is  that  scholars  seem  to
underestimate  the  activity  of  readers  and  spectators  whilst,  conversely,
overestimating  that  of  players.  Comparatively  few  theorists  discussing  games
manage to integrate knowledge from fields in philosophy and/or the humanities
more thoroughly, and they fail to relate questions of fictional truth in video game
stories  to  other  media,  even  though  these  have  been  treated  extensively.  By
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contrast,  philosophers  of  fiction  have  primarily  focused  on  literature  and,
sometimes,  cinema,  but  mostly neglect  video games (e.g.  Lewis  1978;  Searle
1979; Tolhurst and Wheeler 1979; Walton 1990; Currie 1990, 1991, 1995a, 1995b,
2010;  Byrne  1993;  Livingston  1993,  2005,  2009;  Wilson  1997; Phillips  1999;
Hanley 2004; Kania 2005, 2007; Levinstein 2007; Stecker and Davies 2010; Kindt
and Müller 2011; Friend 2017; Stock 2017; Badura and Berto 2019).  Philosophy
of  video  game  fiction  thus  remains  undeveloped  compared  to  literature  and
cinema with regard to fictional truth. Philosophers who do study video games lack
the analytic approach necessary to scrutinize claims made by game scholars,1 and
sometimes repeat what has already been said by game scholars without providing
better arguments. This is problematic for several reasons, the most important one
being that  arguments and conclusions found in  the philosophy of  fiction could
potentially  refute  claims  of  truth  in  video  game  fiction,  thus  invalidating  the
purported authorship of the player; no substantial study has been made where the
philosophy of fiction is applied thoroughly and systematically to video games in
this particular area.
The player is often claimed to influence the game’s story for two reasons:
either  because the story takes place in  the present,  allowing for  the player  to
interact  with  it,  or  because  the  player  becomes  some  kind  of  author  of  the
narrative. Neither of these arguments is well defended. In general, questions of
time are overlooked in video game scholarship, and most game scholars commit
one of two fallacies: the first is that the arguments presented are too rudimentary
and reveal little about the temporality of video game stories, but nevertheless build
on the implicit premise that video games take place in the present (e.g. Murray
1997; Laurel 2014; Ryan 2015); the second is the explicit claim that video game
1 Note the comparatively vague use of the term ‘game scholar’: when used in the 
thesis it refers to a scholar writing about games, who need not necessarily have
an academic background in game studies.
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stories take place in the present, but the arguments used to defend this view are
similar or even identical to the ones that have been (or could potentially be) used
in relation to other media, such as film and literature (e.g. Juul 2005; Nitsche 2007;
Thabet 2015; Hanson 2018).2 From this perspective it would follow that if video
game stories really do take place in the present, so do films and books, which
should make them equally interactive; game scholars do not seem to be aware of
this.
As  for  authorship,  many  scholars  ascribe  authority  to  the  player  (e.g.
Davidson 2008; Warkentin 2011;  Backe 2012; Thabet 2015) but fail to elaborate
on what it means to be an author in general and one of video game narratives in
particular, raising the question of why the player should be regarded as the author
of a game’s story and why arguments defending players as authors do not apply to
readers or film-spectators. Furthermore, the importance these scholars ascribe to
authorship is redolent of the reverence that has been held for literary authors and
cinematic directors (so-called auteurs) in literary studies and film studies; theorists
discussing games fail to address consequences stemming from their respective
conceptions of authorship. They neglect general problems of attributing the author
with  too much responsibility for  the narrative, as well  as the specific problems
unique to video games as a medium, and what issues that follow from seeing the
player as an author.
The reason why this is important is because if truth in fiction is malleable, it
would undermine possibilities of video game criticism and scholarship. One could
no longer analyse the story of any game, since it changes for every playthrough,
so appraisals (e.g. awards) would be meaningless, as would criticism of a game’s
immoral content, since the person praising/criticizing the story is effectively the one
2 For more on temporality and fiction, see e.g. Yaffe (2003), Le Poidevin (2001, 
2007, 2016), and Bourne and Caddick Bourne (2016).
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who creates it. This would make it problematic to hold game designers responsible
for immoral content, since it is the player who makes it true that a game is, for
instance, racist and/or sexist. The current rating-system could also be questioned:
although it  is  the  designer  who  includes the  possibility  of  including  less  child-
friendly content, it is ultimately the players themselves who make a game suitable
for people of a certain age by playing it in a certain way (and one would not hold a
programmer responsible for the possibility of including offensive content in a story
written  with  a  word  processor  she  created).  In  short,  the  very  possibility  of
speaking of a video game’s story hinges on the validity of arguments presented so
far regarding video game narratology; if they turn out to be valid it follows that
scholarship and criticism pertaining to video game stories become futile.
The research questions explored in this thesis are thus as follows:
1) What does analytic philosophy reveal about the validity of arguments used
to defend video games as fictions with a malleable fictional truth?
2) What do theories from philosophy of fiction reveal about fictional truth in
video games in relation to temporality and authorial intentions in terms of
the possibility for players to alter it?
3) In what way(s), and to what extent, do temporal properties of video game
narratives  allow for  interaction  with  their  stories  in  a  way different  from
literary and cinematic narratives?
4) In what way(s), and to what extent, can the player be ascribed authorship
allowing  for  interaction  with  video  game  stories  in  a  way  different  from
literary and cinematic narratives?
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Methodology
Crucially,  then,  the  thesis  differs  from  earlier  research  on  video  games  in  its
application  of  analytic  philosophy  and  philosophy  of  fiction.  The  reason  why
analytic philosophy is suitable for this study is that scholarship on truth in video
game fiction so far seems to mostly have a basis in continental philosophy and its
use in film studies and literary studies (which is not to say that all game scholars
draw on any philosophical theories), and therefore lacks the requisite clarity and
logic that  analytic  philosophy brings to the issues of temporality,  intention, and
agency. It is not uncommon for arguments to be obtuse, even contradictory, which
could  have  been  avoided,  had  scholars  applied  a  more  analytic  perspective.
Arguments  common in  game studies  entail  absurd  consequences  or  presume
unlikely premises, and the failure to expound theories in an analytic manner hides
this fact. Thus, given the application of analytic philosophy in philosophy of fiction
and temporality, the validity of various arguments about games, narratology, and
interactivity will not only become more astute and clearer, but also provide better
reasons  for  accepting/refuting  contemporary  theories  on  video  games  as  a
consequence. Few game scholars treated in the thesis provide adequate reasons
for accepting their respective theories, and arguments are reduced to question-
begging statements, rendering the entire debate ineffectual. With a more analytic
perspective correct conclusions become more persuasive, and incorrect ones can
be refuted.
The thesis consists of two parts, each of which begins with an exposition of
a  particular  area  in  game  studies  followed  by  corresponding  and/or  related
theories in philosophy of fiction. Theories of game scholars are then analysed in
terms of cogency and validity in order to assess whether they stand up to scrutiny,
i.e.  whether  actual  and/or  potential  arguments  can  support  their  conclusions.
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Although  some  philosophers  have  already  addressed  video  games,  their
conclusions mostly do not differ significantly from those already arrived at by game
scholars.  The contribution to  knowledge is  thus twofold:  advancing both game
studies as well as philosophy of fiction.
The thesis elaborates on and develops game scholars’ theories on these
matters; not all  interpretations of these are defended explicitly by said scholars
themselves,  but nevertheless follow as plausible/necessary consequences. The
validity of a given theory is examined not only through scrutiny of its premises and
conclusions, but also by looking at possible consequences following from it, and
how these may invalidate what at first seems like a tenable theory.
Terminology
Throughout the thesis I use the terms ‘story’ and ‘fiction’ interchangeably to refer to
the  event(s)  described/depicted  by  a  novel,  film,  or  video  game.  The  word
‘narrative’ is used to refer to the presentation of said event(s). I adopt this use from
theorists  such as Gérard Genette  (1980),  David Bordwell  (1985),  and Herman
Porter  Abbott  (2008).  I  also  use  the  term  ‘representation’  as  a  synonym  of
‘narrative’.
The thesis employs game-related terminology which may be unfamiliar to
readers  less  versed  in  video  games.  A  ‘cut-scene’  is  a  non-interactive  film-
sequence within the game, typically employed to convey narrative content (Tavinor
2009 pp.112-14, p.199; Zagal and Mateas 2010 p.851; Holmes 2012 p.211; Ali
2015 p.272; Mukherjee 2015 p.64). ‘Gameplay’ is, as Dylan Holmes notes, a term
often  used  but  seldom  defined,  and  he  defines  it  as  the  sum  of  a  game’s
interactive components, as opposed to story, sound, and graphics (2012, p.214).
Grant Tavinor defines it as ‘the interactive involvement typically associated with
videogames, that is, the activities that occur when one plays a videogame’ (2009,
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p.86; original emphasis), and  Simon  Egenfeldt-Nielsen,  Jonas Heide Smith and
Susana  Pajares  Tosca  define  it  as  ‘the  game  dynamics  emerging  from  the
interplay between rules and game geography’ (2008, p.102; original emphasis). I
use it in a similar fashion to refer to instances of interaction with the game. For
instance, the act of jumping and running in Super Mario Bros (Nintendo, 1987) is
part of its gameplay, as opposed to the visual, auditive, and narratological aspects.
Related to this is a ‘playthrough’, by which I mean a complete traversal of a given
game from start to finish. A playthrough need not be accomplished in one sitting,
but can be divided into several ‘gaming-sessions’ or ‘playing-sessions’, by which I
mean  one  uninterrupted  session  of  engaging  with  a  given  game  (which  can
include brief pauses). A playthrough, in my definition, need not include completion
of any secondary tasks (so-called ‘side-quests’), only missions and quests that are
required for completion of the game (if they are completed before the final story-
mission I count them as part of that playthrough, but not if they are completed after
it).
For  the  sake  of  simplicity  and  clarity  I  speak  of  directors  and  game
designers  as  equivalent  to  authors  of  novels,  as  if  these  are  always  singular
people. In practice it is safe to assume that most games and films are made by
more than one person, but the focus of the thesis is not on the question of whether
a single person in a film/game-crew can and/or should always be singled out as
the sole creator of a given work, but whether players can be ascribed such a role
at all.
If  nothing  else  is  stated,  the  thesis  uses the terms ‘author’,  ‘artist’,  and
‘creator’ synonymously and in a general sense to denote the creator of a work of
fiction, the one who makes decisions regarding its content and presentation. Since
the thesis focuses on literary, cinematic, and ludologic works, these are the ones I
primarily refer to with the term ‘work’. Other kinds of art are discussed when they
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can reveal something about these three categories, but then it is made clear that
another art-form is discussed.
For  brief  outlines of  games discussed extensively in the thesis,  see the
appendix ‘Key games discussed in the thesis’.
Theoretical limitations
Since the thesis adopts a definition of fictional truth that only pertains to truth  in
fiction, some areas of philosophy of fiction are automatically excluded, such as the
truth  of fiction,  propositions  that  do  not  obtain  within  the  fictional  world  but
nevertheless express something true about the work per se. For instance, a work’s
themes and genre can be identified only by an interpreter; it is not true within the
story that the events are to be categorized as a certain genre with a particular
thematic  meaning.3 Thus,  the  thesis  does not  treat  so-called  categorial  and/or
thematic properties. One reason for this is that if there is a fundamental difference
between  genre/themes  and  purely  semantic  content,  the  question  of  how  to
distinguish  between  them  would  require  too  much  space  in  relation  to  how
peripheral it is to the central arguments of the thesis. On the other hand, if there is
no fundamental difference between these two types of content, lines of reasoning
regarding semantic properties can be applied to categorial and thematic ones as
well, vitiating the need for an entirely new set of arguments.4
Since the focus of the thesis is narratives, the games that are studied have
a ‘pre-structured’ narrative with a path the player must follow in order to reach a
predesignated ending which functions as a conclusion  to  the story (or  several
3 I adopt this distinction between truth in/of fiction from Levinstein (2007).
4 For more on the distinction between semantic and categorial aspects of fiction, 
see e.g. Currie (1990), Beardsley (1992), Levinson (1992), Nathan (1992), 
Walton (1995), Iseminger (1996), Carroll (1997b, 2002), Livingston (1998, 2003,
2005), Trivedi (2001), D. Davies (2007), Stock (2017), Wildman and Woodward 
(2018).
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paths and endings, in the case of branching narratives). Games with no narrative
at all, such as abstract games, are of little interest to the thesis.
Moreover,  game  scholars  sometimes  speak  of  what  is  referred  to  as
‘emergent narratives’, which, according to Henry Jenkins, encompasses narratives
that are constructed through gameplay; he mentions The Sims (Maxis, 2000) as
an  example  of  a  game  associated  with  emergent  narratives  (2004,  p.128-9).5
Similarly,  Pearce  explains  that  even  in  a  game  like  basketball,  a  narrative
‘emerges as a product of the play itself’ (2004a, p.145; original emphasis).  I will
not be considering such narratives since they do not qualify as narratives proper;
the term ‘emergent narrative’ exemplifies an incorrect and misleading use of the
word  ‘narrative’.  Without  delving  into  debates  on  definitions  of  narrativity,  it  is
evident that a chain of events is not a narrative only because it can be made into
one; if that were the case, any chain of events would be a narrative, rendering the
notion too broad.6 A person playing  The Sims is more like a child using dolls to
‘play house’ than an author writing a novel.7
Moreover, the thesis will not treat multiplayer games (games including more
than one human player, often played online), because firstly, they seldom have the
narrative emphasis often found in single-player games; secondly, their constant
updates create practical issues as a given version of the game may not exist for
long,  and the game may not  be playable when it  decreases in  popularity and
servers are emptied of players and/or ‘shut down’ by their owners; thirdly, if players
are authors of interactive stories, there is no reason why my results would be any
less applicable in principle.8 Narrative complexity could increase in line with the
5 For more on emergent narratives, see also Juul (2005, pp.157-9).
6 The same categorical error has been noted by Espen Aarseth (1997, p.94).
7 Will Wright himself, creator of The Sims, compares the game to a dollhouse 
(Pearce 2004a, p.150).
8 My reasons for focusing on single-player games are similar to those of Holmes 
(2012, p.188), Andrew Kania (2018, p.196), and Marissa Willis (2019, pp.43-4).
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increase in the number of authors (i.e.  players),  but no fundamental  difference
should emerge. If  it does, that is a topic for future research when a theoretical
foundation  has  been  created,  but  this  foundation  is  preferably  based  on  less
complex examples, i.e. single-player games. Also, the thesis does not treat board
games of any kind, including pen-and-paper role-playing games.
Another area outside the scope of the thesis is the old debate surrounding
authorship. This debate has a long history within other disciplines, such as the
‘Death  of  the  Author’ treated by Roland Barthes (1977a)  and Michel  Foucault
([1979]2002) – and the later debates about  auteur theory in film studies – but
these are not pertinent to my arguments.9 Both Barthes and Foucault  seem to
have ideological motivations for rejecting the focus on authorship (e.g. that it is too
oppressive), but such arguments are of a different order, outside the scope of this
work.  
Another aspect of interactivity not treated in the thesis is how video games
in some sense interact with their players. Questions of whether and/or how players
are affected by what they play in terms of changes in personality and values – and
how players interact with one another either in the game or in real life as they meet
up  to  play  –  pertain  to  disciplines  such  as  sociology,  psychology,  and
phenomenology, and can therefore not be answered with the analytic approach of
the thesis.
Thesis structure
The thesis is divided into two parts, the first treating temporality and the second
9 Carroll similarly does not devote much attention to Barthes for the reason that 
Barthes’s theory, as Carroll says, is not very ‘developed’ (1992, p.111), and 
Lamarque (2002a, p.84) notes that the Death of the Author is not of high 
interest to the debate on intentionalism. See e.g. Lamarque (2002a), Nehemas 
(2002), and Stecker (2003) for further criticism of Barthes’s and Foucault’s 
attacks on author-based criticism.
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authorship. The overarching question of the first part is whether a game’s story
can be said to take place in the present, as this is often cited as a reason why
game stories are interactive and literary/cinematic ones are not, the latter being
thought of as accounts of  past events. In chapter 1 I introduce discussions from
game studies regarding temporality. I then discuss the claim that the story takes
place  in  the  present,  i.e.  that  fictional  events  occur  at  the  time  they  are
represented, whereafter I present some issues following from this, pertaining to
the duration of the narrative in relation to the story and the truth-value of future-
tensed propositions. In chapter 2 I continue treating issues following from the claim
that the story takes place in the present, such as how to explain flashbacks and
separate  screenings  of  the  same  fiction;  I  conclude  by  questioning  the  very
principle of identifying any moment as the fictional present, i.e. of claiming that
there is a metaphysically privileged point in time within the fictional world.
The  overarching  theme  of  the  second  part  of  the  thesis  concerns  the
consequences following from viewing players as authors and possible objections
to doing so. In chapter 3 I examine the claim that the player is the author of the
game narrative and relate this to discussions in philosophy of fiction on actual
intentionalism, i.e. the mode of interpretation positing that the author of a narrative
decides what is true in its story.  The chapter  treats the two largest schools of
actual  intentionalism,  extreme  intentionalism  and  modest  intentionalism,  and
explores possible consequences of combining either of them with the assumption
that the player is the author. In chapter 4 I examine reasons for asserting that the
player is a kind of coauthor of the game narrative, creating it together with the
designer, and scrutinize theories on coauthorship and the so-called ‘conversation
analogy’ in order to see whether they can be applied on video games.
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Chapter 1 – Temporality
This chapter examines whether fictional truth in video games differs because of
putative differences regarding temporality, and critiques the claim that video game
stories take place in the present; through the application of philosophy of fiction I
show that there is no good reason to believe that a story takes place now only by
virtue of the medium in which it is conveyed (irrespective of the medium conveying
it),  or  even  that  there  is  a  fictional  present  at  all.  I  show that  the  arguments
supporting such views are equally applicable to stories in other media, meaning
that game stories are not fundamentally different. From this it follows that game
stories cannot be said to be interactive because of particular temporal properties,
as these do not differ from stories in literature and cinema.
In the first  section I  present  several  game theorists and show how their
views implicitly or explicitly indicate that game stories are interactive because they
take place in the present. In the second section I show that the time of reception of
an audiovisual narrative and the time of a story occurrence are dissociated from
each other in games as well as other media. In the third section I argue that if the
story is set in the present it follows that the duration of the story corresponds to
that of the narrative, so if this consequence can be refuted, the assumption must
be refuted as well.  In the fourth  and final  section I  examine the truth-value of
future-tensed propositions, and show that if games are set in the present, future
truths must be indeterminate in games but determinate in other media; both of
these claims are shown to be incorrect.
One important  concept  in  the chapter  is  what  Currie  calls  the  ‘Claim of
Presentness’ (henceforth the CoP), i.e. that the audience imagines that the events
of a film are occurring now, as in at the time they see it (1995a,  p.201). Currie
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explains that the CoP follows from the so-called Imagined Observer Hypothesis,
the theory that the audience allegedly pretends to be within the fictional world.
Currie’s  definition  thus  pertains  to  film  and  follows  from  a  specific  kind  of
engagement with the narrative. In this thesis I diverge from Currie’s more specific
definition  and  refer  to  the  CoP in  a  wider,  vaguer  sense:  that  a  given  story
purportedly takes place at the time of reception, regardless of medium. 
There is an important distinction prevalent in philosophy of time which will
be used throughout the chapter, that between what John McTaggart (1927) calls
the A-series and the B-series. The A-series comprises notions of past, present,
and future, and it is within this series that events change temporal location, in the
sense that what is future now will become present and eventually past; time ‘flows’
in the A-series. By contrast, the B-series describes events as being earlier than,
simultaneous with, and later than one another; the B-series pertains to unchanging
structures,  and time does not change as much as our  perspective  (McTaggart
1927,  pp.9-10).  The question is  then whether  games – or  any medium – can
convey A-series properties or just B-series properties, and whether the A-series
properties of a story can be aligned with those of reality.
A simple way of disproving the claim that game stories are in the present
would be to invoke earlier definitions of narrativity according to which the story is
temporally precedent to the narrative through which it is conveyed. Marie-Laure
Ryan  explains  that  the  standard  conception  of  narrativity  is  that  one  is  telling
someone about something that happened (2004a, p.13); Christian Metz states that
a  narrative  ‘suppresses’ the  now (1974,  p.22);  Keir  Elam thinks  that  classical
narratives  are  ‘oriented towards […]  an imaginary “elsewhere”  set  in  the  past’
(2002,  p.98);  Abbott  asserts  that  narratives  are  representations  of  stories  that
seem  to  pre-exist  their  conveyance  (2008,  p.15);  Genette  argues  that
simultaneous narration is possible (1980, pp.216-17), but does not delve deeper
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into  what  it  signifies ontologically for  narration to  exist  simultaneously with  the
events  narrated.  Genette’s  examples  of  radio  and  television  reports  as
simultaneous narration on the contrary show that narration cannot be completely
simultaneous, as he claims that ‘the narrating follows so closely on the action that
it  can  be  considered  practically simultaneous,  whence  the  use  of  the  present
tense’ (1980, p.216n9; emphasis added). This rather suggests that narration must
refer  to  past  events,  that  there must  be a gap between narration and what  is
narrated; if the comments were simultaneous with the action they would require
supernatural prescience on the part of the commentators. However, unmotivated
adherence to old narratological definitions would be question-begging and would
rule out from the very beginning any possible revision of narratological taxonomy
where interactive stories could be conceivable.
If the story’s being set in the present is both necessary and sufficient for
making it interactive, it follows that either all stories (regardless of medium) are
interactive,  insofar  as  they  take  place  now,  or,  conversely,  no stories  are
interactive.  One could  claim that  presentness is  a  necessary yet  not  sufficient
reason  for  interactivity,  and  that  films  lack  what  games  have  (apart  from
presentness) that renders stories interactive; however, as will become clear in the
first section, game theorists seem to argue that presentness is both necessary and
sufficient. Should one maintain that presentness is necessary but insufficient at
least four questions have to be answered: why is presentness necessary but not
sufficient for stories to be interactive; what other property (or properties) do games
have that make their stories interactive; why is this property necessary but not
sufficient;  what  is it  that  makes this property (or  properties) exclusive to  video
game narratives?
We thus have three claims to scrutinize: 
1. Game stories take place in the present.
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2. Temporal properties of game stories are different from those of stories in
other media.
3. The conjunction of 1) and 2) in game stories allows the player to interact
with them. 
These three claims make up the argument that game stories can be influenced by
the ‘reader’ of the story, i.e. the player; if 1), 2), or 3) can be shown to be false, it
follows that game stories are not interactive.
1.1 The Claim of Presentness in game studies
One common conception of video games is that they are narratives with stories
that are interactive in a different way from conventional ones, in the sense that
player  interaction  influences  the  story  of  the  game (e.g.  Davidson  2008;  Wei,
Bizzocchi, and Calvert 2010; Ip 2011; Warkentin 2011; Holmes 2012; Laurel 2014;
Ulas 2014; Wendler 2014; Haggis 2016; Zarzycki 2016; Whaley 2018). However,
few game theorists elaborate on what implications this conception of stories has
for story temporality,  but some suggest or explicitly argue that game stories, in
contrast to stories in ‘traditional’ media, take place now, at the same time they are
presented (e.g. Murray 1997; Juul 2001, 2005; Newman 2004; Dubbelman 2011;
Holmes 2012; Mukherjee 2015; Ryan 2015; Thabet 2015; Hanson 2018). Jenkins
is one of few people claiming that games are not ‘locked into an eternal present’
(2004,  p.127),  and  Diane  Carr  occupies  a  middle  ground,  saying  that  games
involve events that precede the player’s perception of them, as in conventional
narration,  but  also  that  they  generate  new  events  (2006,  pp.38-9).  It  is
nevertheless common to claim that game stories take place now. Though not all
theoreticians claim explicitly that game stories must take place in the present, it is
a likely and/or necessary consequence of their arguments (outlined below) that
players can ascertain the location of the fictional present, and that it coincides with
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that of the time of playing.
The view that game narratives must take place in the present can be found
in early ludologic discussions. Janet Murray claims that events in games do not
happen in the past to someone else, but now, to the player (1997, pp.79-81). In a
related vein, Brenda Laurel contends that some of the representation’s content is
attributable to either the person or the computer, and some content is an artefact
of  collaboration;  an  interface  is  a  shared context  for  action  in  which  both  are
agents,  not  merely  the  means  whereby  a  person  and  a  computer  represent
themselves  (2014,  p.5).  As  in  the  model  proposed  by  Murray,  the  active
participation of the user is emphasized when Laurel claims that people adopt the
roles of actors, and that the notion of observer disappears (2014,  p.27). Though
Laurel does not elaborate on temporal consequences, a shared interface arguably
presupposes a shared temporality as it  would be paradoxical  to claim that the
user’s interaction is in the present but that of the computer is in the past or future.
A similar view is presented by Ryan as she presents a taxonomy of interactivity.
She outlines the epistemological  and ontological  properties of  interactive texts,
and identifies two dichotomies defining what position a user is ascribed in relation
to  a  digital  representation:  internal/external  and  ontological/exploratory,  which,
when combined, make up four distinct pairs (2015 p.163-5). The most common of
these in computer games, she says, is the internal-ontological, in which the player
impersonates  or  creates  a  member  of  a  story-world,  ‘writing’  the  life  of  her
character and the history of the world. ‘The narrative is created dramatically, by
being enacted, rather than diegetically, by representing past events’ (Ryan 2015,
p.164).  In  an  internal-exploratory text,  the  user  cannot  change anything in  the
storyworld, in spite of occupying a perspective ‘that reflects the embodied point of
view of one of its members’ (Ryan 2015, p.164).
Similar to Ryan, Teun Dubbelman distinguishes between what he calls a
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‘presentational  logic’  and  ‘representational  logic’  (2011,  p.165).  Presentological
narratives  create  story  events  in  the  present  whereas  representological  ones
communicate events from the past (Dubbelman 2011,  p.169). He argues that a
story can be set in the present irrespective of interactivity or lack thereof, and is
thus one of  few game theorists  who downplays purported differences between
games and other narratives in terms of temporality, whilst still concurring with other
game theorists that games can and do take place in the present. Holmes presents
a model similar to that of Laurel, that video games convey that ‘the player and his
avatar are one and the same’ (2012, p.51), which indicates that Holmes believes
that they share the same temporal frame. He confirms this consequence when he
says that players are in the game (2012, p.58), and that the story is ‘happening’,
even in the case of flashbacks (2012, p.72).
Juul  has treated temporality more extensively than many other scholars,
and  he  argues  that  ‘the  game  constructs  the  story  time  as  synchronous  with
narrative time and reading/viewing time: the story time is now’ (Juul 2001).  Juul
asserts that time is almost always chronological in games, since flash-forwards
and  flashbacks  eliminate  any  possible  impact  of  the  player’s  agency,  either
because of the predetermined character of the story or because of the possible
paradoxes following as a result;  should the player  fail  in  a flashback,  it  would
render  the  present  impossible  (2005,  pp.147-8).  Another  reason  why  Juul
maintains that flashbacks are a potential ‘hazard’ in game narratives is the sheer
impossibility of reconciling player interaction with the temporal properties of the
events  portrayed:  ‘it  is  impossible  to  influence  something  that  has  already
happened’ (Juul 2001). Juul argues that the possibility of interaction necessitates
that the fictional time of the game and the play time of the player coincide at least
once, and he uses the terms ‘mapping’ (2004, p.134) or ‘projection’ (2005, p.143)
to refer to the phenomenon when ‘the player’s time and actions are projected into
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a game world’ (2004, p.134). It is because of this moment of ‘mapping/projection’,
says Juul, that games have the sense of happening in the present. Juul seems to
argue that  since literary and cinematic  narratives  are  not  interactive,  it  makes
sense to conclude that they are in the past: past events cannot be interacted with,
and since events in literary and cinematic narratives cannot be interacted with,
they  must  be  set  in  the  past.  Games,  by  contrast,  allow  for  interaction,  and
therefore they must be in the present.
James  Newman  agrees  with  and  draws  on  Juul  when  explaining  that
narratives in other media recount past events (2004, p.103). Nevertheless, claims
by Juul have been questioned indirectly by other scholars. Hans-Joachim Backe
also speaks of ‘mapping’, but says that this relation between real world time and
game world  time  changes  incessantly  and  can  be  manipulated  by  the  player
(2016,  pp.11-12).  José  Zagal  and  Michael  Mateas  agree that  future  events  in
games are influenced by the player’s actions (2010, p.845), which suggests that it
takes place in the present, but they also mention that games can have playable
flashbacks (2010,  p.851), and these claims seem irreconcilable for the reasons
mentioned by Juul. Huaxin Wei, Jim  Bizzocchi, and Tom Calvert object that it is
more  common  for  recent  games  to  contain  flashbacks,  and  mention  some
examples (2010, p.5).
Like Juul, Tamer Thabet emphasizes the immediacy of games in contrast to
literary narratives, saying that the player narrates the story as it occurs, not as a
past  experience.  He goes so far  as to  ‘fuse’ the selves of  the player  and the
protagonist,  claiming that  a  game narrative is  a  live experience (Thabet  2015,
p.32-4). Thabet does not think that flashbacks undermine his presentist claim, but
says  that  the  temporal  properties  of  the  fiction  are  maintained  as  the  player
narrates the present of that past episode, being transported from one present to
another (2015, p.35).
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Michael Nitsche, like Thabet, claims that players are ‘transported to a new
temporal location’ (2007, p.147). Similar to Juul, he speaks of mapping, but argues
that the relation between story time and narrative time need only be constant, not
direct, meaning that the narrative time can be slower/faster than story time as long
as  it  is  always slower/faster  (Nitsche  2007,  p.147).  However,  this  seems  to
contradict his claim (similar to Backe’s) that the ‘mapping’ can be manipulated by
the  player  in  some  games  (Nitsche  2007,  p.148).  Nitsche  also  contends  that
games differ  from cinema and literature  in  how films and books concern  past
events, whereas events portrayed in games  are generated at the time of narration
(2009, p.55).
Christopher Hanson devotes an entire book to time in video games, and he
asserts that video game temporality is unique (2018, p.153). Hanson argues that
the player’s ability to manipulate the temporality allows her to alter the text itself
(2018, p.198), and he speaks of ‘copresence’ (2018, p.22, p.45, p.50), which refers
to the player’s purported experience of being present within the structure and rules
of the game, and argues that players ‘operate in the shared space and time of
copresence […] with  the game itself’ (2018,  p.36).  Like Laurel  and Tavinor,  he
notes  the  similarity  between  players  and  actors,  arguing  that  the  player
participates in the events as a ‘causal agent’, which requires genuine involvement
as opposed to the illusion sometimes offered by other media (Hanson 2018, p.29).
He further argues that players can control a game’s temporality by pausing the
game (Hanson 2018, pp.59-61, p.82). Similar to Thabet, Hanson contends that the
possibility of saving games gives players the opportunity to return to earlier points
in a fictional time-line (2018, pp.86-91). He claims that there are similar kinds of
temporal control in both film and literature, but argues that games are nonetheless
unique because of their interactive nature (Hanson, 2018, p.198).10
10 Note the circularity of this line of reasoning: games are interactive because they
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Souvik  Mukherjee  is  one  of  few  philosophers  discussing  video  game
temporality. He draws on continental philosophers, such as Deleuze and Derrida,
and stresses the ephemeral quality of the narrative that is the gameplay, and says
that ‘although the actual instance of the game might not be available again, the
narrative  is  nevertheless  recorded  in  diverse  ways’  (2015,  p.104),  mentioning
video recordings as one means of doing so. He seems to suggest that the story
disappears along with the narrative, possibly because otherwise one could access
the story again by recreating the narrative, i.e. through playing the game again.
Mukherjee  downplays  the  differences  between  games  and  other  media,  yet
concurs that  a game like  Prince of Persia:  The Sands of Time  (Ubisoft,  2003;
henceforth  Sands of Time), although set in the past, gives the player the sense
that the events transpire now, and he goes on to argue that the difference between
then and now is ‘confused’ by the game (2015, p.131). 
Ultimately,  even  if  time  remains  comparatively  unexplored  by  game
scholars, we can safely conclude that there it has been a prevailing idea that game
stories take place in the present. The conception, however, that games are set in
the present has not been elaborated upon in much detail.
1.2 Simultaneity of representation and its events
In this section I examine the argument that games could be thought of as taking
place in the present because the events onscreen seem to occur at the same time
as the audience/players perceive them. One reason why games could take place
now is that players imagine they do. Currie discusses this question only in relation
to cinema, but his conclusions can be applied to both games and films. He refers
to, among others, Béla Balázs, Erwin Panofsky, and Metz, according to whom the
film spectator believes that she is watching real events, occupying the position of
are unique, and they are unique because they are interactive.
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the camera, which Currie calls Illusionism (Currie 1995a, p.23, p.26). According to
Illusionism, if  the spectator imagines watching the events, it  follows that she is
watching them now (Currie 1995a,  p.201). Another theory presented by Currie is
the  one  mentioned  in  the  introduction  of  this  chapter,  the  so-called  Imagined
Observer Hypothesis, according to which the viewer imagines herself to be inside
the  fiction,  occupying  the  place  of  the  camera.  Both  views  resemble  those
presented by game theorists in section 1.1, and similar conceptions of players as
taking  part  in  the  fiction  or  performing  it  can  be  found  among  other  game
theorists.11 It has also been adopted by some philosophers.12 If we accept for the
sake of argument that players imagine that they take part in the fiction, it follows
that they imagine that it takes place now. If the audience/player is supposed to
imagine that events take place now, one must consider what compels them to do
this.
One  possible  explanation  is  that  they  are  to  imagine  this  because  the
images of the film/game are themselves in the present. Gideon Yaffe attempts to
defend a thesis similar to Illusionism, and thinks that what needs to be clarified is
whether films represent time automorphically or homomorphically, and if they do
so  strongly  or  weakly.  The  definitions  of  homomorphic  and  automorphic
representation he takes from Currie, and Yaffe summarizes them as follows:
Representation R of event E automorphically represents E as having 
property P if and only if  R’s having property P represents E as having
property P.
Representation R of event E  homomorphically represents E as having
11 See e.g. Wolf (2001d), Rehak (2003), Atkins (2003), Schott (2006), Davidson 
(2008), Servitje (2014), L. Joyce (2015, 2016), and Whaley (2018).
12 See e.g. Cremin (2012), Meskin and Robson (2016, 2017), and Tavinor (2017). 
For objections, see Patridge (2017).
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property P  if and only if  R’s having a property of the same kind as P
represents E as having property P (Yaffe 2003, p.117; original emphasis)
Yaffe explains that mere correspondence between properties is not enough: the
words ‘black ink’ are neither homomorphic nor automorphic, as the colour of the
ink with which the words are written is not relevant to the content of the sentence
(2003,  p.118).  However,  Currie  contends  that  text  can  be  both  auto-  and
homomorphic; whether it is differs from one occasion to another (1995a, pp.97-8).
He explains that the sentence ‘Fred is red’ is  automorphic  if and only if the red
colour of the words conveys the red colour of Fred, and it is homomorphic if and
only if the red colour of the words conveys that Fred has some colour, but not
necessarily the same colour as the words themselves (Currie 1995a, p.98). Currie
also adds that what constitutes an automorphic representation can vary depending
on the specificity at which one is operating. In his example with Fred, Currie says
that the exact shade of the colour red of the sentence and of Fred respectively
need not correspond to one another, it can suffice that both are some shade of
red. 
Yaffe then moves on to discuss what it would mean for a film to represent
time auto- and homomorphically, and he abbreviates variables as follows:
‘F  is  a  collection  of  representations  of  events,  such  as  a  film;  F  consists  of
representations  R1,  R2,  R3 […]  such  as  a  collection  of  images,  that  represent
events E1, E2, E3 […] respectively; T is a type of property, such as duration […];
and T(x) is the token property, of type T, possessed by x’ (Yaffe 2003, p.118).
He then presents the following definitions:
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F  strongly auto-/homomorphically  represents  T  if  and  only  if Ɐk(Rk
auto-/homomorphically represents Ek as having property T(Ek))  (Yaffe 2003;
p.118, original emphasis)
F  weakly auto-/homomorphically  represents  T  if  and  only  if ⱻk(Rk
auto-/homomorphically represents Ek as having property T(Ek)) (Yaffe 2003;
p.119, original emphasis)
Although Yaffe does not mention games, it is evident that the same definitions can
be applied to them in order to establish whether there is any correlation between
the  real  and  the  fictional  present.  His  example  of  a  property  represented  is
duration, but for current purposes we can let T be presentness; I treat duration in
section  1.4.  Hence,  what  we  have  to  find  out  is  whether  games  strongly
automorphically represent  presentness,  i.e.  if  stories  in  games are  necessarily
represented as  present  by virtue  of  being  conveyed by images located in  the
present.
Yaffe explains that sentences, written or oral, possess A-series properties,
and there is a correspondence between the presentness of the utterance and its
temporality: an utterance in the present tense claims that the events take place
now, and the utterance is itself taking place now. However, Yaffe objects to any
correlation imputed to the utterance and the temporal properties it conveys, as it
will continue to represent the event as present, even when it becomes past itself
(2003, pp.122-3). Yaffe then goes on to argue that the experience of witnessing a
real  event  corresponds  to  that  of  watching  images  in  films,  and  therefore  the
presentness  of  the  film  conveys  presentess  of  the  story (2003,  pp.124-5).  He
claims  that  our  visual  experiences  are  usually  simultaneous  with  the  events
experienced, thus representing the B-series property of simultaneity, and it is this
simultaneity that informs us that what we experience has the A-series property of
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being  in  the  present.  However,  there  are  at  least  three  flaws  with  Yaffe’s
reasoning.
The first is that it would entail that people who dream of past events – and
possibly people with  flashbacks in real  life  – would experience the very same
events  they  remember,  insofar  as  their  dreams/flashbacks  retain  perfect
phenomenal  fidelity  to  the  first  time  they  experienced  it;  they  experience  the
memory as present, so therefore the events within it are present. Yaffe’s argument
would thus make dreams – and,  potentially,  real  flashbacks – cases of  actual
temporal regression.
The second flaw is that Yaffe speaks interchangeably of different temporal
properties. Currie distinguishes between three temporal properties: those of the
work, of the observer’s experience, and of what the work represents (1995a, p.92).
Yaffe  conflates  either  the  last  two or  all  three,  and undermines the  distinction
between  a  past  event  and  the  (present)  representation  of  one,  once  more
presuming that experience and temporality stand in a direct relation. 
The third flaw is that, depending on which conception of time one adopts,
Yaffe’s claim either precludes anachronies, or is irreconcilable with assessments of
which  moment  is  the  fictional  present.  If  we  adopt  some  kind  of  ‘four-
dimensionalism’, and deny that there is a metaphysically privileged point in time, it
follows that ‘now’ refers to ‘the moment at which it is thought or uttered. So people
at any location in space-time who believe that they exist in the present, will believe
correctly’ (Braddon-Mitchell 2004, p.199). This model is not available to Yaffe, as it
is incommensurate with A-series properties. If we adopt a presentist view of time –
that  the only time that exists is the present – it follows that ‘all that exists is the
present, so the fact that we know we exist guarantees that we are in the present’
(Braddon-Mitchell 2004, p.199). If the fictional present is the only time that exists,
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the fictional present must be the moment we currently experience, as that is the
moment to which we (and the characters) have epistemic access, but this would
make  anachronies  inconceivable  (since  no  past  or  future  exists).  However,
Braddon-Mitchell  notes,  if  we  combine these  two  views  and  posit  several
hyperplanes (like fourdimensionalism) but maintain that only one of the regions of
space-time is present (like presentism) it will be possible for people in the past to
falsely believe that they are in the present (2004, p.200).
Given  these  flaws,  it  becomes  clearer  why  Yaffe’s  assumption  is
unwarranted. As he has said himself, an utterance will always purport to be in the
present, even when it recedes into the past. He then acknowledges the similarities
between the utterance of a sentence and the experience of the moving image, in
the sense that the simultaneity of the visual experience itself and the object seen
(i.e. the image) will both recede into the past; however, he fails to realize that a
character occupying a moment receding into the past may still (incorrectly) claim
to be in the present. Hence, Yaffe seems to confuse A-series properties with B-
series properties, or, alternatively, he is assuming that the former supervene on
the latter; both are untenable in a defence of equating screen present with real
present. He illustrates his point by saying that when, in real life, you see a bear
running towards you, it is the simultaneity of the visual experience of the bear and
the bear’s running that conveys that the latter is happening in the present, even if
said simultaneity is a relation that will always hold (Yaffe 2003 p.125). He thinks
that it will always be true at other points in time that a bear was running towards
you at the time that you saw it running, but that it was the ‘now-ness’ of the event
that motivated you to run away at the time of occurrence, and not at another point
in time. Yet, as is clear in this line of  reasoning, it presupposes that there is a
property such as ‘now-ness’ (as in a metaphysically privileged point in time)  and
33
that this property can be derived from/supervenes on simultaneity; Yaffe fails to
defend either of these and instead assumes both. Since there seems to be no
reason  to  assume  that  simultaneity  conveys  temporal  relations  between  real
events and the perception thereof, we cannot apply it to the perception of fictional
events.
Hence, when reading a book or watching a film we cannot assume that the
story-present coincides with the time of reading/screening only with reference to
the simultaneity of narrative presentation and our experience of it. Likewise, in a
game  narrative  one  cannot  claim  that  the  point  one  interacts  with  is  the
metaphysically privileged point in fictional time by virtue of the simultaneity of the
playing and the experience of the story, because that simultaneity will always hold,
even when the moment has receded into the past. At the beginning of The Legend
of Zelda: Ocarina of Time (Nintendo, 1998; henceforth Ocarina of Time) Link fights
the spider Gohma, and the urgency of this situation is an eternal property of that
one moment that will not disappear even as the player progresses and it recedes
into the past, and we cannot deduce that this urgency is present only because we
experience it in our own present. If we were to think that the game takes place in
the past the urgency would nevertheless obtain because of the simultaneity of
Link’s experience of the event and the occurrence of it, just as one will always be
compelled to run away from a charging bear at the moment one sees it,  even
when said moment as such is no longer present.
Furthermore,  Yaffe  maintains that  events must  take place at  the time of
observance and that this is usually the case in our everyday lives. He draws on
George Berkeley, according to whom vision does not represent distance as such;
rather, it is the visual experience of features – such as faintness and size – that
leads to our belief  that it  is far  away (Berkeley 1901, sections 44-5). By citing
Berkeley’s explanation of how we are conditioned to equate size with distance,
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Yaffe appears to concede that we are equally conditioned to assume that present
visual  experiences  correspond  to  present  events,  as  becomes  clear  in  the
following example:
For instance, imagine that I look through a very powerful telescope after being
told that the events that I will see unfolding happened many years earlier, many
light-years away. If am [sic] able to shake off my habit of taking what I see to be
happening  now,  then  my  visual  experience  will  not  represent  the  event  it
represents as present, but as past. Similarly, various facts about the placement
of  an  image  within  a  film  can  cause  that  image  to  represent  the  event  it
represents as past, even though it would have represented it as present in the
absence of those contextual accompaniments. (Yaffe 2003, p.126)
Yaffe then mentions that a documentary could represent events as past, once the
spectator knows that it is a documentary. 
There are at least two ways in which Yaffe inadvertently undermines the
validity of  the CoP through the concession above.  Firstly,  if simultaneity is not
indicative of presentness even between real events it follows that the very reason
to  assume any such correlation  between real  and  fictitious events  is  arbitrary.
Yaffe’s own example is illustrative of this, as not even real experiences correspond
to present events when the distance travelled by photons is large enough so as to
‘distort’ the impression, so that it no longer conveys temporal properties of that
which  is  seen;  we  get  the  impression  that  the  stars  exist  because  our  visual
experience is simultaneous with their  light  reaching Earth,  but this simultaneity
obscures the fact that the stars may no longer exist.
Berkeley’s  example  of  distance  further  reinforces  this  conclusion,  as
distance is  yet  another  property that  spectators  erroneously ascribe  to  objects
represented in  a  film.  The image is  two-dimensional,  and one could  draw the
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conclusion that it is only because of the conditioning pertaining to size explained
by  Berkeley  that  the  viewer  interprets  objects  as  standing  in  different  spatial
relations to each other. There are numerous examples of how film-makers use this
kind of conditioning in order to convey false information about the size of objects,
such as how Frodo (Elijah Wood) in The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the
Ring (Jackson, 2001) appears to be smaller than many other characters, because
Elijah Wood was placed further away from the camera. In the same way, temporal
properties between objects and events can be distorted in films: clever use of
shot-reverse-shot can hide the fact that two actors appearing to converse with one
another were actually filmed at separate occasions. Shots of two different actors
can also be combined so that they both appear within the same image and appear
to be in the same place at the same time. Players may be led to believe that the
events  with  which  they  interact  must  take  place  in  the  present  because  the
representation reacts to their interaction in the present, but the events onscreen in
a game need not share the ‘now’ of the player anymore than events depicted by a
film, even though a filmic representation also shares the ‘now’ of the viewer.
This  can  be  related  to  Murray’s  point  about  digital  environments
representing navigable space as opposed to portraying it (1997, p.79), and Ryan’s
taxonomy of video games, where the internal-ontological category allows players
to change the fictional world whereas the internal-exploratory only allows them to
inspect it without altering anything (2015, pp.164-5). Both argue that games take
place  now because  players  can  explore  their  environments  (although  Ryan  is
aware  that  exploration  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  player  can  alter
anything). As has become clear, there is a difficulty in ascertaining the temporal
properties  of  that  with  which  one  interacts:  one  cannot  assume  that  the
environment (or anything in it) shares the same ‘now’ as the person exploring it.
Thus, it is irrelevant that the space is navigable and explorable, since it could still
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be on another temporal plane than the player. 
The second way in which Yaffe unwittingly undermines the CoP is how he
assumes that we are conditioned to equate simultaneity with presentness, but can
‘unlearn’ to do it. This claim is debatable, as one arguably cannot learn to perceive
present experiences as past events; stars watched through a telescope always
appear to be present, even after we realize that they have disappeared. As Alon
Chasid has argued, an experience does not change in nature if one learns that it is
nonveridical (2014,  p.405). An example of this would be how a trompe-l’œil still
gives the same visual experience even after it has been revealed to be an illusion;
Frodo  does  not  seem  larger  once  the  spectator  learns  how  the  effect  was
achieved.  If  Yaffe  is  right  and one could  ‘unlearn’ to  connect  simultaneity  and
presentness,  it  would  render  the  CoP  even  more  arbitrary,  as  there  is  no
necessary correlation between our experience and the temporal properties of the
images and no way to distinguish when this correlation obtains. One could claim
that images in films/games represent A-series properties weakly automorphically –
i.e. some fictional events are portrayed as being in the present by virtue of being
conveyed by images in the present – but this would be question-begging (it was
that which Yaffe set out to prove);  the representation will  necessarily be in the
present, yet Yaffe fails to show why this must indicate that some fictitious events
must be as well, or why an A-series property of the representation can be linked to
an A-series  property of  the  fiction.  If  that  were  the  case one could  claim that
literary narratives convey  colour weakly automorphically insofar as the colour of
some fictional objects corresponds to that of the text, but we would hardly say, for
instance, that the colour of the eponymous feline in Poe’s  ‘The Black Cat’ (Poe,
[1843]2015) is conveyed by the colour of the text. Likewise, we could posit that the
presentness  of  Link’s  battle  against  Gohma  happens  to  correspond  to  the
presentness of the gameplay conveying it, but that the correlation is incidental.
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Further, if the relation between the A-series properties of representation and story
respectively is as arbitrary as Yaffe makes it  out to be, one could just as well
defend a homomorphic representation of A-series properties, claiming that all films
and games are set in the past, and that the property of pastness is conveyed by
virtue of the images’ presentness.
Moreover, there are cases where the presentness of the image could be
subverted by the salient pastness of the content represented. Le Poidevin (2016,
p.324),  Dubbelman  (2011,  p.163),  and  Sarah  Cardwell  (2003,  p.86) mention
characters’ clothes as a means of conveying that events take place in the past,
and Mukherjee implies something similar when saying that Sands of Time is set in
the ancient past (2015, p.131) (a conclusion he does not motivate, but which we
may nevertheless presume is based on the diegetic content such as clothes). If
contextual markers are imperative for making a person perceive events as past,
then presentness cannot be assumed to be the default setting only with reference
to the presentness of images, because this quality will  be retained even in the
presence  of  contextual  markers  (such  as  clothes).  If  contextual  markers
automatically ‘override’ the impression of presentness, temporal properties of the
images  become redundant,  as  they will  not  alter  the  impression  given  by the
content. If events are always presumed to be in the present the spectator/player
would  assume  that  films  like  The  Godfather (Coppola,  1972)  and  its  game
adaptation are actually set in the present (until they are told explicitly that they are
not),  that  the  stories  are  about  present-day people  who,  for  some inscrutable
reason,  dress  and  act  as  if  they were  living  in  the  1940s.  With  this  in  mind,
temporal properties of images in films and games seem entirely superfluous, as it
is ultimately the content of the fiction which determines when the story takes place.
Another indicator of pastness overlooked by the scholars mentioned here is the
presentation itself: the quality of the image and/or sound may indicate the age of
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the film. Similarly, old games often have a lower resolution and/or framerate, and
simpler animations.
In brief, if the presentness of the images can convey any temporal property
– be it pastness or futurity – one cannot assume that they must necessarily convey
presentness.  Also,  if  our  belief  about  the  presentness  of  events  is  merely
conditioned, it follows that the CoP becomes trivial and arbitrary: screened events
take place in the present – in virtue of being screened in the present – except
when they do not.  Further,  if  experienced presentness is  not  indicative  of  the
temporal  relation between two events when both are either real  or fictive, one
cannot  extrapolate  that  the  experienced  presentness  reveals  anything  about
temporal  properties between a real  and a fictive event,  such as in the relation
between a spectator/player and a film/video game. Lastly, the content of a fiction
can inform the  recipient  about  when the  story takes place,  which  renders  the
temporal  properties of  the  medium superfluous in  the  assessment  of  temporal
properties of what is represented.
1.3 Duration
Another important issue is the duration of story events, i.e. the relation between
the  presentness  of  the  fictional  events  and  the  actual  present,  and  their
progression in relation to one another. Yaffe argues that in films, the duration of a
represented event generally corresponds to that of  the cinematic image (2003,
p.119), and that ‘the movement of the presentness of the image must represent
the movement of the presentness of the represented event’ (2003, p.132). Even
when duration is not represented automorphically (as in slow- and fast motion)
Yaffe says it is still represented homomorphically: ‘The events are represented as
occupying a certain amount of time by representing the “moving” presentness of
the image as “moving” at a particular rate of speed that maps onto the rate of
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progression of the “movement” of the presentness of the represented event’ (2003,
p.131). Drawing  upon  Currie  he  asserts  that  the  duration  of  a  film  sequence
reveals something about the duration about the scene, if only weakly, i.e. that the
event has some duration in virtue of the scene having it (Yaffe 2003, pp.119-20). In
a related vein, Le Poidevin asserts that by equating fictional and real presentness
with  one another,  all narrative  episodes oblige  the  viewer  to  imagine  that  the
fictional time is shifting successively as other events become fictionally present
(2016,  p.325).  This,  he  explains,  is  not  exclusive  to  anachronies,  it  obtains
whenever time progresses, since progression entails that fictional time changes.
Similar thoughts can be found elsewhere: Bordwell mentions that some scholars –
for instance Metz – think that every shot of a film illustrates a continuous duration
adhering to the temporal integrity of the events; temporal relations, they claim, are
then conveyed through the relations between shots (2004, pp.205-6). Currie does
not equate story time with fictional time in a strict sense, but does claim – similar to
Metz – that the duration of individual shots in film conveys something about the
duration of the action (1995a, p.102). The audience utilizes temporal properties of
the  representation (i.e.  the  film)  to  comprehend the temporal  properties of  the
events represented (Currie 1995a, p.99).
However,  there are problems with  this conception of narrative time. It  is
clear that it does not apply to all media, as is illustrated when Genette elaborates
on the possibility of a literary narrative whose duration corresponds to that of the
story and asserts that it does not, and could only do so in a laboratory experiment
where the reading speed must never vary (1980, pp.86-8). One could claim that
this objection is invalid, as literary narratives do not possess temporal properties in
virtue of their  manifestation in a particular  medium, as opposed to audiovisual
narratives. Then it would possibly be true that game stories are in the present,
because the duration of fictional time and play time could be synchronous. As will
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become evident, however, there are other reasons why the Duration Assumption is
equally problematic in game narratives.
1.3.1 Duration of story events
The  Duration  Assumption  (though  not  referred  to  with  this  name)  has  been
defended by, among others, Mukherjee, who notes that the duration of gaming-
sessions often depends on the interaction of the players (2015, p.64, p.129), and
Mark Wolf, who contends that the time experienced by the character and player
must be congruous and that it is the player who decides how much time is to be
spent in any given location (2001c,  p.86).  According to Zagal  and Mateas this
relation  is  not  constant:  in  games  segmented  into  rounds  the  fictional  time
distributed across the rounds may vary, so that one round may correspond to a
single year of fictional time whereas another corresponds to 200 (2010,  p.855).
Similarly, Wei, Bizzochi, and Calvert assert that the standard in games is for story
time and narrative time to be of the same duration, but they concede that there are
exceptions, such as slow-motion (2010, pp.6-7). Note that this clearly contradicts
Hanson’s theory that the player can control the passage of time, since the flow of
time cannot be stopped if the Duration Assumption is to obtain (i.e. if fictional and
real time are to be isometric), it can only be extended or decreased.
Denying  that  duration  must  be  determined  by  the  player  would  be  at
variance with the CoP, because if fiction and reality are to be A-series aligned in
the engagement with audiovisual narratives, the actual and fictional presents must
be  aligned  (or  ‘mapped’  to  borrow  Juul’s  terminology) throughout  the  entire
screening/playthrough; a single moment of alignment would not suffice. This point
cannot be emphasized enough: if the story takes place now, it cannot be for a
singular moment; the aforementioned theorists seem to imply that this obtains for
the game in its entirety, not for a limited time. This is a necessary consequence if
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the fictional and actual timelines are to be A-series aligned, i.e. that the story takes
place now, at the time of the screening/playing of the film/game: if video games
are interactive because their stories are in the present, it follows that they must be
in the present at every interactive moment, i.e. for the entire playthrough, meaning
that the duration of the story is equivalent to the duration of the playthrough. The
reason for this is simple: for every fictional event E there must be a corresponding
interactive  representation  IR,  in  this  case  the  image  with  which  the  player
interacts, so events E1, … En always directly correspond to game images IR1, …
IRn. For this reason it becomes obvious that if the duration of the story does not
correspond to  the  duration  of  the  narrative,  we  may conclude  through  modus
tollens that the game cannot be in the present: the CoP necessitates the Duration
Assumption,  and if  the Duration Assumption can be refuted,  the CoP must  be
rejected as a consequence. In brief: if the player both creates and participates in
the  story,  its  duration  cannot  be  fixed,  because  it  would  rupture  the  A-series
alignment.
The first counterargument against Yaffe’s and Juul’s claim that the fictional
present ‘projects onto’ the actual one is that it presupposes that they move in the
same direction. In film-sequences played backwards this does not obtain, because
then the fictional present moves away from the actual one, obviating mapping. The
duration of the film played backwards and that of the event portrayed could still be
coterminous, the point is only that they are not A-series aligned, as their respective
presents do not align. The same phenomenon appears in games allowing players
to  ‘rewind’ time, such  Sands of Time,  Braid (Number None,  2008),  and  Life is
Strange (Dontnod Entertainment,  2015).  This  shows that  actual  time does not
‘project onto’ fictional time with necessity, as Yaffe seems to think.
Moreover, the Duration Assumption becomes problematic when applied to
films and games that purportedly have a temporal discrepancy between play time
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and fictional time. Juul unwittingly presents theories that indirectly undermine the
Duration Assumption. As mentioned earlier, he dissociates between what he calls
fictional time – the time denoting events in the game world – and play time, i.e. the
time experienced by the  player,  maintaining  that  these can but  do not  always
coincide (Juul 2005, p.142-3). He mentions first-person-shooters as an example of
games taking place in real-time, with a 1:1 correspondence between fictional time
and play time, as opposed to games where time may move faster:  in  SimCity
(Maxis, 1989), Juul explains, two minutes of play time can correspond to two years
of fictional time, and in Fifa 2002 (EA Canada, 2002), a match takes 45 minutes in
the game, but only four minutes of play time (2005, p.143, p.151).13 As intuitive as
this conception may seem, it is nonetheless irreconcilable with the CoP. If there is
a discrepancy between play time and fictional time, it would follow that the present
of each time-line (i.e. our own and that in the game) coincide only momentarily
before drifting apart further and further as the game progresses. In a game with
the kind of temporality found in SimCity, it would mean that play time and fictional
time  start  out  at  the  same  moment,  but  since  the  fictional  time  elapses
considerably faster, it follows that the ‘now’ of the story is moved further ahead in
time, so that the player is interacting with events in the fictional future. 
Naturally one could claim that there is no reason to assume that the ‘now’ of
the respective times coincide  initially, it would also be possible to posit that the
game starts out in the past only for the ‘now’ of the fictional time to ‘catch up’ with
that  of  the  player,  but  this  alternative  only  exacerbates  the  problem,  as  the
discrepancy  becomes  twofold:  first,  the  player  supposedly  interacts  with  past
events, then, for an infinitesimally brief moment, the present of the fiction and that
of the player coincide, and then we attain the same state as above, where the
13 Wolf (2001c, p.88) and Zagal and Mateas (2010, p.845, p.855) also note this 
kind of temporal discrepancy. 
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‘now’ of the fiction is incessantly moved farther away into the future. In either case,
the ‘now’ of the story and that of the player would not be synchronous for long,
they would coincide momentarily and then move further and further apart as the
game progresses. As Juul’s conception of interactivity presupposes that fictional
time can be ‘mapped’ (2004, p.134) or ‘projected’ (2005, p.143) onto play time, it
would follow that game stories cannot be interactive.
An  additional  critique  is  presented  by  Bordwell:  he  objects  to  the
representation’s  purportedly  necessary  adherence  to  the  temporal  integrity  of
narrative  events  in  films,  claiming  that  the  duration  of  the  action  can  be
compressed, even when the action takes place within a single shot (2004, pp.205-
7). He further adds that neither is it necessarily possible to segment the action
exactly,  by  which  he  means  that  there  is  no  necessary  and  consistent
correspondence between the duration of the representation and that of the action;
as such, Bordwell stresses that in a continuous event which occupies a minute of
screen-time and an hour of fictional time it does not follow that each second of
screen-time corresponds to a minute of fictional time. This is in line with Craig
Bourne and Emily Caddick Bourne’s assertion that a fiction may leave the duration
of an event indefinite (2016, p.239). It is not hard to find examples of this; Bordwell
mentions  Rope  (Hitchcock,  1948),  which lasts  80  minutes  and  contains  no
ellipses, but covers several hours (2004, p.208). Other examples abound: in The
Twilight Saga: New Moon (Weitz, 2009) the camera is circling around Bella in a
single long take, and whenever the window through which she is staring enters the
frame, nondiegetic text and the view from the window indicate that another month
has passed. Similarly, in Notting Hill (Michell, 1999) the four seasons come and go
as Hugh Grant walks through the streets in one long take.
This does not contradict Currie’s and Yaffe’s thoughts about film-duration
revealing something about story-duration, even if their theories initially appear to
44
be  in  line  with  the  theories  to  which  Bordwell  objects,  since  neither  makes  a
substantial  claim.  Both  assert  that  the  duration  reveals  something,  but  Currie
admits that what is revealed could be trivial. As an example, he mentions how a
shot of the Empire State Building may reveal little more than the fact that it stood
unchanging during the point in time it is observed by the spectator (Currie 1995a,
p.102). Currie appears to want to reach the same conclusion as that opposed by
Bordwell, but admits that the correlation is not direct (as Metz would have it), and
in so doing the elucidating potential of his theories diminishes, and can be reduced
to the claim that the action represented possesses some kind of temporal property
in virtue of being conveyed in a medium with some but not necessarily the same
kind  of  temporal  property  (i.e.  time  is  represented  homomorphically);  hence,
details of the story’s temporal properties cannot be deduced from the temporal
properties of the narrative.
Nonetheless,  one  could  claim  that  this  has  no  impact  on  the  ludologic
representation  if  one argues that  it  is  in  virtue  of  the  interactivity  and not  the
audiovisuality that games possess their temporal properties. Audiovisuality could
still be necessary for explicating the temporal properties of game stories – albeit
not sufficient – but then one would have to answer the four follow-up questions
presented in the introduction of the first  chapter without constructing a circular
argument.
Yaffe concedes that all anachronies (including ellipses) as well as slow- and
fast motion rupture the alignment of A-series properties of fiction and reality (2003,
p.133), so one must nonetheless explain why this is not detrimental to the CoP
and the  Duration  Assumption,  if  presentness is  the  very concept  that  enables
interaction. Wolf, for instance, asserts that games can compress time and include
ellipses  (2001c,  p.86),  but  like  Juul  he  seems  unaware  of  the  paradoxical
consequences of this.
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One possible solution is to not interpret theories like those of Juul and Wolf
as literally as they appear to do themselves. Juul and Wolf seem to assume that
one fictional year is of equivalent duration to one year in real life, even when the
fiction is projected at  such a speed that  players perceive that  entire  year  in a
radically shorter time span. Juul and Wolf both illustrate this with the example that
something  taking  only  a  couple  of  seconds  of  play  time  in  SimCity (e.g.
constructing a power plant) takes longer in the fictional time, as indicated by the in-
game clock. Similarly, Juul mentions that the in-game clock in Grand Theft Auto III
(2001; henceforth  GTA III) indicates that it takes one minute of play time for one
hour  of  fictional  time  to  pass.14 However,  Juul  is  aware  of  the  problematic
consequences following from this, and mentions that in  Fifa 2002 it takes David
Beckham a second of actual time but twelve seconds of fictional time to run but a
few meters, meaning that he actually moves very slowly and the representation
has been ‘sped up’. A similar example not mentioned by Juul is in Vice City, where
it takes the protagonist Tommy Vercetti  a couple of seconds in actual time to cross
the street, but the in-game clock indicates that it takes several minutes of fictional
time. Nevertheless, time cannot be ‘sped up’ in games if the game story is to be
set in the present, events must occur in real time, and for that reason the story is
not amenable to the same temporal disjunctions as other audiovisual media.
One thus has to explain the apparent discrepancy between play time and
fictional time in games like the GTA-series if one maintains that game stories take
place in the present. One possible solution to this dilemma is presented by Bourne
and Caddick Bourne. They discuss fictions in which a character can ‘freeze’ time
for  everyone but  themselves,  so  that  they can move  about  as  usual  whereas
others are stuck, immobile (Bourne and Caddick Bourne, 2016, p.83). They assert
14 In this respect GTA III is identical to Grand Theft Auto: Vice City (Rockstar 
North, 2002; henceforth Vice City). Having done more research on the latter I 
will refer to it throughout the discussion.
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that time cannot freeze, as there would then be no time in which the character
could  act,  so  in  fictions where people seem to do so they actually freeze the
surrounding  world,  not  the  progression  of  time.  One  can  extrapolate  this
explanation and conclude that if time never freezes but the world does, then by the
same principle time does not speed up, the world does. We must then assume
that it does take a couple of seconds to build a power plant in the world of SimCity
and  not,  as  Juul  proposes,  a  significantly  longer  amount  of  fictional  time,
condensed into a shorter amount of play time; otherwise one must renounce the
idea of games as taking place in the present. It  does explain Tommy Vercetti ’s
potentially slow movement in  Vice City, but also introduces the issue of why the
game clock moves so fast. Not only is this an implausible idea introduced to save
the CoP, it also entails several problems.
The  first  question  that  arises  is  how  to  explain  why  fictional  time  is
measured in the same units  as in reality,  even though their  respective lengths
differ.  Advocates  of  CoP  could  claim  that  the  measuring  of  fictional  time  is
equivalent to how the same terms are always applied when measuring time on
other planets in our galaxy. Though we may employ the same term to refer to the
physical  process  of  a  planet’s  rotation  around  its  own axis  (‘day’),  it  acquires
different values depending on to which planet it refers (24 hours and two weeks
with regard to Earth and Mars respectively). Naturally this has no consequences
for temporal properties  per se;  time is not dilated on Mars.15 Similarly, in video
games,  we may use the same signifier  for  different  signifieds:  the length  of  a
fictional minute may vary between games, but time passes at the same rate, even
if the same temporal unit designates different amounts of time.
However,  this  solution  presumes  that  games  use  the  same  units
15 Barring the insignificant time-dilation introduced by the theory of general 
relativity.
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consistently, and this is not the case where different purportedly objective temporal
markers co-exist: Juul notes that there is a discrepancy in GTA III between the in-
game clock and a timer that appears occasionally, where twenty seconds of the
timer correspond to twenty minutes of the fictional clock (2005, p.152); the same
discrepancy exists in Vice City. The game thus indicates, on the one hand, that the
in-game time progresses from 12pm to 12.20pm, i.e.  that twenty minutes have
passed, and on the other,  the countdown timer counts twenty seconds. Juul is
unable to resolve this issue, and here he cannot not use the solution presented
above  –  that  the  same  temporal  units  designate  different  amounts  of  time  –
because the game does the opposite by using two different units for the same
amount of time. 
Even  if  one  disregards  the  problems  of  several  indicators  of  time,  and
assumes that in the fiction the same temporal units refer to other quantities of time
than we would in real life (i.e. that one hour really means one minute in Vice City),
this solution remains problematic, as it leads to counterintuitive conclusions about
the story-world. If days only last for a matter of minutes in Vice City it must have an
impact on the world as a whole: for instance, it becomes difficult but necessary to
explain how characters are able to carry out their quotidian chores during a day
lasting a quarter of an hour. More importantly, nothing else in the fiction prescribes
us to imagine that this temporal discrepancy obtains;  Vice City,  being a typical
gangster-story, does not allow for such radical departures from reality, so it seems
more reasonable to assume that the rapid progression of time is not a fictional
truth, but rather a property of the presentation.
A more fundamental problem is crystallized when the progression of time is
not consistent, as in games where the player seemingly has the ability to slow
down and/or speed up time, such as Max Payne (Remedy Entertainment, 2001),
Sands  of  Time, and  Perfect  Dark  (Rare,  2000).  In  these  games time  can  be
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slowed down to different extents, but they have in common that the movement of
characters  and  objects  alike  is  slowed  down.  According  to  the  Duration
Assumption, when the protagonists in these games move in slow-motion – such as
when Max Payne hurls himself out of the way of bullets slowly soaring past him –
the action is still depicted in real-time, meaning that bullets do not merely appear
to take several seconds to reach their targets whilst actually travelling faster than
indicated, their velocity has in fact been decreased temporarily (recall Bourne and
Caddick Bourne’s assertion that time itself cannot be manipulated, only the world
as such).
This introduces yet another problem: one cannot maintain that things really
do move at a faster pace in games where temporal progression varies, as that
would require  an explanation of  the kind  that  the protagonist  is  endowed with
some kind of supernatural power enabling him to control the velocity of all things
visible, which is not true in Max Payne or Perfect Dark. Bourne and Caddick and
Bourne’s interpretation of  the world  as frozen – as opposed to time itself  – is
motivated  by  limitations  of  actual time,  and  they  seem  to  disregard  possible
discrepancies  between  actual  and  fictional  worlds,  but  it  would  be  wrong  to
assume that fictional temporality must be identical in nature to the actual one. Le
Poidevin speculates on what properties of time are essential and which are merely
contingent (2016, p.329), and while he does not mention the possibility of slowing
down time, this distinction is nevertheless pertinent for present purposes: the only
reason time could not slow down in fiction is if it were an essential feature of time
that it cannot do so, and even then one could claim that a story where time can be
slowed down – in spite of  it  being an essential  feature that it  cannot – is still
conceivable,  so  long  as  one  accepts  that  there  can  be  fictions  with  true
contradictory  and/or  inconceivable  propositions,  so-called  ‘impossible  fiction’.
Regardless  of  whether  time  could  possibly  slow  down  there  is  no  reason  to
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endorse Bourne and Caddick Bourne’s assertion that it is the objects and not time
itself that are slowed down since it clearly lacks support from the stories of games
which do not account for their  temporal  manipulation in terms of,  for  instance,
supernatural  powers.  The  more  intuitive  conclusion  supported  by  many of  the
aforementioned games is that it is the player, not the character, who has the ability
to  slow  down  the  representation, not  the  actual  characters  and  objects,  and
therefore that there is a discrepancy between actual and fictional  time; i.e.  the
story is not in the present.
We may then conclude that the progression of the fictional ‘now’ does not
correspond to the actual  one, because temporal  indicators such as timers and
clocks cannot be explained with regard to what time they are supposed to indicate,
and because variation in the temporal properties of the representation (e.g. slow-
motion) is at variance with the idea that fictional and actual presents move at the
same speed.
1.3.2 Separating the CoP and the Duration Assumption
One could object that the player need not influence the duration of the story, that it
is possible to retain the CoP whilst abandoning the Duration Assumption. Even if
one believes that the player creates and participates in a story that takes place in
the present, one could argue that story duration is one of the factors not controlled
by the player; the game story lasts for a fixed amount of time, regardless of the
length of the narrative conveying it.  Something similar is said by Abbott,  as he
distinguishes between what he calls clock time and narrative time, and asserts that
the clock time in the story is not necessarily prolonged even when narrative time
is, for instance through the addition of more information (2008, pp.4-5). He does
not refer to video games, yet it is possible that problems related to duration would
disperse if the same principle obtains in them. If so, the story takes place now, but
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duration is not one of the properties controlled by the player, just as she may not
always control the looks of the avatar, or in which order to play the levels. Similar
thoughts have been expressed by Le Poidevin who, as noted earlier, claims that
we usually think of fiction as independent of our engagement with it and that not
everything imagined by the recipient of a narrative translates into fictional truth
(2016, p.323-5).16 Nevertheless, though Abbott’s and the others’ assertions could
obtain  in  non-interactive  representations  like  films,  it  seems  like  a  less  viable
option in games if they are to remain interactive, for at least two reasons.
First of all, it would necessitate a contradictory temporality where the ‘now’
progresses with the same speed in both timelines, yet it nevertheless retroactively
becomes the case that the real and the fictional ‘now’ did  not progress with the
same speed when the screening/playthrough is over; present-tensed propositions
would acquire a truth-value different to that of past-tensed propositions in spite of
conveying the same facts. For instance, it would be true, when playing Ocarina of
Time, that it takes Link n hours to save Zelda and, once Link has succeeded, it did
not take n hours. Another solution could be sought in mereology: one could deny
that the temporal sum supervenes on its parts, so that two sums may be different
in spite of being made up of the same constituents. This would mean that an equal
number of moments of the same duration are added to both the fictional and the
actual  timelines,  but  they  still  end  up  being  of  different  sizes.  Both  of  these
solutions are contradictory, counterintuitive, and primarily motivated by a desire to
save the CoP.
Second, if  story content is ‘added’ by the player and distributed within a
fixed time frame, it would lead to improbabilities in the game stories in terms of
how many events occurred in a given amount of time, and would diminish the
16 So do Currie (1990, p.72), Walton (1990, pp.58-9), and Patridge (2017, pp.181-
3).
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verisimilitude – possibly the very conceivability – of the story: it would entail that an
unreasonably high/low number of actions are accommodated by a comparatively
small/large time frame. Before the reason for this can be explained, a taxonomy of
time in games is required.
Many story-driven action/adventure games seem to have one out of two
kinds of  temporalities:  in  the first  kind,  time always elapses at  the  same rate,
regardless of what  happens in the game. This model  appears in,  for  instance,
Ocarina of Time and  Vice City, where the flow of time is independent of player
action, so that days and nights pass at a consistent pace in fictional time as the
player progresses through the game. We can call this  fluid time.  In the second
kind,  time is  fixed in relation to  a given narrative  passage.  In  Resident  Evil  4
(Capcom, 2005) and Half-Life 2 (Valve, 2004) some sections will always take place
in daytime, and the day will last for as long as it takes the player to get to the end
of the stage, and not turn into night until she has progressed. We can call this
fixed time.17 
Several problems arise regardless of which temporality a game adopts. If a
game has  fixed time, there are two possible solutions as to why the first day in
Resident Evil 4 lasts anything between one and a potentially infinite number of
hours (depending on how long it takes for the player to finish the level). The first
would be to postulate an idiosyncratic temporal dynamic in the story where the
passage of time varies, i.e. the first day lasts one hour and the second one lasts
thirty hours, because that is how long it takes for the player to finish those parts of
the  game.  However,  that  means  that  a  given  day in  the  story could  last  any
theoretical amount of time, and this lacks support in the story; we are never told
that days vary severely in length in the fiction. It is rendered even more unlikely by
the fact that different players will  spend different amounts of time in any given
17 Although more categories may exist, these suffice for current purposes.
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segment, so the length of a given day/night in the story will vary between players
and playthroughs.
The second solution is that the duration of the day is constant, regardless of
how long it takes the player to finish it, but that means that an infinite number of
events could be compressed into a finite time-segment. In  Resident Evil 4  and
Half-Life 2 the player could meander for a potentially infinite amount of real time,
but the same amount of fictional time would have passed in the story. One would
then  have  to  be  forced  to  invoke  the  same  kind  of  temporal  compression
mentioned by Juul,  but as has already been shown, this would go against the
notion of the story taking place in real-time. Furthermore, temporal compression
would entail the same kind of perplexing conclusion attained by Juul regarding the
speed of events, i.e. that the story events are portrayed as if they play out at the
same speed in the story as they would in real  time when in fact the temporal
progression has been altered, so the impression that the game is in real-time is
merely ostensible. As already mentioned, Juul speculated that since 45 minutes in
Fifa 2002 take 4 minutes to play, events must have been sped up, so that the
football-players are in fact moving much slower in the fictional world (2005, p.152).
In Resident Evil 4 and Half-Life 2 the opposite would be true: the characters seem
to move at  the  speed of  a  normal  person in  real  life,  when in  fact  they (and
everything else in the story world) are moving at a superhuman speed. In order to
retain temporal congruity it would have to follow that the velocity of fictional events
increases proportionally with the duration of the play time, meaning that the longer
the player takes to complete a section, the faster the characters have to move in
the story so as to allow the fixed time-frame to accommodate the events. In Half-
Life  2 and  Resident  Evil  4,  as opposed to  Vice City,  no consistent  correlation
between play time and fictional time can be asserted, as the relation between story
time passed and time required for the player to finish a certain level will invariably
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differ between stages; one level may be finished in a comparatively short amount
of time, diminishing the temporal discrepancy, whereas segments where the player
needs  more  time  said  discrepancy  would  increase  proportionally.  Nothing  in
Resident Evil  4 or  Half-Life 2 indicates that this temporal discrepancy exists to
begin with, nor that it varies. Briefly, if a story segment is said to take place during
a single hour it would be difficult to ‘make sense’ of the segment and its content if it
takes the player more/less than 60 minutes to finish it.
A similar problem occurs in games with fluid time. Wolf claims that games
do not have a fixed running time in the way films do (2001c, p.91). He may be right
about running time, but as stated by Abbott above, prolongation of narrative time
need not influence story time, so the question remains of what relation obtains
between story and narrative in game narratives. Perhaps the story’s  duration is
extended when the narrative’s duration is. The story of Ocarina of Time could be
prolonged for a potentially infinite amount of time, taking anything between a week
and several years of story time, as nothing indicates the contrary. Whilst this could
be  true  of  some game stories,  it  is  less  plausible  in  others.  In  Vice  City the
omnipresent  in-game clock indicates how much fictional  time has passed,  and
while it is possible that the protagonist Tommy Vercetti spends several days trying
to complete any given mission – as a result of a particular player spending more
time playing it – it seems unlikely that something like a car-chase could last for
weeks of story time only because it  takes a player hours of play time. Further
temporal discrepancies arise if the player retries the same section (or replays the
game) and does not finish it  in the same time as the first try.  Repetition is an
almost inevitable part of games, and retries are likely to be of different lengths,
indicating that the same events took different amounts of time.
Moreover, in Ocarina of Time this complexity is exacerbated as it contains
both fixed and fluid time: when Link is in a town time will not pass, when he is
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outside  it  does.  This  cannot  be  explained  with  reference  to  the  magic  that
pervades the story; ontological conundrums in fairy-tales cannot be resolved by
appealing to magic only to save the CoP and Duration Assumption, and stories like
those in  Resident Evil 4  and  Half-Life 2 make no open reference to anything –
magic or technology – that justifies such a conception of time.
Another  problem  is  how  the  combination  of  the  CoP and  the  Duration
Assumption renders ellipses impossible: since play time corresponds to fictional
time,  no  jump forward  in  time can take place,  because that  would  violate  the
correlation between the two temporal currents. When the narrative cuts from one
scene to another, the following scene must take place immediately after the first if
story time and playtime are to remain synchronous. As argued earlier, temporal
compression is not a viable option. Juul and Wolf could argue that ellipses are
different from anachronies, but Currie asserts that they are both a kind of temporal
violation (1995a, p.220), so treating ellipses differently would be manifestly ad hoc
on their part. The result is that ellipses are merely ostensible in games, meaning
that  everything  in  their  narratives  occurs  in  real  time.  Unseen  passages  of
transportation  from one location to  another  must  be interpreted,  not  as  longer
periods of time with implied information, but as unexplained, instant teleportation
from one location to another, with inexplicable alterations (misleadingly) indicating
the passage of time (e.g. clocks indicating that several hours have passed).
Films are replete with ellipses; we are rarely shown the entire journey from
point A to point B. Film theorists defending the Duration Assumption could object,
as  they  claim  that  temporal  integrity  must  be  retained  within  a  segment,  not
between them, but this may be ad hoc,  as many scenes consisting of several
shots do retain temporal integrity in the sense that cuts are instantaneous; often
no time passes between two  consecutive  shots  if  they are  parts  of  the  same
scene.  As was clear  in  Bordwell’s  explanation,  it  is  the content  of  a  shot  that
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determines the progression of time, yet Bordwell does not acknowledge that this is
always the  case,  within  as  well  as  between  shots:  two  consecutive  shots  are
deemed to take place in instant succession (i.e. no time passes in the cut between
them)  if  the  content  indicates  this,  for  instance  if  we  cut  from one  person  to
another in a continuous dialogue. The shots take place further apart in time if the
content gives this impression, for instance if the sun is rising in shot number 1 and
setting in shot number 2. What Bordwell fails to point out is the general rule of
content indicating passage of time, both within and between shots, which is why
film theorists defending the Duration Assumption are wrong in stating that temporal
manipulation takes place between shots. This means that ellipses are still possible
between shots, but not for reasons advocated by film theorists. For this reason,
both  the  Duration  Assumption  and  ellipses  can  obtain  in  films,  albeit  not  in
conjunction with one another.
However, in games ellipses cannot be used at all because, as explained
above,  the  story  would  then  no  longer  take  place  now,  but  in  the  future,  or,
alternatively, in a less distant past. This has awkward consequences for many (if
not  most)  game stories:  in  Ocarina  of  Time,  when  the  young  Link  enters  the
Temple of Time and acquires the Master Sword, he falls into a deep slumber and
is awakened seven years later, whereupon he is informed by an old man (a ‘sage’)
that his spirit was sealed away for some time so that he had time to grow up. If the
game takes place in the present and play time corresponds to fictional time, this
cannot be true (meaning that the sage is lying), because Link has in fact been
asleep for a brief moment (as long as his slumber lasts in the narrative), and there
is some unknown reason as to why he has grown up; nor is it explained why the
rest of the world has changed with him, giving the impression that seven years
have passed.
Furthermore, factors depending on the player’s ability to travel back and
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forth  in  time  must  be  interpreted  in  counterintuitive  ways  when  the  Duration
Assumption is applied: as a kid, Link can plant a magic seed which grows into a
plant when he travels forward seven years in time. If gameplay is synchronous
with duration, it means that the amount of time needed for the plants to grow is
arbitrary, because, as already noted, seven years only pass ostensibly. The player
could spend weeks, even  years of fictional time as young Link without the plant
growing, but as soon as he visits the Temple of Time and ‘travels forward in time’
(ostensibly), the plant will inexplicably have grown, even though it takes a couple
of seconds for the transformation from young to old Link to be completed.   
Bourne and Caddick Bourne provide a possible explanation: they suggest
that in  any fiction with time travel, we are not shown a singular person travelling
through  time,  but  several  people  from  various  time-lines  who  have  ‘quasi-
memories’ that happen to correspond to what happened to people from the time-
lines up until then (2016, pp.132-3). Thus, they explain, Marty McFly (Michael J.
Fox) does not really travel back in time in Back to the Future (Zemeckis, 1985), but
instead the spectators are shown two almost identical people in different possible
worlds,  one  of  which  erroneously believes that  he  has travelled  back in  time.
Bourne and Caddick Bourne use this explanation to solve ontological problems
stemming from paradoxes of time travel, but it could potentially be applied to our
current  issues.  However,  most  narratives  do  not  prescribe  imagining  several
possible worlds, so this would be a counterintuitive solution resorted to primarily to
salvage the Duration Assumption and the CoP. Further, positing possible worlds
would not resolve the issues of temporal compression/dilation  within a segment
either, such as the in-game clock of Vice City, or when the progression of time is
reversed, as in Sands of Time. The only way to apply it would be to claim that at
each instant we are transported to a new possible world,  an interpretation not
supported by most cinematic and ludologic fiction. Moreover, that would still leave
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the combination of fluid and fixed time in Ocarina of Time unexplained.
Thus,  the  problems  of  duration  remain.  The  CoP  and  the  Duration
Assumption necessitate one another,  but  are equally incompatible in  films and
games, with further problems added to the latter: if the duration of story time is
fixed  and  it  is  to  correspond  to  screen/play  time,  all  players  would  have  to
complete  the  game  in  exactly  the  same  amount  of  time.  Related  to  this  is
Genette’s  speculation  on  how  literature  could  potentially  establish  the  same
temporal relation between narrative time and story time as films are presumed to
have, so that reading time corresponds to story time, but he says that this would
require reading at a constant speed with no variations. It seems as if games, just
as literature, may not have a fixed relation between fictional time and reading/play
time. This would be in line with the claims of Le Poidevin, Currie, and Patridge,
namely, that not everything imagined translates into fictional truth.
Hence, we may draw the conclusion that just as in literature and cinema,
the duration of a game story stands in no necessary correlation to the time of the
narrative. It may take players different amounts of time to complete each stage,
but the time passed in the story remains the same, just as it may take readers
different amounts of time to read the same page without that affecting the duration
of the fictional events, or how a shot in a film may last for a longer or shorter
amount of time than the event depicted. This makes the combination of the CoP
and the Duration assumption untenable. However, neither is tenable even on their
own, so it seems more propitious to give them up and accept that games are not
set in the present and that their  stories, for  that reason, cannot  be said to be
interactive.
1.4 Future truth
A topic related to the CoP is the truth-value of future-tensed propositions. If the
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game story takes place now and the player is able to interact with the story, it
follows that the fictional future cannot be fixed. Conversely, if the fictional future is
fixed, players cannot alter the truth-value of future-tensed propositions, which in
turn obviates interaction with the story. 
Some game theorists allude to this question. Juul claims that a description
of future events prevents the player from doing anything, and that games give the
impression  that  upcoming  events  are  not  determined  (2001).  Gareth  Schott
contends  that agency  is  a  matter  of  bringing  about future  events,  not  just
predicting  or  expecting  them  (2006,  p.139).  As  mentioned  in  the  introduction,
Zagal and Mateas argue that players influence events in the future (2010, p.845).
Similarly, Colin  Cremin asserts that the outcome in games is not predetermined
(2012,  p.81).  Mukherjee  agrees  when  he  argues  that  ‘the  end  of  a  game  is
impossible  to  predict’  (2015,  p.132),  and that  each playthrough has numerous
different endings (2015, p.137). By contrast, Jan Simons notes that although game
scholars think that the game’s outcome is ‘hidden in the future’ (2007) and that it
for this reason can be influenced by the player, in actuality only some outcomes
are possible; the fact that the player may not be aware of which these outcomes is
merely a phenomenological aspect (2007). Similarly, Holmes contrasts nonlinear
games with linear ones, explaining that in the latter ‘future events are set before
the game has even begun’ (2012, p.216). Contrary to these views, Torben Grodal
contends that  cinema is a medium apt for giving the impression that the fictional
future is undecided, and that even in a medium in which the narrative is fixed the
recipient may still have the experience that the fictional future is not (2003, p.137-
8).
Le Poidevin discusses the concept of fictional future in greater depth than
the game scholars above. He explores what he calls the ‘Fixed Fictional Future
thesis’ (2007, p.142), or FFF for short, according to which some fictions contain
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true, future-tensed propositions. He argues that in Macbeth (Shakespeare, 1623),
we get the impression that it is inevitable that the eponymous hero becomes king
and that this was, if not true, then at least  inevitable at the encounter with the
witches telling him about it  (2001, pp.70-2,  2007,  pp.142-3).  He also mentions
Time and the Conways (Priestley, 1937) as an example of a fiction where only the
audience has a vision of the future – the second act takes place after the third –
and asserts in this case the future is fixed as well, since when we watch the third
act we already know what the events will eventually lead up to (2007, p.143). In
contrast, according to the open future hypothesis, the future does not exist and is
therefore  indeterminate,  consisting  of  a  set  of  possibilities  (Le  Poidevin  2016,
p.316).18 With respect to film, he explains, the fictional future’s openness partly
depends on the location of the fictional present in relation to the ‘screen present’,
i.e. the image currently projected. Le Poidevin argues that if the fictional future is
open, the screen present can only show the fictional present or past, since only
they contain determinate facts; if the fictional future is open there would be nothing
to show, since it does not exist yet (2016, p.318). However, he continues, if we
assume that the screen present is in the fictional past, it follows that the events
following  the  screen  present  are  determinate,  because  the  fiction  is  complete
before we access it (Le Poidevin 2016, pp.321-2). In addition, Le Poidevin briefly
considers interactive fictions, originally asserting that they are as closed as non-
interactive  ones  (2001,  p.90),  but  later  on  nuances  this  and  says  that  their
potentially unfixed nature could depend on whether the player is a coauthor or not,
and  concludes  that  players  could  nevertheless  have  erroneous  beliefs  about
fictional facts (2007, pp.160-1) (whether players can be seen as authors will be
treated in the next chapter).
18 Le Poidevin does not give the open future hypothesis an abbreviation. For the 
sake of simplicity I will call it the OFF for short, to contrast it with the FFF.
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Bourne  and  Caddick  Bourne  criticize  Le  Poidevin  for  assuming  that
information  about  upcoming events necessarily reveals anything  about  the  the
fictional  world’s  metaphysical  structure  (2016,  p.47).19 They argue  that,  in
Macbeth, it is not necessarily true at the time Macbeth hears the prophecy of the
sisters that he will become king in the sense that it is not true at this stage that the
latter  stage  (at  which  he  is  king)  already  exists.  Instead,  this  is  a  way  of
simultaneously representing two stages of the fictional world (Bourne and Caddick
Bourne  2016,  pp.45-6).  Another alternative considered by Bourne and Caddick
Bourne is to limit the prophecy to how the representation will develop in order to
elicit certain expectations from the audience, without encompassing truths about
the fictional future (2016, p.46). In brief, they underline the difference between, on
the  one  hand,  the  representation  of  fixity,  and  on  the  other,  the  fixity  of
representation (Bourne and Caddick Bourne 2016, p.47).  They further add that
whatever makes future-tensed propositions true need not be located in the present
(Bourne and Caddick Bourne 2016, p.44). Therefore, even if it is true that Macbeth
will become king, it does not follow that this was true at the time it was foretold by
the sisters (Bourne and Caddick Bourne 2016, pp.46-7). Likewise, they argue that
even though the second act of Time and the Conways takes place after the third
act (and even though we know that the acts describe the same events in the same
fictional world) it is nevertheless not already true in the fictional time of Act III that
the fictional  future will  be as illustrated by Act  II  (Bourne and Caddick Bourne
2016, p.49). Although this does not mean that the future is fixed, it nevertheless
does not prevent the audience from interpreting the narrative differently than if the
events had been shown in chronological order, since knowledge of later events
can be used when evaluating earlier  ones (Bourne and Caddick Bourne 2016,
19 They may have misunderstood Le Poidevin, as he claims that the narrative’s 
determined nature does not entail that story events are predetermined (2001, 
p.73, 2007, p.144).
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pp.49-50). In brief, ‘metaphysics cannot straightforwardly be read off features of
the representation’ (Bourne and Caddick Bourne 2016, p.128).
1.4.1 Characters with foreknowledge of the future
Both Le Poidevin and Bourne and Caddick Bourne discuss characters making
predictions. Bourne and Caddick Bourne are at pains to make the future open in
Macbeth, saying that even if Macbeth becomes king, it does not follow that this
was true at the time the sisters told him about this. They suggest that the sisters
inform the audience on how the representation will develop, that they are watching
a fiction in which Macbeth will be king, but that this information does not pertain to
the fictional  world’s  metaphysical  structure (Bourne and Caddick Bourne 2016,
p.47). If we adopt this line of reasoning and apply it to the Prince’s premonitions of
the future in the Sands of Time, one could argue that the visions only pertain to
gameplay and not the story. However, it is problematic to claim, as Bourne and
Caddick Bourne do, that a proposition is true at a time prior to the events to which
they refer without, at the same time, drawing the conclusion that the fictional future
is fixed and/or that it already exists. Bourne and Caddick Bourne do not explain
how a premonition could be true only about the representation and not the fiction,
seeing how the witches are themselves part of the fiction, as is Macbeth (who
hears this prophecy too). Similarly, the Prince’s visions in Sands of Time are not
exclusively available to the player; it is fictionally true that the Prince sees future
events. Thus, we can rule out this solution, as it would eliminate the difference
between  fictions  where  information  about  the  future  is  available  only  to  the
audience and where fictional characters share this knowledge; it is evident in the
context that we are supposed to understand that the witches and the Prince are
prescient. 
One could object that it was the very act of telling Macbeth about his future
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that made him pursue it, making it a self-fulfilling prophecy, but if we maintain this
whilst denying that their prediction was true at the time of telling they cannot be
said to possess genuine knowledge of his future coronation, only justified belief.
Besides, they successfully predict events beyond Macbeth’s control, indicating that
their predictions are in fact true. Moreover, if it is predetermined that Macbeth will
be king and the witches know this for the reason that it is predetermined, we can
also presume that it was predetermined that they would tell him about this. One
must not forget that the witches themselves (and their predictions) are part of the
timeline; that the predictions also have a causal role in the fictional chain of events
is a different matter. Similarly, if we deny that future-tensed propositions are true in
Sands of Time, the Prince would have no knowledge about upcoming events, but
would suffer from hallucinations that serendipitously happen to correspond to what
would have become true later on even if he had not had the visions. Naturally one
could insist that both Macbeth and the Prince are deluded and that the future was
never closed to begin with, that their prophecies are self-fulfilling, but this would
not make game stories more interactive. If the prerequisite for interaction is that
the  given  story  has  an  open  future,  we  still  have  no  explanation  as  to  why
Macbeth is not as interactive as Sands of Time, even though the fictional future is
equally open in both.
Another point Bourne and Caddick Bourne try to make is that even if the
prophecy is true, it does not follow that the later stage of which the witches speak
already exists. Similarly, Le Poidevin argues that from the fact that a given event
comes to pass it does not follow that it was always true that it was going to come
to pass (2001, p.73).20 This distinction between a future event being true and being
20 Cf. D’Alessandro, who claims that by producing a sequel it becomes true 
already in the first part that future events will occur (2016, p.57). However, his 
poor defence of this claim poses no challenge to Le Poidevin’s theory. For 
criticism of D’Allessandro, see Motoarcă (2017).
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‘merely’ inevitable is a crucial one; even if we presume that the future does not
exist it does not entirely refute the FFF. We would have an A-series where people
are bound to  act  in a  certain  way,  making the future inevitable/predetermined,
without making future-tensed propositions true. This would allow us to maintain
that  games  take  place  in  the  present,  but  even  when  ignoring  the  numerous
problems already mentioned in relation to this in previous sections, it still would not
follow that the player can alter the story. The Prince’s flash-forwards in Sands of
Time entail that even if we had accessed the story at the time it took place, we still
would not have been able to influence the course of events. Failing to bring about
the events in the Prince’s premonitions would be no different from failing to show
the right film-reels when screening a film, it would not affect the fictional truth.
A game that takes place in the present and includes flash-forwards would in
principle be no different from games including flashbacks. As Juul admits himself,
flashbacks do not allow for players to alter the story,  but we cannot endorse a
certain conception of game temporality only on the grounds that we would rather
have  interactive  stories;  our  preferences  are  irrelevant.  This  proves  that  it  is
irrelevant where the fictional present is located in relation to the screen present: if
the fictional future in relation to the screen present is fixed, nothing is changed by
the theory that the screen present and fictional present are aligned, we still cannot
interact with the story. This proves that games are not interactive by necessity,
because even a story supposedly set in the present can be fixed.
1.4.2 Non-diegetic premonitions
Stories that contain flash-forwards but lack premonitions on the part of a fictional
character  present  other  problems.  Here  opinions  differ  once  more,  and  Le
Poidevin and Bourne and Caddick Bourne devote much attention to the concept of
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‘fictional authors’ (or ‘implied authors’),21 and what these know about future events.
However, this concept is irrelevant for the discussion; it is not pertinent whether we
conceive of truth in fiction as that which is believed by the implied or the real
author as long as we emphasize that what is fictionally true is what the reader is
prescribed to imagine. 
It is problematic to maintain, as Bourne and Caddick Bourne do, that flash-
forwards are not true in the present, even when they are only accessed by the
audience, and this becomes more evident when related to definitions of truth in
fiction. As Stock notes, drawing on David Velleman, an open fictional  future is
precluded when the interpreter is encouraged to imagine that such-and-such will
be the case,  because when one does so ‘effectively it  is  as if  it  is  already a
completed state of affairs that such-and-such will be the case ’ (2017, p.23; original
emphasis).22
 Moreover,  unless  we  state  that  Act  II  is  true  in  Act  III  it  would  be
problematic  to  claim,  as  Bourne  and  Caddick  Bourne  do,  that  we  may utilize
knowledge gained from representations of upcoming events in our interpretation of
current ones, and that this hindsight may highlight facts we otherwise might not
have noticed, had the scenes been shown in chronological order (2016, pp.49-50).
This seems contradictory: on the one hand they allow for use of knowledge from
flash-forwards, on the other, they deny that this would make the future fixed. If the
future, however, is not fixed, events in the flash-forward are not guaranteed to take
place, which in turn precludes possibilities of utilizing knowledge gained from it.
There is no reason to presume that we may apply knowledge gained from Act II
21 For more on implied authors, see e.g. Currie (1990, 1995a), Kania (2007), and 
Kindt and Müller (2011).
22 However, Stock neglects the distinction between imagining that something will 
be true and the possibility that it will be true. Stock’s argument entails that any 
imagination pertaining to future events precludes an open future, which 
obviously is not true when spectators are encouraged to adopt certain 
expectations which are subverted later on.
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when watching Act III if the events in Act II are not true in Act III. This would refute
their own claim that the flash-forward informs the audience that they are watching
a fictional world where the events in the flash-forward take place, since the future,
being open, could be altered so that those events never occur. Alternatively, we
could question that Act II and III represent the same possible world (an unlikely
theory Bourne and Caddick Bourne reject in this particular case, but which they
nonetheless consider in relation to other fictions). Further, if knowledge of future
events  were  always  sufficient  for  analyses of  present  ones,  even when  future
events are not true in the present, it would follow that we are always able to use
knowledge about events in the fictional future regardless of whether one construes
the fictional future as open or not. For instance, when seeing a film for a second
time we may use knowledge gained from the first screening, for instance in order
to study the careful  foreshadowing of upcoming plot-twists and revelations, but
such an examination is clearly inappropriate in some sense (we are not prescribed
by the film to study the preparation of upcoming twists), and we intuitively presume
that knowledge of future events is necessary only in narratives where these are
shown, not otherwise.23 When watching Citizen Kane (Welles, 1941) it is obvious
that we should not know to what ‘Rosebud’ alludes at the beginning of the film and,
for  that  reason,  may  not  employ  our  knowledge  about  this,  should  we  have
acquired it anyway prior to the screening.
Secondly, if it is not true in Act III that the events of Act II will take place
even though we see Act II  before Act III,  it  becomes unclear what Bourne and
Caddick Bourne believe  would make the future fixed. As Le Poidevin notes, not
even an explicit statement about fictional temporal properties would suffice since
23 Walton (1990, p.261) agrees, but Ryan (2015, p.106) objects that one can only 
suspend disbelief, not knowledge. However, she neglects that it is nevertheless 
not fictional that p will occur even if we know that the narrative will convey p 
later on.
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interpreters  are  cautious  to  take  any  fictional  statement  at  face  value  (2007,
pp.159-60). This conundrum is equally problematic for establishing any properties
pertaining to the fixity of the fictional future, as it  would make fictions with and
without  fixed  futures  practically  indistinguishable.  Bourne  and  Caddick  Bourne
claim  that  the  open  or  fixed  nature  of  the  fictional  future  is  determinate  but
underdetermined, due to lack of information on this matter; it is one or the other,
but  we  cannot  say  which  (2016,  p.64).  This,  however,  would  refute  their  own
assertion that the future-tensed propositions in  Time and the Conways lack truth
value as this conclusion of theirs presumes that the fictional future is open, but the
lack of evidence for a closed future is in itself not sufficient for proving the contrary;
what they have really established is the difficulty of ascertaining the nature of the
fictional future in general. As for  Time and the Conways, and similar narratives,
they have not disproved the FFF, nor proved the OFF.
On the other hand, Bourne and Caddick Bourne may be too sceptical in
their attempted refutation of the FFF. The fixity of the future is never portrayed as
such,  but it follows from the use of flash-forwards, and it is dubious whether it
could be conveyed in any other way. Bourne and Caddick Bourne are certainly
correct in their  assertion that  ‘metaphysics cannot straightforwardly be read off
features of the representation’ (2016, p.128), but as Currie notes, cinema cannot
represent  certain  temporal  properties  (1995a,  p.218),  and though he does not
mention  fixity/openness  of  the  fictional  future,  this  could  be  one  of  those
properties. If so, the failure to portray one of these features cannot in and of itself
be taken as evidence for its converse or its negation. That is, if fiction  f fails to
represent the fictional future as open, it does not follow that the fictional future is
not  open,  nor  does it  follow that  the  fictional  future  for  that  reason is  closed,
because those properties cannot be portrayed at all. 
Nevertheless,  the  fact  that  metaphysical  properties  cannot  be  read  off
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straightforwardly does not mean that a narrative structure never reveals anything;
the objection that a property of  the representation need not express a fictional
truth, although true, is trivial, because sometimes it arguably does, and it would be
a  false  dichotomy  to  put  beliefs  about  the  representation  and  the  fiction
respectively  in  necessary opposition  with  one  another  in  the  way Bourne  and
Caddick Bourne seem to imply in their criticism of Le Poidevin. Moreover, films
and novels usually use the order of scenes to convey the order of fictional events
(the  order  of  scenes  and/or  shots  often  corresponds  to  the  order  of  fictional
events),  anachronies  and  scenes  shown  ‘backwards’  (as  if  rewound)  being
exceptions to this rule; even a film like Memento (Nolan, 2000), where scenes are
shown in a non-chronological order, represents events chronologically within each
scene. When the order of fictional events is presented non-chronologically it  is
intuitive to assume that  it  is  done for a reason,  potentially that  features of the
representation  do reveal something about fictional metaphysics. Thus, although
Bourne and Caddick Bourne are right in asserting that metaphysical properties are
not  necessarily  revealed  by  those  of  the  representation,  it  is  not  universally
applicable;  it  does  not  pertain  to  all  fictions,  nor  to  all  fictional  metaphysical
properties.
The fact that fictional metaphysical properties are not always conveyed by
actual properties of the representation also shows why we cannot assume that
games have an open future: if we cannot presume that the fictional future is fixed
only because the representation is, it follows that we, conversely, cannot presume
that the fictional future is  not fixed only because the representation is not. This
means that  game scholars  who  presume that  the  fictional  future  is  open  with
reference  to  the  non-fixed  nature  of  video  games  make  the  same  erroneous
assumption that Bourne and Caddick Bourne accuse Le Poidevin of doing, but by
assuming  its  negation:  they  mistake  the  non-fixity  of  representation for  the
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representation of non-fixity. 
A third problem with the claim that it is not fictional in Act III that the events
in Act  II  will  follow is  that  it  would arguably elicit  the wrong expectations from
interpreters. It would mean that after a flash-forward the audience would  not be
expected to utilize the information it  provides but instead should hope that the
future events will perhaps not come to pass after all (since it is not fictionally true
that they will).  This would be counter-intuitive and would dissolve the essential
difference  between  narratives  where  tension  is  established  through  lack  of
certainty regarding the outcome of a chain of events and those where interpreters
know from the start how the story will end and instead take an interest in how that
came to be.
Alternatively, if it is true that the events in Act II will take place, but not true
in the fictional time of Act III, there are two solutions: the first is that the events in
Act II are not true in Act III, but it is true in Act III that the events it portrays are
disposed in such a way that they will inevitably lead to the events in Act II. That
way we could have a fictional A-series with an open future – since Act II does not
exist  yet,  which  it  would  have  done  if  it  were  a  B-series  –  but  then  we  are
immediately presented with the problem of how to explain the representation of Act
II; if it does not exist and is indeterminate it should be blank, as explained by Le
Poidevin above: if the fictional future is truly open we would not be able to see it,
since  any determinate  content  would  make  the  future  equally  determinate  (Le
Poidevin 2016, p.318). Furthermore, by introducing this kind of predestination the
fictional future becomes closed anyway, so in effect this would be no different from
saying that the events in Act II are already true. This predestination would also do
away with the impression we get that the characters have free will, undermining
one of the purposes of a fictional open future.
Another way of retaining a fictional A-series whilst allowing for interpreters
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to use information from Act II when watching Act III is to posit that Act II is not the
future, but that Act III is in the fictional past, i.e. that Act II is not a flash-forward,
and Act III is a flashback. This allows the fiction to have an open future, since we
do not know what happens after Act II. Likewise, in Max Payne we can presume
that  what  happens  after  the  chronologically  last  scene  is  undetermined.  This
solution is easy to miss since Bourne and Caddick Bourne fail to specify what it
would mean for Act II to be true in the fiction but not true at the time of Act III, and
because they misleadingly speak of Act II as future events without disambiguating
what ‘future’ means in this context; it is unclear whether they refer to the future
relative to the screen present – the fictional events chronologically posterior to the
moment  currently  displayed  –  or  relative  to  the  fictional  present  –  the  events
following  the  metaphysically  privileged  fictional  point  in  time.  Moreover,  Le
Poidevin asserts that even if we assume that the fiction has an open future, there
is  nothing  contradictory  in  assuming  that  events  following  a  flashback  are
determinate, since said events are located in the fictional past (2016, p.324). It is
not contradictory to endorse the OFF whilst claiming that the upcoming events are
determined,  because as  Currie  notes  in  his  discussion  on tense in  cinema,  a
fictional event can be tensed from the perspective of a character even when it is
not  from the  perspective  of  the  viewer  (1995a,  p.218).  In  the  same  way  that
fictional events may be present for the characters at the time of occurrence yet not
for the viewers, the future could be open for them but not us. However, then the
OFF comes at the cost of the CoP, since we know that the events in Act II – which
are in the fictional future relative to Act III – will inevitably take place, and it follows
that the story is fixed, albeit for other reasons than the fixed nature of the future.
The same principle applies in games. We could concede that the future in
game fiction is open,  but in games where we are provided with information of
upcoming story events must necessarily be set in the past, so the game story
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would therefore not be interactive. In a game like Max Payne, we could claim that
the first scene is in the present, but the rest of the game would not be interactive
since the future relative to the following events is in the fictional past, making their
future determinate. Moreover, this principle also applies to literature and cinema,
so once more there is no reason to presume that truth in fiction would be different
in  game  stories.  Lastly,  there  still  is  no  reason  to  presume  that  even  the
chronologically last scene in a narrative is in the fictional present; one could just as
well presume that everything occurring after the story is in the fictional past. In
Sands of Time this seems plausible: seeing how the story is set in ancient times
one naturally presumes that the Prince’s entire life is in the past, not only those
parts which the player observes in the gameplay.
A related fallacy is committed by Le Poidevin when he speaks of the relation
between the fictional present and the screen present. He says that the fictional
future is open if what follows a fictional event is undetermined at the time said
fictional event is present. He further adds that this can only be the case if  the
screen present is in the fictional present, because if the screen present is in the
fictional past the events following it are determinate, which would refute that the
fictional future is open (2016, pp.321-2). However, this conclusion does not follow;
the  determinate  nature  of  the  events  portrayed  does  not  necessarily  reveal
anything about the fictional temporality. If the screen future is  also to be open it
would  indeed  be  necessary  for  the  screen  present  and  fictional  present  to
coincide, but we can maintain that the fictional future is open even if the screen
future is not, as long as we restrict our conclusion to the fictional future per se, not
the events that  follow what  is in the screen present  (which could be in a less
distant  fictional  past,  not  necessarily  future).  What  follows  a  given  portrayed
fictional  event  may  well  have  been  undetermined  at  the  time  of  occurrence,
allowing  the  fiction  to  have  an  open  future  (as  argued  above  by  Le  Poidevin
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himself, regarding how the determined nature of events following a flashback does
not  preclude  an  open  future).  This  does  not  require  the  fictional  present  and
screen present to coincide, and undermines the possibility to prove any specific
relation between the respective presents in any given fiction; the screen present
may represent  the fictional  past,  meaning that  the time-span following what  is
currently on-screen could have been undetermined when the events in the screen
present were the fictional present.
If we thus presume that a given story takes place in the past it can consist
exclusively  of  determinate  facts  whilst  retaining  an  open  future:  one  can  be
prescribed  to  imagine  both that  such-and-such  will  be  the  case  in  the  future
relative to the screen present and that at the time of occurrence within the fiction it
was  not  already  true  that  such-and-such  would  inevitably  be  the  case.  One
consequence of this is that although game fictions may have open futures they are
nevertheless  not  necessarily  interactive  (since  the  fictional  present  is  not
necessarily in the screen present), and they do not differ from fictions in other
media. Moreover, if all segments in a story share the property of fictional pastness
we arguably lose any potential advantages offered by the A-series, since there is
nothing to distinguish them in terms of tense (save in their respective distances to
the never displayed fictional present), so we may as well, if only for the sake of
simplicity,  think of them exclusively in terms of a B-series, since it  is only their
temporal locations relative to one another that conveys anything of importance. In
brief, both Le Poidevin and Bourne and Caddick Bourne neglect that the fictional
future can be open irrespective of when the fictional present is located in relation
to the screen present. This, however, does not necessarily entail that story events
are not fixed, meaning that game stories are not more interactive than stories in
other media. 
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1.4.3 Open and closed futures in narratives without anachronies
So  far  the  discussion  has  treated  narratives  with  premonitions  accessible  to
characters  and/or  the  audience,  but  not  fictions  where  neither  characters  nor
audience possesses knowledge about the future. Le Poidevin says that the FFF
need not apply to  all fictions (2007, p.143).  For instance, he  mentions that in
fictions without visions of the future – either fictional premonitions or flash-forwards
– we cannot conclude that future-tensed propositions were always true prior to
when those events eventually come to pass (Le Poidevin 2007, p.144). This point
allows  defenders  of  the  CoP  to  argue  that  fictions  can,  as  a  principle,
accommodate  worlds  with  an  open  future,  which  in  turn  opens  up  for  player
interaction. There are nevertheless at least two fundamental problems that refute
this possibility. 
Firstly,  neither  Le  Poidevin  nor  Bourne  and  Caddick  Bourne  provide  a
cogent explanation as to how we may ascertain the openness/fixity of the future in
fictions without explicit allusions to facts about the future (including but not limited
to flash-forwards and premonitions); without such references it effectively becomes
impossible  to  distinguish  between  fictional  worlds  with  fixed  and  open  futures
respectively. Bourne and Caddick Bourne suggest that some temporal properties
are indefinite (2016, p.41),24 but if this is true we cannot determine whether a given
fiction without  flash-forwards has an open or  fixed future.  Secondly,  and more
importantly, this problem applies to all media. If we grant that the absence of flash-
forwards,  premonitions  etc.  suffices  in  itself  as  evidence  of  indeterminacy
regarding  whether  the  future  is  open  or  close,  it  follows  that  the  open/closed
nature of the fictional future is indeterminate in both video games and novels/films,
insofar as they lack evidence to the contrary, yet again raising the question of why
24 Later on they claim that temporal properties are not indeterminate but merely 
underdetermined in the sense that we lack the information necessary to 
ascertain certain properties (Bourne and Caddick Bourne 2016, p.64).
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we should presume that video games are unique. Ultimately, whether a fiction has
an open or closed fictional future is unrelated to the medium of the narrative, so
the OFF does not make game fictions more interactive than stories in other media.
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Chapter 2 – Temporal manipulation and relocation
This chapter continues the discussion from the previous chapter, and thus needs
no repetition of theorists treated. While the first  chapter introduced theories on
temporality and addressed questions of  simultaneity,  the second chapter deals
with  various  kinds  of  temporal  manipulation  of  a  narrative  and  how  they
problematize the assumption that the story conveyed takes place in the present. In
the  first  section  I  consider  how  anachronies  (such  as  flashbacks  and  flash-
forwards) can be understood if temporal properties of a narrative do not allow for
temporal relocation. In the second section I examine how separate and/or paused
playthroughs influence story temporality.  In the third and final section I  discuss
whether there is any need at all to assume that there is a present in video game
stories.
2.1 Problems with flashbacks
2.1.1 Anachronies in games
As mentioned in  the  introduction,  Juul  claims that  games mostly present  their
stories chronologically, but objections can be raised against this claim. Firstly, the
scarcity of flashbacks in games does not seem to be exclusive to them: Grodal
notes that radical changes in temporal order raises difficulties in comprehension,
which is why oral narratives are predominantly canonical (2003, p.134).
Secondly,  the  claim  that  flashbacks  are  uncommon  in  games,  if  true,
remains  descriptive:  it  is  indicative  of  common practice  and sheds no light  on
ontological properties of the story. The reason why many games do not present
interactive scenes in a non-chronological order probably stems from ludological
practice  rather  than  narratological  properties,  since  many  games  include  an
incremental accumulation of resources, units, weapons, and/or upgrades. Thus,
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the scarcity of flashbacks need not implicate that they must be rare, and even if
they for some reason must be, Juul does not explain why this is is a consequence
of medium-inherent properties.
Thirdly, Juul invalidates his own conclusion through the admission that this
is mostly the case, and that alternatives are therefore possible. Other theorists are
aware of anachronies in games and do not seem to find this to be as problematic
or uncommon as Juul makes it out to be (see for example Wei,  Bizzocchi, and
Calvert 2010, p.5; Zagal and Mateas 2010, p.851). There are examples of games
including both kinds of anachronies declared to be impossible by Juul: Max Payne
and its sequels commence in what purports to be present time with the events
leading up to  the first  scene in  the plot  (which is  the  last  scene in  the story)
presented in flashbacks;  Max Payne 3 (Rockstar Studios, 2012) includes a long
interactive  flashback  in  the  middle  of  the  game  (since  the  entire  game  is  a
flashback  this  is  a  flashback  within  a  flashback). Sands  of  Time is  told  as  a
flashback interspersed with occasional flash-forwards.
Moreover,  both  Sands  of  Time and  Metal  Gear  Solid  3:  Snake  Eater
(Konami, 2004; henceforth Snake Eater) reference the type of paradox alluded to
by Juul. In  Sands of Time, if the player dies, the narrator objects and wishes to
rectify his account  (since the Prince is both the protagonist  and the narrator it
would be odd if he died in his own story). In Snake Eater, the player can kill the
character Revolver Ocelot, who serves an integral part in the earlier games in the
series (that chronologically take place after  Snake Eater).  However,  should the
player do so the game ends and the regular game over-screen is replaced with
one saying ‘time paradox’. Hence, both games acknowledge that their respective
stories cannot progress after the death of a vital  character,  and they force the
player to retry without creating a ‘heterodox’, paradoxical version of the story.
The common feature  of  both  games is  that  failure to  maintain  temporal
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congruity is treated in the same way as any failure tout court: with a ‘game over’-
screen, offering the player to try again. Juul does not explain why losing the game
in this way differs significantly from any other kind of ‘game over’ and why this is
caused by properties unique to games; all forms of ‘game over’ are cases of failure
to  complete  established  objectives  presented  by  the  game,  and  in  all  cases
narrative  closure  is  deferred.25 Thus,  the  purported  scarcity  of  anachronies  in
games  reveals  nothing  about  their  conceivability,  and  there  are  numerous
examples of how games can accommodate them. Even if there are some aspects
unique to games in how they retain temporal integrity (e.g. not allowing players to
kill certain characters to avoid paradoxes) this has no bearing on their capacity to
include anachronies, even if they may treat anachronies differently. As Juul stated,
it  is  not  possible  to  alter  the past,  but  he fails  to  realize that  the  ‘game over’
prevents the player from doing this; should she fail in a flashback, she is allowed
new attempts until temporal congruity is secured. One could nevertheless object
that the inclusion of flashbacks does not necessarily refute the CoP, but as will
become clear throughout this section, the claims that games are in the present
and that they contain flashbacks seem to be irreconcilable. 
2.1.2 Flashbacks as memories
If  games  are  in  the  present  it  follows  that  players  cannot  be  ‘transported’  to
another  temporal  plane  (past/future)  in  their  engagement  with  fiction,  so
flashbacks have to be explained in some other way. One solution mentioned by
Currie, with respect to flashbacks in film, is that flashbacks are memories of a
character, and that the mental activity takes place in the present (1995a, p.204).
Bordwell agrees, saying that remembering and/or recounting the past is a common
framing device in classical Hollywood film, and that this may be the reason why
25 Wei, Bizzocchi, and Calvert present a similar objection (2010, p.6).
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many narratologists have asserted its necessity (2004, p.215). For instance, when
a character recounts a past event, the images of the flashback could represent her
words (Metz 1991a, p.121; Branigan 1992, p.176-9). Such a solution could retain
the  CoP  whilst  obviating  temporal  repositioning  of  the  spectator.  One  could
maintain  that  games  with  flashbacks  take  place  in  the  present  for  the  same
reason, either because they are memories or because the images correspond to
what is uttered by a character. This solution has not been endorsed by the game
theorists mentioned above; if  they elaborate on temporal properties at all,  they
seem  more  inclined  towards  actual  temporal  repositioning.  Nevertheless,  one
could possibly defend the CoP in games by claiming that flashbacks are memories
in the present.
There  are  several  games  that  provide  framing  devices  similar  to  those
Bordwell claims can be found in classical Hollywood film: most missions in Hitman:
Contracts (IO  Interactive,  2004)  are  presented  as  memories  of  the  dying
protagonist Agent 47. Some of the missions are altered versions of missions in
earlier games, which could be explained as a result of Agent 47’s critical state (this
explanation  would  actually  be  preferable,  as  it  explains  the  inconsistencies
between the games). Likewise, in Metal Gear Solid 4: Sons of the Patriots (Kojima
Productions, 2008) there is a flashback to a segment from the first game in the
series, which is revealed to be the dream of the protagonist. As in the case of
Hitman: Contracts, the inconsistencies between the dream and the first game are
conveniently explained with reference to a character’s unreliable memory. As for
verbal narration being conveyed as images, the entire story of  Sands of Time is
presented as the Prince telling someone about his adventure, and he frequently
interjects when the player dies, wishing to rectify his account; similarly,  in  Max
Payne many events are commented upon by the eponymous hero/narrator. This is
reconcilable with Metz’s and Branigan’s thoughts of images as corresponding to
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the  words  of  the  narrator,  because  if  the  images  in  Sands  of  Time had  not
corresponded to the Prince’s narration in any way at all, he would not have wanted
to correct himself when the player fails.
However,  Currie  objects  to  this  solution,  as  most  flashbacks  are  not  a
character’s purported act of remembering, and to assume that all flashbacks must
be memories is question-begging (1995a, p.204). There are some complications
following this solution that Currie does not address sufficiently; some of these are
noted by Bordwell as he objects and explains that the character ‘introducing’ the
flashback is not always a witness of events shown and could not have accessed
all  the  information  in  it  (2004,  p.215).  Bordwell’s  solution  is  that  an  act  of
remembering or verbal narration be best thought of only as the  initiation of the
flashback, but recounting/recalling only occurs at these ‘boundary points’ as he
calls them, where voice-over and images are both present (2004, p.216).
Here one might raise some possible objections. It is reasonable to assume
that not all flashbacks should be thought of as verbal accounts of what happened,
not even when this is suggested by their introduction. One reason for not equating
verbal narration and images in a flashback is that this introduces the problem of
how to account for possible discrepancies between them, i.e. when the images
reveal that the narrator is unreliable. If the images correspond to what the narrator
says, but nevertheless differ from it, it follows that the narrator would present two
concurrent, contradictory discourses, conveyed to the audience through voice-over
and images respectively. The most obvious objection is that a person cannot be
saying  two  things  at  exactly  the  same  time,  but  apart  from  the  practical
impossibility of simultaneous  ‘double-narration’ it would make little sense for the
narrator to tell both versions, the incorrect as well as the correct one, as it would
be irreconcilable either with her own interests (if she is hiding the truth on purpose)
or  her  limited  comprehension  of  the  events  (if  she  expresses  her  incorrect
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interpretation  of  them).  Further,  the  fictional  interlocutors  mostly  seem  to  be
unaware of this discrepancy seemingly accessible only to the spectator, meaning
that the content  of  the images is not  conveyed to them and can therefore not
correspond to a verbal account.
Another  problem  of  equating  the  images  with  the  narration  is  the
considerable number of details in the image that would presumably have to be
conveyed orally – since all content of the images is presumably included in the
verbal  account  –  and we do not  presume that  the narrator  is  describing each
minute detail to the fictional interlocutors of what the audience perceives visually.
That would have to mean that the narrator is, for instance, describing the visual
appearance of every single person in a crowd (even the ones she presumably
cannot see himself) only because the audience sees what they look like.
This indicates that a character does not inform the interlocutors of all details
in  a  flashback,  even when it  is  introduced in  conversation.  However,  this  only
counters Metz’s and Branigan’s claim that images somehow correspond to the
narrator’s verbal account of the events; they may still correspond to the narrator ’s
memories of them, which would resolve the issue of verbal discourse differing in
content from the images. The images would then correspond only to the narrator ’s
memory,  so she is both remembering and narrating in the present.  As already
mentioned,  Bordwell  objects,  claiming  that  flashbacks  do  not  correspond  to
memories, save at ‘boundary points’, but there are two possible reasons why his
objections are invalid: the assumption that the narrator was a witness herself, and
the  assumption  that  images  necessarily  correspond  to  the  narrator’s mental
activity (either remembering or imagining).
The first reason why Bordwell may be wrong is illustrated by  How I Met
Your Mother (2005-2014). Every episode of the series is presented as a flashback,
of which most (if not all) contain several flashbacks of their own. Many scenes give
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the impression that the narrator was not present and could therefore not have
seen  that  which  he  is  narrating  to  his  contemporaneous  interlocutors,  which
suggests – in accordance with Bordwell’s claim – that events in the flashback are
not part of the narrator’s own memories or narration. However, this conception is
contradicted by some passages where the narrator explicitly fills in details to the
best  of  his  knowledge,  claiming that  he does not  know what  really happened,
sometimes going so far as to explicitly state that the characters he is talking about
insist  that  events transpired in  the way narrated,  suggesting that  he is  merely
retelling what they told him. With this in mind it seems likely that the narrator was
mostly –  but  not  always –  informed at  a  later  event  of  what  happened in  his
absence.  We could  make the  same assumption  in  both  films and games:  the
narrator need not have been present in order to know what happened, but could
have been told by others afterwards, and it  is this which she then goes on to
narrate. One could persist, and argue that just as the significant number of details
in  the  image  most  likely  does  not  correspond  to  a  narrator ’s  otiose  verbal
description,  mnemonic  fidelity  renders  mere  reminiscence (unaccompanied  by
verbal narration) equally unlikely and problematic for the same reason; the sheer
number  of  details  conveyed  visually  would  make  it  unlikely  that  any  normal
character  could  remember  even  a  single  frame,  let  alone  the  entire  scene.26
However, Walton provides a counterargument against both the problem pertaining
to the narrator’s acquisition of knowledge and her mnemonic fidelity: it is clearly
fictional that the narrator knows everything in the flashback, and how she came to
acquire that information is irrelevant (1990, pp.360-1); similarly, Currie argues that
imagining one thing does not entail imagining its consequences (1995a, p.177).
Thus, we could be prescribed to imagine that a narrator knows everything in a
flashback without having to bother with the potential issues that follow. Hence, it is
26 Branigan makes a similar observation (1992, p.274).
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not  a  problem that  the  narrator  could  not,  realistically,  possess or  convey the
knowledge she does, so the narration could still be in the present.
The second objection is that if one rules out that the images correspond to
the narrator’s memories, they could still represent the mental activity of some other
character, perhaps the imagination of the interlocutors.27 However, this objection is
not  very  cogent:  Currie  says  that  not  all  anachronies  can  be  unequivocally
associated  with  a  character’s  memory  or  premonition  (1995a,  p.204),  so  this
objection seems to presuppose the CoP rather than prove it. There are examples
not mentioned by him which illustrate this well: in  Run Lola Run (Tykwer, 1998)
there are flash-forwards showing the fate of characters Lola encounters, but no
character accesses this information (nor could they, since no one is made out to
be prescient). In  Memento, the first and second half of the story are divided into
narrative  segments  interspersed  with  one  another.  Narrative  segments  of  the
second half are shown achronologically (we see the second half ‘backwards’: first
the  last  scene,  then  the  penultimate  etc.),  and  these  are  interspersed  with
segments from the story’s first half which are shown chronologically until the first
and second half of the story finally ‘meet up’ at the end of the film; the ending of
the narrative takes place in the middle of the story. However, the protagonist has a
mental condition that prevents him from creating lasting long-term memories. Here
one cannot possibly claim that the protagonist is thinking at a much later stage
about the events portrayed and that the images represent his act of remembering,
because his condition prevents him from storing memories for that long (the story
is largely centred around his very inability to remember). Nor could one construct
some kind of regress where he remembers one moment in which his past self
remembers  yet  an  even  earlier  moment,  because  that  would  entail  temporal
relocation, doing away with the presentness. More importantly, there is no property
27 Branigan considers this possibility too (1992, p.179).
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inherent in and unique to the medium of video games that prevents developers
from making a game-adaptation of Memento; the game Spoiler Alert (MEGAFUZZ,
2014)  is  similar  to  it  structurally,  since  one  plays  the  last  level  first,  then  the
penultimate etc. Also, just as in films, there are games where flashbacks cannot be
attributed to a reminiscing narrator: both Goldeneye 007 (Rare, 1997) and Grand
Theft Auto V (Rockstar North, 2013) begin with a text telling the player that the
events took place nine years ago, and  Uncharted 2: Among Thieves (Naughty
Dog, 2009) starts  in medias res and then shows what happened earlier, but in
none of these games are the sequences from the past presented as someone’s
memories. 
Moreover,  there  may  be  certain  kinds  of  narratives  where  it  would  be
unconvincing  or  outright  impossible  to  invoke  memories  of  the  narrator.  For
instance, Le Poidevin notes that so-called ‘mindless fiction’ –  where the events
are  not  observed  by  anyone  –  could  not  include  flashbacks  if  they  must
correspond to someone’s memory, but there is no reason to think that they could
not (2016,  p.325). Moreover,  this  seems  to  be  unrelated  to  medium-specific
properties. Mindless fictions seem rare in games, but there are some examples: in
Flower (Thatgamecompany, 2009) the player controls the wind, and we could most
certainly imagine a game like Flower that does not tell its story chronologically. Yet
again, current practice in the game industry does not necessarily reveal inherent
medium specific properties.
Another possible argument by defenders of the CoP mentioned by Currie is
that  an  anachrony  could  be  attributed  to  some  extradiegetic  narrator  (1995a,
p.204). The idea would be that all narratives have some kind of narrator, if only
implied, and that it  is this narrator whose memories are shown. This argument
could be even more appealing to game theorists defending the CoP, especially to
those considering the player to be the narrator of the story (e.g. Thabet 2015). If
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the narrator is the deictic centre, and the player is the narrator, it follows that the
player is the deictic centre, meaning that the game story shares her temporality.
However,  Currie’s  counterargument  concerning  films  is  that  it  would  be
controversial to claim that all films (with or without anachronies) have a narrator,
and this is indeed a contentious issue.28 To posit that all films and games  must
have a narrator, even when none is seen or heard of, seems more like an ad hoc
move to save the CoP.
In fact, this point has an even bigger impact in relation to games, where
interactivity  is  at  stake,  which  becomes clear  in  the  light  of  another  objection
presented by Currie: he explains that if a story is to take place now, some of the
narration would have to be contemporaneous with the events it describes, but the
common conception is that a narrator – if there is one – speaks of  past events
(1995a, p.205). Seymour Chatman agrees with this conception of the narrator ’s
relation to the events (1978, p.63, p.83). With this in mind, we can thus distinguish
two  necessary  premises  for  it  to  be  true  that  flashbacks  in  films  are  present
memories of a narrator: 1) all films have a narrator (who may be implied) and 2)
the  events  in  the  flashbacks  are  in  the  present.  It  follows  from  Currie’s  and
Chatman’s assertions that these two premises are irreconcilable with one another,
as the narrator speaks of past events; either the flashback is in the present or it is
the memory of a narrator, it cannot be both.
The same premises can be adopted in games, and they are problematic
there for the same reasons. In Sands of Time and Max Payne it is made clear that
the narration is not simultaneous with events narrated. Advocates of the CoP could
regard this as confirmation of the thesis that the present of the game corresponds
to that of the player, but it could at most prove that the narration is present (if even
28 See, for instance, Seymour Chatman (1978, 1990), Bordwell (1985), Wayne 
Booth (2002), Kania (2005), and Katherine Thomson-Jones (2007).
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that), not that which is narrated. Both Max Payne and the Prince categorically use
the past tense when referring to events that seem, to the player, to appear in the
present, and it is the narrated events that would have to be in the present in order
for the stories to be interactive, but they are clearly set in the past.29
There are more fundamental problems related to flashbacks and the claim
that all scenes in a game or film must necessarily be in the present. Abbot explains
that narrative time can depart from story time in three major ways: rearranging the
order of story events in the narration; expanding/shortening narrative time devoted
to a given story event; displaying the same story event more than once (2008,
p.242).  If  the  CoP  obtains  in  games,  it  makes  Abbott’s  three  temporal
manipulations  inaccessible  to  them;  relocating  a  scene  in  the  B-series  would
consequently relocate it in the A-series. Rearranging the scenes of a film does not
change the order of its story events,30 and game theorists like Juul fail to explain
why it should be different in games.
The reason why it  follows that  relocation  in  the  B-series  would  entail  a
corresponding relocation in the A-series is simple: Abbott explains that whereas
the temporal direction and structure of a narrative is malleable, the story within it is
always chronological (2008, p.17). This means that if we have a story sequence
with three events with a clear temporal connection to each other, 1-2-3, and these
are represented by a narrative sequence with three corresponding scenes, x-y-z (x
corresponds to 1, y to 2 and z to 3),  then regardless of how we structure the
narrative  sequence  in  a  film  or  a  novel  (y-z-x;  z-x-y;  x-z-y  etc.)  readers  and
spectators alike are still expected by the text to conclude that the story events take
29 Hanson acknowledges that the events narrated are in the past but asserts that 
‘the player is acting in the present, controlling the past actions of [the 
Prince].’(2018, p.152)
Jordan Mechner, the creator of Sands of Time, notes that narration in the past 
tense should contradict the impression that one is able to influence the course 
of events (2007, p.116).
30 Aarseth agrees ([1994]2003, p.765).
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place  in  the  order  1-2-3. If  one  on  the  other  hand  imputes  a  direct  structural
correlation to plot and story so that the chronological order of story events always
corresponds to the order of the narrative sequences that present them – which
one is obliged to do if one claims that the story is in the present – it follows that a
structural rearrangement of narrative events entails a temporal rearrangement of
story events. Thus, if scene x would be moved in the plot so that it is represented
after y and z (giving y-z-x) it would follow that x’s corresponding story event 1,
because  of  this  rearrangement,  now  takes  place  after story  event  2  and  3
(conveyed by y and z) instead of only being represented after them, so narrative
sequence  y-z-x  conveys  that  the story  events  take  place  in  the  order  2-3-1,
because if 1 would still take place before 2 and 3 in spite of being represented
after them, it would follow that the fictional present of 1 does not coincide with the
screen present. If this were the case, flashbacks would be inconceivable in game
narratives,  as  the  operation  necessary  to  produce  flashbacks  in  other  media
would, in games, bring about alterations in the events’ temporal relations to  one
another in order to  preserve that  between  the story and the player,  that  is,  of
concomitance. Game theorists mentioned in the introduction are unaware of these
consequences, but will  have to concede that they follow from the premise that
games are always in the present.
The  sheer  absurdity  of  these  consequences  becomes  obvious  when
studying  any  game  with  flashbacks,  as  Abbott’s  first  and  second  temporal
rearrangement would not be possible in games (neither rearrangement of scenes
nor  revisiting  them).  In  the  beginning  of  Max  Payne, the  eponymous  hero  is
standing  on  a  skyscraper,  beholding  the  helicopter  he  has  just  shot  down,
reminiscing about his wife and child who died three years earlier. The following
sequence is an interactive flashback in which Max comes home and discovers his
recently killed wife and daughter, and the rest of the game is about what led to the
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beginning of the game. If rearrangement in the representation entails a temporal
rearrangement of  story events as outlined above, it  would follow that the story
events in  Max Payne necessarily follow one another chronologically.  The story
would  then  begin  with  Max  on  top  of  a  skyscraper  looking  at  the  helicopter
wreckage,  brooding  over  his  dead  wife  and  kid,  whereafter  he  enters  his
apartment and finds his family inexplicably resurrected (only to be killed again),
finally leading up to what is presumably a different but identical scene where Max
is,  once  more,  standing  on  top  of  a  skyscraper,  looking  at  (another)  burning
helicopter he just shot down.31
It  would  also  follow,  paradoxically,  that  the  temporal  relations  between
narrative sequences would change when presented in a different medium: a chain
of events would have to be seen as present at the time of playing the game only
because of purportedly medium specific properties (meaning that they transpire
chronologically,  as  outlined  above),  but  since  Juul  and  others  claim that  non-
interactive media can indicate other temporal properties, and the narrative of Max
Payne clearly  indicates  that  the  narrative  is  a  flashback,  the  order  would  be
rearranged as a consequence of moving the events from an interactive medium to
a non-interactive one. The exact same narrative sequence would then express
different temporal relationships between its segments in virtue of being expressed
in different media, meaning that a playthrough of a game and a recording of it
convey different  relations  between  the  very  same segments.  This  means  that
when playing Max Payne, the discovery of the dead wife is in the present (since
flashbacks cannot exist if the CoP obtains in games), so, as already noted, the
scene would show how Max discovers his resurrected wife who has been killed for
31  Wei, Bizzochi, and Calvert also reach the conclusion that the player’s 
interaction influences temporal relations (2010, pp.7-8, p.13), but neglect the 
problematic consequences I outline. Ryan reasons similarly to the way I do but 
for some reason only draws this conclusion with regard to hypertext (2015, 
p.198).
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a second time. In contrast, in a recording of this playthrough, the death of Max’s
family and the events following it would instead be a flashback, since a film can
convey anachronies in a way games allegedly cannot. This would also contradict
what Mukherjee asserted earlier, that the game story can be stored in recordings,
because once recorded, it would become a different story. Game scholars would
then be obliged to argue that the same text can accommodate different works, a
theory none of the aforementioned theorists seems to embrace, or even consider.
Thus, flashbacks pose a significant challenge to the CoP, as they imply that
the story takes place in the past. Conceptions of flashbacks that allow for them to
take place in the present – e.g.  claiming that the images correspond to verbal
narration or memories – lack support in many narratives, as there is not always a
narrator to whom we could ascribe the narration. Positing that all narratives have a
narrator not only is ad hoc, it also entails that the events narrated are necessarily
set in the past, which precludes interaction with them. Moreover, the assumption
that  flashbacks  are  absent  in  games  entails  that  all  scenes  are  presented
chronologically, which would lead to counterintuitive interpretations of narratives
that clearly present their stories in a non-chronological order.
2.2 Separate screenings, pauses, and temporality
2.2.1 Separate screenings and playthroughs
Another  problem  mentioned  by  Bourne  and  Caddick  Bourne  –  related  to  the
assessment of temporal properties of a fiction in relation to those of a person’s
reception of it – is the question of what happens when the same film is screened at
different  but  overlapping times,  so that  one person is  watching the first  scene
when someone else is watching the second. It  follows that it  would result in a
contradiction if both viewers are to imagine that the respective scenes onscreen
are present in virtue of being watched in the present (Bourne and Caddick Bourne
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2016, pp.34-5). A similar point has been raised by Le Poidevin (2016, p.325). As
the CoP leads to the same result for both people, Bourne and Caddick Bourne
conclude that it is not a reliable mechanism for locating the fictional present (2016,
p.36).
There is an implied premise here, of which neither Caddick and Caddick
Bourne nor Le Poidevin seem to be aware, namely that each audiovisual fiction is
only seen/played once in one continuous screening/playthrough. By rejecting this
premise  it  also  follows  that  temporal  discrepancies  arise  whenever  a  given
screening/playthrough is experienced as fragmented because of pauses, or when
the same narrative is experienced twice by the same person. One can assume
that readers are not expected to re-read a previous passage before finishing the
book, and that spectators are not expected rewind a film mid-screening to watch
the same scene again,  but  it  is  nevertheless possible  to  do so and,  one may
presume,  not  uncommon.  Moreover,  repeated  access  to  the  same  narrative
segment  is  generally  regarded  as  the  rule  rather  than  the  exception  in  video
games, as it seems to be generally acknowledged that repetition is ubiquitous, for
instance when players lose and retry the same section over and over until they
master  it  (Aarseth  1997,  p.113;  Wolf  2001c,  p.81;  King  2002,  p.52;  King  and
Krzywinska 2002, pp.18-19; Frasca 2003b, p.227; Ryan 2004, p.351; Egenfeldt-
Nielsen, Heide Smith, and Pajares Tosca 2008, p.204; Wei, Bizzocchi, and Calvert
2010,  p.7;  Warkentin 2014; Wesp 2014;  Mukherjee 2015, p.124; Tavinor 2017,
p.27;  Hanson  2018,  p.111).  In  fact,  repetition  is  so  essential  to  the  game
experience  that  some  of  these  theorists  claim  that  this  feature  makes  them
fundamentally different from novels and literature.32
Bourne and Caddick Bourne contend that it would be wrong to presuppose
32 I do not deny that repetition may be more essential in games, my point is only 
that it is nevertheless possible in other media.
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a temporal relation between our world and the fictional one, and that one for that
reason cannot ask what happens in the fiction while time passes in the actual
world (2016, p.36). Le Poidevin  adds that by assuming a  temporal connection
between the fictional world and ours one has to explain why there is not also a
causal one (1988, p.254),  and he further says that it  could be argued that we
cannot speak of the temporal properties of a world within which we are not located
ourselves (2001, p.71). His point can possibly be countered by game theorists like
Juul and Thabet who do posit a causal connection between the game world and
ours, which would allow for a temporal relation as well. What is problematic is how
to explain this connection without resorting to circular reasoning of the kind that
games are interactive because they are in the present, and that they are in the
present because they are interactive (leading to the four questions mentioned in
the introduction of the first chapter). Furthermore, both temporal issues related to
films, mentioned above, cause the same problems when applied to games: if two
players play the same game but start at different times, it follows that the same
event is past and present simultaneously. Further, if a player pauses the game
momentarily,  it  behoves  the  game  theorists  to  explain  how  the  timelines  can
remain aligned when the player continues the game.
Le Poidevin elaborates on the problem of simultaneous screening, and says
that if a fiction is partly constituted by the performance of it, one would be forced to
equate  each screening with  its  own unique fiction (2016,  p.325).  He does not
condone  this  solution,  arguing  that  we  usually  think  of  fictional  truth  as
independent of screenings of a given narrative (Le Poidevin 2016, p.325). Bourne
and  Caddick  Bourne  defend  a  solution  similar  to  the  one  presented  by  Le
Poidevin,  when the  fiction  itself  presents temporal  incongruities:  in  Groundhog
Day (Ramis, 1993) the main character seems to be stuck in a time-loop, waking up
on the same day repeatedly, but Bourne and Caddick Bourne argue that we are
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actually shown several possible worlds with identical people waking up in identical
circumstances, not the same world with the same person experiencing the same
day (2016,  p.96).33 Perhaps we could introduce a similar  concept  for  separate
screenings,  so  that  they  are  actually  about  different  but  identical  people  in
separate possible worlds.
However,  there  are  good  reasons  to  concur  with  Le  Poidevin  that  one
should  not  increase  the  number  of  fictions  to  resolve  temporal  discrepancies,
some of which he does not mention. By pairing each screening/playthrough with
its own fiction we resolve the problem of simultaneous and/or multiple consecutive
screenings/playthroughs of the same film/game, because, by definition, the same
fiction can only be accessed once; one can never step into the same narratological
river twice. However, not only does this interpretation lack support in most fictions
–  Groundhog Day does not  prescribe imagining distinct  possible  worlds  – this
would then have to obtain for films and games alike, so the difference between
them would be undermined, and game theorists would either have to explain why
we cannot interact with films if they too take place in the present, or concede that
games are not interactive in virtue of being set in the present. To claim that games
are unique in this respect is ad hoc.
Furthermore,  it  would mean that there is a potentially infinite  number of
identical fictions, each of which is presented for each screening of a given film, or
almost identical fictions created each time a given game is played. The debate
regarding whether identical texts (or almost identical ones) convey different stories
is outside the scope of this thesis, but for present purposes it suffices to say that it
is counterintuitive to demand that an infinite number of (almost) identical texts be
paired with an infinite number of stories, all for the sake of salvaging the CoP.34
33 Ryan also considers the possibility of regarding a singular fiction as a collection 
of possible worlds (2015, p.199).
34 For more on textual individuation, see e.g. Tilghman (1982, pp.297-9), Currie 
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However, several game theorists are quite open to the conception of the
player as some kind of creator (e.g.  Davidson 2008;  Ip 2011; Warkentin 2011;
Laurel  2014;  Ulas  2014;  Wendler  2014;  Haggis  2016;  Zarzycki  2016;  Whaley
2018). This could imply that each playthrough is its own fiction, and for that reason
one could equate the actual present with the present of its respective game story,
but  that  would be a desperate  measure on their  part,  and would  eliminate  all
possibilities of speaking of a game as having a singular story (which most scholars
and critics alike tend to do). Hence, they would have to do away with one of two
premises: 1) the same story can be analysed by different people playing the same
game, or 2) the story can be created/altered by the player since it takes place now.
Regardless  of  which  premise they reject,  they would  have to  explain  why the
remaining one applies exclusively to games and not film and/or literature.
2.2.2 Pauses
However, there are other problems that are not likely to be resolved by linking
each  playthrough/screening  to  its  own  story,  even  if  one  disregards  the
counterintuitive nature of this solution. It has the appeal of obviating issues arising
when two players  play different  segments  of  the  same game:  by linking  each
playthrough to its respective fiction the problem is merely ostensible, for they are
not really playing the same story. Nevertheless, even if the narratives are different,
problems concerning temporal relations within their respective stories remain, and
one has to  answer  what  happens to  the  temporal  alignment  of  a  film/game if
watched/played at separate occasions due to pauses.
Juul sees nothing problematic in how games may be paused, either by the
player or by the game when it is loading the next area, and he claims that this
(1990, pp.77-8, pp.152-3, p.178),  Lamarque (1990, p.337, 2009, pp.75-6), 
Livingston (2005, pp.112-34),and Tavinor (2012, p.192).
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break only applies to play time but not fictional time (2004, p.136, 2005, pp.148-
151). Likewise, Zagal and Mateas (2010, p.856), Charley Reed (2016, p.632), and
Hanson (2018, p.59) contend that players can control time through pausing it. It
has also been argued that they can reset time by loading a save game (Hanson
2018, p.106), or simply by resetting the game itself (Reed 2016, p.632). Similarly,
Ryan  explains  that,  in  an  RPG,  whenever  the  player  is  considering  possible
responses in dialogues with other characters, narrative time stops until the player
makes her choice (2015, p.237). None of these theorists seem to be aware that
such an explanation is untenable, as it would preclude the CoP.
The CoP presumes that a film is only seen once, in one sitting without any
breaks,  because  if  it  is  not,  one  would  have  to  explain  what  happens  to  the
fictional  present  when the  same film is  watched a  second time,  or  when  it  is
paused and the screening is continued at another occasion. Games are usually
not  played  once  in  one  uninterrupted  sitting,  nor  do  they seem to  encourage
players to play them this way, so adherents of the CoP would have to explain why
these temporal connections are incessantly dispersed and reestablished.
Here it may be objected that games should ideally be played in one sitting
even if common practice does not reflect this, just as films are not supposed  to be
interrupted by commercials and/or toilet breaks. After all, not all games do have a
pause function, such as Dark Souls (FromSoftware, 2011). However, this objection
does not seem warranted. Firstly,  as already stated, game theorists agree that
repetition is ubiquitous and essential in games. Secondly, it is atypical to play a
game taking many hours to finish in but one sitting (Newman 2004, p.84; Kania
2018, p.198n23). A game theorist may object that it takes considerably less time in
a so-called ‘speed-run’, a playthrough where the game is played with the intention
of finishing it  as fast as possible,  but game narratives usually do not seem to
prescribe players to finish them as quickly as possible, nor is it possible to do so
93
on the first attempt. Speed-runs require much practice in order to memorize and
master  the  optimal  strategy  in  the  various  levels  and  missions,  and  although
games prescribe the player to learn the best strategy through playing, they do not
expect players to already know it on a first playthrough.
Furthermore, not all games can be played without pausing: in Ocarina of
Time and  Resident Evil 4 one  must pause to reach the inventory screen where
one can equip weapons and items necessary for completion of the game. Not
even films always seem to be intended to be seen in one sitting, as longer ones
like  Ben-Hur (Wyler, 1959) and  2001: A Space Odyssey (Kubrick, 1968) include
intermissions in  the middle.  For  films to  be  A-series  aligned,  the  intermissions
would have to start and end at exactly the right moment, with nothing happening in
the story inbetween. In games, it would mean that the spectator/player happens to
start, pause and unpause the game at the exact same moment for the timelines to
be aligned. This becomes even more problematic in both films and games when a
sequel  commences at  the  same moment  where  the  first  film/game ends.  The
films/games would have to be synchronized so that the player/spectator can go
from one to the other without any break, stopping the first film/game at the moment
the credits appear,  which is impossible for those playing/watching the first  part
when it first comes out, who have to wait for the sequel to be released. This is
made even more problematic by prequels, since they are seen after the first film
but take place before it, and thus could not possibly be A-series aligned. In brief,
the argument that each film and game should be experienced without breaks does
not hold, so they are not likely to be A-series aligned.
This relates to the more fundamental question already mentioned, of what
happens to a given fiction when it is not watched, which is addressed by Bourne
and Caddick Bourne, and Le Poidevin. Bourne and Caddick Bourne contend that it
is unwarranted to ask whether the fictional present progresses irrespective of our
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engagement with  it  (2016, p.36),  but this conclusion stems primarily from their
conception  of  fictional  time  as  unrelated  to  ours.  Unlike  Bourne  and  Caddick
Bourne,  Le  Poidevin  does  not  immediately  reject  the  question  of  whether  the
fictional present keeps moving outside of screenings (2016, pp.325-6), and by so
doing he unwittingly points to the more fundamental problem of how the real and
the fictitious present could be aligned to begin with, and why they continue to be
so.  If  game theorists  like  Juul  and Thabet  accept  that  the fictional  and actual
presents are not aligned when we are not engaging with a narrative, they must
explain why they are aligned when we do engage with it, what it is in a given fiction
that prescribes imagining this. If there is no direct link between actual and fictional
time, it could at most be an inexplicable coincidence that games take place at the
same time as they are played, and causal connections should disperse along with
the temporal ones, ergo: game stories would cease to be interactive.
One possible explanation as to why video game stories take place in the
present, which is reconcilable with pauses, is that just as the player affects the
story of  the game,  she also affects  its  very temporality,  in  the  sense that  her
playing generates fictional truths in the story but also that her playing extends the
fictional timeline. Time would thus not pass when the game is not played, because
it is playing per se that adds time and allows it to progress. Thus, if fictional truth is
equivalent  to  prescribed  imagination,  and  we  are  not  prescribed  to  imagine
anything outside our engagement, it follows that we are not prescribed to imagine
that  time  passes  outside  engagement.  This  allows  for  the  fictional  present  to
progress  when  we  engage  with  a  fiction  without  entailing  problems  of  what
happens outside our engagement; it further seems to be in line with Bourne and
Caddick Bourne’s claim that it is unwarranted to ask whether the fictional present
progresses outside our engagement with it.
Does  this  resolve  the  issue  of  pausing?  Not  necessarily.  First  of  all,
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narratives in all  media could potentially prescribe imagining that the story takes
place in the present, meaning that video games are not unique. Secondly, a fiction
can prescribe imagining that the story progresses even when it is not screened:
the first season of the TV-series 24 (2002) indicates that story time passes during
the commercial breaks. 
More importantly, this solution is countered indirectly by Le Poidevin when
he considers potential temporal connections in film, and asserts that if it  is the
engagement that generates fictional truths about which moment that is present, it
follows  that  fictional  facts  disperse  when  there  is  no  screening  (2016,  p.325).
Some game theorists endorse this solution, and accept that there is no fiction in a
game when it is not played, but maintain that this only applies to games and not
films:  Ken  Perlin  does  not  think  game-characters  exist  when  he  leaves  his
computer  (2004,  p.15),  and  as  mentioned  earlier,  Mukherjee  argues  that  the
narrative  of  the  game  disappears  after  the  playing  but  may  be  preserved  in
recordings. By contrast, Jon Robson and Aaron Meskin claim that fictional truths in
games still  obtain even when they are not played, and that if  the gameplay is
recorded, the truths of that recording obtain even when it is not watched (2016,
p.172). If fictional truths are dependent on screenings, then theorists like Perlin
and Mukherjee would have to concede that we can only speak of fictional truths
when we are playing, as it is only then that we are prescribed to imagine them
(and even then we could only speak of the fictional truths obtaining at a particular
moment in the fiction, since we are never prescribed to imagine the fiction in its
entirety).  Moreover,  this  principle  would  not  be  unique  to  games:  either  both
games and films generate fictional truths at the time of screening or neither does.
Either way, game narratives would not differ from films (and possibly novels that
use the present tense), so their stories cannot be interactive if those in films (and
some novels) are not.
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One could  potentially  solve  the  problem of  what  happens when  pauses
‘break up’ a narrative by extrapolating the principle mentioned earlier, of equating
each screening with its own fiction. Thus, each time a segment of a film is watched
we access a different fiction, meaning that by watching the first and second half of
the  same  film  on  different  occasions,  one  is  actually  watching  two  separate
fictions.  Likewise,  by  pausing  the  game,  one  stops  the  representation  of  one
fiction, and by unpausing, one starts that of another.
However,  even  if  we  disregard  the  issues  following  from  this  solution,
already mentioned in the discussion on separate screenings, this would aggravate
other  questions  of  truth  in  fiction.  It  would  follow  that  if  one  watches/plays  a
film/game  one  minute  at  a  time,  a  100  minutes  long  narrative  becomes  100
minute-long narratives, which would arguably make the 100 corresponding stories
incomprehensible. When watching/playing segment 100, one could never say with
certainty what happened in the time leading up to it (i.e. the events one would
intuitively connect to minute 1 through 99), because most textual evidence other
spectators/players would use is inaccessible to the ‘fragmenting’ spectator/player.
She cannot claim that each segment belongs to a unique fiction which happens to
be  identical  to  that  of  a  corresponding  fiction  received  in  one  coherent
screening/playthrough – i.e.  that  her  segment  number 43 corresponds to  what
happens  in  the  same  film/game  after  43  minutes  when  said  film/game  is
watched/played in one sitting35 – because she has no textual evidence to support
it, only a disjointed series of 100 minute-long minimalist narratives. Someone who
watches the end of  The Empire Strikes Back (Kershner, 1980) (or plays a video
game adaptation of it) cannot say, when watching/playing the very last minute-long
segment, that Vader (David Prowse) is the father of Luke (Mark Hamill), because
35 Provided that there is an ‘ideal playthrough’ with a fixed duration. Precluding this
assumption would only exacerbate issues of fragmented fiction even further.
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that  is  revealed  in  another  segment,  which  constitutes  a  separate  fiction.
Furthermore, when watching/playing the segment where their kinship is revealed
the spectator/player should not be surprised to find out this. Since the preceding
segments belong to other fictions, it is not true in this segment that this had been a
secret to real and fictional characters alike up until the moment of revelation; the
impact of all plot-twists would disappear.
Furthermore, this presupposes that Luke’s accusation of Vader killing his
father and Vader’s revelation appear in the same minute-long fiction; if it is divided
into two separate minute-long fictions it would not be true in either that Luke and
Vader  are  related.  In  one  collection  of  screenings/playthroughs it  may be that
almost no piece of information obtains, should the narrative be segmented at the
‘right’ instances in  such  a  way that  no  two  utterances  related  to  one another
appear in the same segment. In a video game the number of separate fictions
would often be many more than in a film for two reasons: firstly, games are often
longer than films; secondly, as noted above, several theorists think retries are an
integral part of video games, but if each retry marks the beginning of a new fiction,
it means that in difficult games the player could end up with much more than one
fiction  per  minute.  With  all  this  in  mind,  one  can  rule  out  that  each
screening/playthrough  is  linked  to  its  own  unique  fiction,  and  the  problem  of
retaining the relation between actual and fictional present remains.
2.2.3 Resetting time
There is another possible solution which does not require thinking of the same
narrative as conveying infinitely many identical  stories:  Yaffe  suggests that  the
fictional present in films can be ‘reset’ (2003, p.134). Similar thoughts can be found
in  discussions  on  games:  Ryan  contends  that  whenever  one  hears  the  same
narrative more than once,  one is  ‘temporally relocated’ to  its  beginning (2015,
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pp.105-6); Juul calls save-games manipulations of game time that allow players to
continue from a stored game state at a moment in play time (2004, p.137); as
already mentioned, both Hanson (2018, pp.90-1, p.106) and Reed  (2016, p.632)
maintain that the player’s control  of game time comprises the ability to reset it
(neither Juul nor Hanson explain why this does not apply to films). Similarly, Le
Poidevin suggests that the time of a film could be reset for every screening of it,
but contrary to the aforementioned scholars he does not seem to take this solution
seriously (2016, p.326).
Yaffe speaks primarily of temporal resetting within a single fiction in relation
to  anachronies,  but  this  principle  can  be  applied  to  paused  and  separate
screenings as well, because both are connected to the more fundamental problem
of explaining how the actual and fictional A-series can be aligned. Yaffe argues
that if films are A-series aligned it means that fictional events recede into the past
at the same rate as the images conveying them. When a flashback appears, he
says, the images before the flashback – which purportedly show the present – will
recede at a slower rate than if the events had been shown chronologically; the pre-
flashback scene can be followed directly by the post-flashback-scene in fictional
time, but in viewing time they could be several minutes, or even hours apart, since
the  flashback  is  inserted  between  them.  Yaffe’s  solution  is  that  the  flashback
‘resets’ the  spectator’s  conception  of  the  location  in  order  to  re-align  the  past
images (2003, p.134). 
Yaffe is right in his observation regarding the possible temporal discrepancy,
because  if  we  have  a  flashback  that  lasts  for  half  an  hour,  we  may  get  the
awkward consequence that the pre-flashback events seemingly took place only an
instant ago, but must have taken place thirty minutes ago in story time since they
are  half  an  hour  away  in  screen-time. If  the  A-series  properties  of  the  story
supervene on those of the screening, it follows that the pre-flashback story event
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must have taken place thirty minutes ago even if the narrative indicates that the
post-flashback event followed immediately afterwards. If fictional time progresses
at the same rate during the flashback it must mean that nothing happens in the
story for as long as the flashback is onscreen, which seems unlikely in films where
the action continues immediately where it left off before the flashback, or returns to
a moment much later in story time than the length of the flashback would allow for
(i.e. the post-flashback scene takes place two hours after the pre-flashback scene,
even though the flashback only lasts a couple of minutes). There simply is no
guarantee that temporal progression during flashbacks always corresponds to the
duration of said flashback. By saying that the fictional present can be ‘reset’ the
temporal discrepancy is obviated, and the fictional and the actual present remain
aligned.  What  Yaffe  does  not  seem to  realize  is  that  this  possibly  solves  the
problem of all anachronies – he only mentions flashbacks but does not see that it
is equally applicable to flash-forwards and ellipses –  as well as the issues focused
on in this section, of fragmented and separate screenings/playthroughs. Whenever
a player pauses the game, or when the game stops to load the next level, or even
when its framerate slows down because of limits in the hardware, one could say
that the present ‘resets’, so that fiction and reality become A-series aligned once
more. It could even solve the problem of the Duration Assumption if we hold that
the present ‘resets’ at every frame throughout the narrative.
However, this is not a viable solution; it is egregiously ad hoc and arbitrary,
yet another move primarily motivated to save the CoP. Moreover, it does not prove
that the story takes place in the present, for one may just as well claim that we
access  the  past  of  the  story,  and  that  it  is  the  pastness  that  is  ‘reset’  at
anachronies, pauses, and separate screenings. Instead of claiming that fiction and
reality are A-series aligned, and that this relation is maintained through ‘resetting’
for which there seems to be no imaginative prescription by the narrative, it would
100
be better to concede that there is no A-series alignment at all, i.e. that the video
game story does not take place in the present and cannot be interactive for that
reason.
Hence, separate screenings of the same narrative show that one cannot
assume  that  a  story  takes  place  in  the  present,  unless  one  adopts  the
counterintuitive  conception  that  each  screening/playthrough  corresponds  to  its
own  unique  fiction  (that  happens  to  be  identical  to  those  of  other
screenings/playthroughs of the same narrative). This solution is made even less
plausible by the fact that a single screening/playthrough may be paused, which
would  require  each  segment to  be  its  own  fiction,  which  would  complicate
interpretative matters even further. One could attempt to resolve this by positing
that the temporality can be ‘reset’ so as to retain the alignment between the real
and fictional timelines, but this solution is ad hoc. 
2.3 The existence of the fictional present
The question examined in this section is whether any moment in the fiction can be
identified as present at all, in the sense that there is some kind of metaphysically
privileged point in fictional time. As Bourne and Caddick Bourne explain, the flow
of  time – ‘the change in  the temporal  location of  events  from being future,  to
present, to past’ – is, according to theories on the A-series, ‘not to be understood
merely in terms of the temporal perspective we have towards those events. In this
sense, the flow of time is an objective feature of reality’ (both quotes from 2016,
p.27).  If  games are to  take place in  the  present,  it  would mean that  it  is  this
metaphysically privileged point in time that moves, and if games are to differ from
narratives in other media, one would have to claim that this is not a feature of film
and literature. One could claim that there is no flow in films, but that only our
perspective changes, and what sets games apart  – what makes it  possible for
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them  to  be  interactive  but  not  films  –  is  that  fictional  time  actually  flows.
Conversely, if there is no metaphysically privileged, moving point in fictional time,
games cannot be interactive. Briefly, can time in any kind of fiction be an A-series,
or is it with necessity only a B-series? Does this differ between media?
The first question to be answered is why any point in the story should be
labelled as present. The first reason for this may be that there presumably is a
present in the actual world, and it seems intuitive that things should be similar in
the fictional one.36 Such a solution has been presented by Le Poidevin, drawing
inspiration from Lewis. According to David Lewis’ view on how to ascertain what is
true in fiction:
A sentence of the form ‘In the fiction f, ϕ’ is non‐
vacuously true iff some world where f is told as known
fact and ϕ is true differs less from our actual world, on
balance, than does any world where f is told as known
fact and ϕ is not true. It is vacuously true iff there are no
possible worlds where f is told as known fact. (Lewis 1978, p.42)
Le Poidevin simplifies this as follows: ‘It is true in fiction  F that  p if and only if,
within the class of possible worlds where F is told as known fact, there is at least
one world where p is true and which is closer to the actual world than any world in
that same class where  p is  not true’ (Le Poidevin 2007,  p.150). This principle,
which Walton calls  ‘the reality principle’ (1990,  p.144),  has been discussed by
several theorists to varying extents, even if they do not always call it by this name
(e.g. Eco 1979; Byrne 1993; Livingston 1993; Hanley 2004; Kania 2007; Gendler
2010; Le Poidevin 2016; Friend 2017;  Stock 2017). However, one recurrent flaw
among some (but not all) of these theorists is that they treat the Reality Principle
36 Provided that the actual time series is an A-series; for objections, see 
McTaggart (1927, section 33).
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as  separate  from other  principles  that  define  truth  in  fiction,  something  to  be
combined with,  for  instance, the intentions of the author,  or the most plausible
meaning of a text in relation to linguistic conventions. Stock goes so far as to say
that  the  Reality  Principle  is  incompatible with  her  own  preferred  interpretative
method of equating fictional truth with the intentions of the actual author (2017,
p.52). However, The Reality Principle is not incompatible with any interpretative
model, it is contingent on them. An intentionalist like Stock could claim that truth in
fiction is defined by the actual author’s intentions and that the Reality Principle
obtains if and only if this is what the real author intends. Otherwise Stock would
face some serious issues of how to explain why we always seem prescribed to
draw on knowledge of  the  real  world:  ‘Anyone who supposes that  fictions  are
radically cut  off  from the world  will  need to  confront  the obvious fact  that  […]
fictional “worlds” incorporate a great deal of straightforward information about the
real world’ (Lamarque and Olsen 1994, p.95). Therefore, we cannot say that the
fictional time-line is an A-series only with reference to real life, because we cannot
apply the Reality Principle without ‘permission’ from the fiction in question. Seeing
how many games, films, and books include timelines quite different in nature from
our own, there is little reason to assume that the fictional time must correspond to
the actual one in that it too is an A-series, in spite of all other possible differences;
in a game like Sands of Time where time can be slowed down and/or reversed, it
makes little sense to presume that time must be an A-series only because that
would bring it closer to the actual world, seeing how it is already radically different
in other respects.
Related to this, some of what Le Poidevin says about the fixity/openness of
the fictional future can be applied in relation to presentness as well. Le Poidevin
claims that ‘if it is a necessary non fictional truth that the future is unfixed, then in‐
no worlds will the future be fixed’ (2007, p.150). Likewise, we may conclude that if
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it is a necessary property of actual time that there is a present, it follows that there
must be a present in the time of game stories; conversely, if it is not an inherent
property, video game stories need not necessarily have a fictional present.
One reason as to why there is no fictional present, cited by both McTaggart
(1927, p.16) and Currie (1995a, p.207) is that it is impossible for the recipient of a
narrative to ascertain which moment in the story that is the present. According to
Bourne and Caddick Bourne: 
A satisfactory theory of time’s flow requires there to be something significantly
different about the present moment which serves to characterize the difference
between past, present, and future and thus what it would be for there to be a
genuine change from one to the other.  Without such a significant  difference
between the present time and other times, it is hard to see what it would be for
time to flow, because it is hard to see what sort of change the flow of time would
involve. (Bourne and Caddick Bourne 2016, p.27)
If we cannot tell whether a given scene is an anachrony or in the fictional present,
then there is perhaps no significant difference that sets the fictional present apart.
In films, it seems problematic to locate any such metaphysically privileged point in
the story;  as noted by Cardwell,  we cannot  tell  whether  a  shot  is  a  flashback
unless  it  is  seen  in  context (2003,  pp.86-7).  In  games  one  could  argue  that
interactivity is the property that makes the metaphysically privileged point in time
different. The fictional present would thus be the moment one can interact with,
similar to what Juul says when he defines the game’s present as the moment with
which one interacts (2005, p.143). In  Max Payne, this would mean that the first
scene is a flash-forward since it is not interactive, and that the second scene is in
the present because it is. However, this hypothesis is problematic because of four
factors: the possible circularity of the argument, the possibility to save and reload
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video games, games containing anachronies and time travel, and the multimedial
nature of games.
Firstly,  the  claim  that  the  moment  with  which  one  interacts  must  be  a
fictional present seems more like an assumption than a necessary consequence of
the dynamics of fictional temporality. It is an argument presuming the existence of
a fictional present as well as its location in the screen present, possibly leading to
circularity: the interactive segment is the fictional present because it is interactive,
and it is interactive because it is the fictional present. Moreover, the mere fact that
one moment in the narrative differs from others does not set games apart from
other media. One could just as well claim that the present moment in a film is the
moment currently represented onscreen, or that the present moment in a book is
the one the reader is currently reading about.  In both of these cases, it  is the
property of being represented that sets the moment apart, and the flow of time
changes which moment that is represented and therefore which moment that is
present. Having a moment labelled as present, however, does not make films or
books  interactive,  so  this  cannot  be  sufficient  to  make  video  game  stories
interactive either.
Secondly, it is problematic to posit any one moment as present with regard
to its interactivity, because reloading a saved game allows the player to bring back
a past moment to interact with it, as mentioned by both Mukherjee (2015, p.137)
and Juul (2004, p.137). Interactivity is a property unique to games and presumably
gives us a reason to classify a given moment as present in a way one cannot do in
films and books, since they lack interactivity.  Nevertheless, it  is  the very same
property that  precludes this  classification and deprives that  one moment  of  its
exclusiveness; we can bring back any moment and make it interactive once more,
meaning that interactivity does not suffice to indicate temporal properties of any
given moment, since it can be acquired repeatedly by the very same moment (so
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this property does not set a given moment apart from the rest).
The third reason why interactivity in itself is not an indication of the fictional
present is,  as noted in section 2.1, that there are interactive anachronies. The
possibility of ‘bringing back the past’ can also be integrated into the story itself in
games including time travel: The Legend of Zelda: Majora’s Mask (Nintendo, 2000;
henceforth  Majora’s  Mask)  is  about  Link  travelling  back  in  time  and  re-
experiencing the same three days over and over until the end of the world (on the
third day) can be prevented. Interactive anachronies and fictional time travel can
possibly be explained in one of two ways. The first possible explanation is that the
metaphysically privileged point in time is moved along with the player and that the
moment which the player chooses to interact with is the fictional present only for
as  long as  she stays  in  it,  leading  to  the  first  two problematic  factors  already
discussed  above,  the  question-begging  argument  that  the  interactive  moment
must be present because it is interactive, and that this moment can move back
and forth in time; in Majora’s Mask the first day would become fictionally present
every time Link rewinds time. In that case video games are not unique, because
Ryan has argued, similarly to Thabet, that the reader of a book can be transported
to the ‘now of the storyworld’ (2015, p.98). Ryan argues that this involves a shifted
present  and not  merely being informed about  events in  a  fictional  past  (2015,
pp.105-6).  This  would  mean  that  films and books  can  bring  back  the  fictional
present too, either through rewinding the film or rereading an earlier passage, or
through a flashback, meaning that there is no reason to posit that game stories are
interactive given that the feature of bringing back the fictional present is not unique
to them.  The second possible explanation is that the present moves at a steady
pace  and  only  in  one  direction,  and  that  flashbacks  and  flash-forwards  are
representations of  the past and future.  Something similar  has been argued by
Yaffe:  he  argues  that  when  the  same  event  is  shown  twice  in  a  film,  it  is
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represented as a past event the second time (2003, p.128). If this is also true in
games in the sense that flashbacks are representations of the past, it follows that
the  player’s  interaction  is  not  limited  to  the  present.  In  Ocarina  of  Time and
Majora’s Mask it would then mean that the present is not moved along with Link
when he travels back in time, so he is actually relocated to the past. The same
would obtain in  Max Payne, so that the entire game is actually in the past if the
first scene is the present. This would in turn mean that the player is able to interact
with the past both in the case of flashbacks and voyages through time, but then it
follows that  games are not  interactive because of  their  presentness  (there are
more problems related to this issue, which will be discussed later).
The fourth and final reason why interactivity in itself is not an indication of
the  fictional  present  is  that  the  division  between  games  and  film/literature  is
ultimately a false dichotomy: many games consist partly of films and text, in the
form of cutscenes and text-segments. If films and novels do not convey events in
the fictional present, it follows that the gameplay before and after a cutscene/text
segment takes place in the present, but that the events  within the cutscene/text
segment take place in the past – in virtue of being expressed in a non-interactive
medium – which in practice would render all games with cutscenes/text segments
temporally complex and contradictory. 
An example makes this clear: in one mission in  Vice City  Tommy Vercetti
storms the mansion of  gangster  lord Ricardo Diaz.  The mission begins with  a
cutscene where Vercetti arms himself, then he kills Diaz’s thugs in an interactive
sequence, whereafter Diaz enters in a cutscene, is shot down in an interactive
sequence, but Vercetti’s  coup de grâce is delivered in a cutscene. If interactive
gameplay always conveys presentness and a film must therefore always convey
pastness (as it is non-interactive), it follows that Vercetti arms himself in the past,
kills Diaz’s thugs in the present, then Diaz enters in the past, is shot down in the
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present  and  killed  in  the  past.  This  principle  applies  to  text-segments  too:  if
literature also signals pastness, it follows that, in  Ocarina of Time  and  Majora’s
Mask, when Link approaches a character, the act of approaching is in the present,
but the dialogue with the very same character – conveyed in text-boxes – is in the
past.
Issues arising from assuming that the temporal locations of events can be
derived from the medium of the narrative are exacerbated further when cut-scenes
and gameplay convey events of different temporalities – e.g. when the interactive
part is a flashback and the noninteractive is the fictional present, or vice versa –
and this leads to even more counterintuitive results. In Max Payne, the first scene
is a cutscene, and the second one is an interactive flashback. If films invariably
convey pastness, it follows that the first scene (where Max reminisces over his
dead family) is in the past, and the following (where he finds them in his bedroom
recently killed) is in the present, i.e. after he reminisces about their death.37
In games that mix gameplay and cut-scenes game theorists either have to
sacrifice all  causal and temporal congruity in the narrative along with the most
intuitive interpretations of them – i.e. that text segments, cutscenes, and gameplay
describe the same time-span – or they have to concede that films, novels, and
games share the same temporal properties and intermittently represent the same
events, meaning that both gameplay, text, and cutscenes take place in the present
(or, more likely, in the past). Either way, games, films, and novels convey stories
with  the  same  temporal  properties,  meaning  that  game  stories  cannot  be
interactive only in virtue of having a fictional present.
37 Note that this is not the same argument as in section 2.1.2: there the issues 
followed from the claim that games must convey their stories chronologically, 
here the problem follows from the claim that different media convey different 
temporal properties.
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2.3.1 Temporality and narration
As already mentioned in section 2.1, some scholars appeal to the existence of
some kind of fictional narrator located within the story who tells the events as if
they were known facts, and this narrator could be used to establish the location of
the  fictional  present.  Le  Poidevin  considers  the  possibility  of  adopting  the
perspective of an ‘internal narrator’ who tells the story as truth and whose position
is to count as the present (1988, pp.256-7). Le Poidevin’s objection to this is that if
the  narrator’s  position  in  time  does  not  change,  then  neither  can  the  events
narrated,  and for that  reason the events cannot  constitute  an A-series.  This  is
correct, but Le Poidevin does not sufficiently explore this objection. He claims that
in order for the narration to be present, it has to change its temporal position (since
flow is an essential property of the A-series), but that there is no perspective from
which we can say that the narration becomes past. This means, Le Poidevin says,
either that the narration must be stuck in an eternal present, or that we have to
establish a ‘second-order’ narration in relation to which the first narration becomes
past, but then there has to be yet another order of narration with respect to which
the  second  order  becomes  present  and  so  on  ad  infinitum (1988,  pp.256-7).
However,  pace Le  Poidevin,  we  need  not  appeal  to  an  external  perspective
relative to which the narration becomes past, because we can still accept that the
story narrated is in the past relative to the first-order narration even without being
able to assess the temporal location of said narration itself, so one could claim,
similarly to this, that we could appeal to a second-order narration in order to locate
the  first-order  narration  temporally  without  having  to  locate  the  second-order
narration. More importantly,  if we say that the narration is in the present it follows
that the events narrated are in the past, which is problematic for reasons already
mentioned in section 2.1.
The  principle  of  Le  Poidevin’s  argument  still  stands,  however:  it  is
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problematic to place the narration in the same time-series as the events narrated,
since it follows that the narration too must move in the A-series, receding further
and further into the past, meaning that we cannot even say for certain whether the
narration is in the present. If  we instead say that the narration is in an eternal
present, but still  claim that the events narrated are in the past (relative to said
narration), it follows that these events will not move in the A-series. Seeing how
change is an essential property of A-series relations, and the narrated events do
not move in the A-series (i.e. there is no change), it follows that the story is not an
A-series but a B-series. From this it follows that no stories, regardless of medium,
are necessarily in the present, since we cannot locate the time of narration, and if
we could it would entail that the narration would not remain in the present for long
before receding into the past. In neither case are video games different from other
media, so there is no reason to believe that they are interactive because of their
temporal properties.
2.3.2 The relation between an A-series and a B-series
Another solution to the problem of locating the fictional present is to presume that
the  first  scene  of  the  narrative  is  the  temporal  ‘anchor’  which  determines  the
directions of anachronies, but Currie asserts that the first scene may itself be an
anachrony,  the  exact  nature  of  which  is  determined  by  following  parts  of  the
narrative (1995a, p.213). The broader implication following from this, as noted by
Currie,  is  that  this  potentially  leads to  a  regress,  where  one scene’s  potential
capacity as anachrony is determined by another story event, which in turn must
also be assessed in order to determine whether that is an anachrony or not. One
could add that  this  method of  locating the fictional  present  does not  set  video
game narratives apart from other media: since narratives in all media have a first
scene, all narratives would for that reason have a fictional present.
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Currie says, referring to films, that we cannot ascertain the direction of an
anachrony in terms of A-series properties. If we have two scenes that follow one
another but are presented out of order, we cannot say whether the first scene is a
flash-forward or the second scene is a flashback: ‘The onscreen representation of
Y occurs before the representation of X, but it is fictional that Y occurs after X. Do
we  have  here  a  flashback  or  a  flash-forward?’ (Currie  1995a,  p.213).  In  Max
Payne, either the first scene on top of the skyscraper is a flash-forward relative to
the second scene when Max finds his dead wife, or the discovery of the deceased
spouse is a flashback relative to the scene on the skyscraper.  The CoP, Currie
explains, renders anachronies problematic,  as a flashback is supposed to take
place in the past, and we cannot see past events (1995a, pp.201-2). He explains
that advocates of the CoP think that presentness is overridden by contextual cues,
that the ‘default’ setting is present unless, for instance, a dissolve or pure narrative
coherence indicates otherwise. Scenes from the past/future, Currie says, require
another kind of interpretation (not imagining seeing), and could be seen as some
kind of signs conveying what happened/will happen at another point in the story.
Currie objects, as one cannot detect any experiential difference between watching
scenes from the present and past respectively, so flashbacks can be identical to
other parts of the film. From that it follows, Currie says, that we cannot identify any
moment  as  present  without  identifying  them  all  as  such,  since  they  are
experienced identically. In a related vein, Cardwell notes that our inability to tell
whether a shot is in the fictional past only by looking at it raises the question of
how we can know that  the  shot  in  question  is  in  the  present  (2003,  p.87).  In
contrast to Currie, Le Poidevin contends that it is natural to assume that what is
onscreen  is  in  fact  the  fictional  past  (since  he  thinks  fictional  films  look  like
documentaries), but adds that it is nevertheless hard to determine how remote that
past is (2016, pp.320-1).
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Currie  and  Cardwell  are  right  in  the  sense that  if  we  cannot  determine
whether  a  shot  is  past,  it  does  not  follow  that  one  can  assume that  another
temporal  location  (e.g.  present)  is  the  standard;  the  inability  to  determine one
temporal location does not necessarily entail the ability to determine another. For
the same reason we cannot identify a shot as past without identifying all of them
as past. If one is open to moving the player to the present of a past event one
could also posit, contrariwise, that the entire story is in the past and that in every
scene the player  is  transported to  another  part  of  that  past,  not  exclusively in
flashbacks. The suggestion made by Thabet (among others), that the player is
transported to the present of a past event is ad hoc, and from Currie’s particular
example  of  identifying  the  present  we  can  conclude  that  no  segment  can  be
ascribed any A-series property – be it past, present, or future – without endowing
all scenes with the same property.
However,  Bourne and Caddick Bourne object to arguments pertaining to
ascertaining  the  location  of  the  fictional  present,  asserting  that  metaphysical
properties of a time series – be it an A-series or a B-series – and the location of
events  within  said  time  series  are  two  independent  issues (2016,  p.37).  They
argue that if A-series properties are independent of a subject’s perception of them,
our inability to ascertain whether a moment is past, present, or future is irrelevant
and does not in itself prove that the fictional timeline has no such properties; it only
shows that we are not part of that time series, and if we are not part of it,  we
cannot  expect  to  locate  its  present (Bourne and Caddick  Bourne 2016,  p.35).
Likewise, Le Poidevin says that we cannot locate the past in any time series but
our own, but that just as a fictional world can have its own B-series disjoint from
ours it can also have its own A-series (1988, p.251), and Yaffe argues that the fact
that A-series properties are not necessary to describe anachronies is not in itself
proof against  the very existence of  A-series properties in fiction (2003,  p.124).
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Currie unwittingly confirms this himself when he states that the ‘failure of cinema to
represent fictional events as tensed is a failure to represent them as tensed from
the perspective of the viewer, not from that of the characters’ (Currie 1995a, p.218;
original  emphasis).  He  compares  this  to  how the  fictional  places  are  spatially
present to the characters, a point which cannot be emphasized enough: just as we
can obtain sufficient comprehension of spatial properties within the fiction in order
to understand the game story without postulating that there is a metaphysically
privileged point in space, we can ascertain temporal properties without postulating
a metaphysically privileged point in  time, yet several game theorists inexplicably
insist on the importance of the latter but not the former. In  Ocarina of Time, we
understand where Kokiri Forest is in relation to Hyrule Castle and that Link lives in
the first place before he arrives in the second, and that both places are temporally
present for him at the moment they are physically present, but in neither case are
we required to ascribe metaphysical privilege to any point in space to comprehend
this, so it is equally unnecessary to ascribe metaphysical privilege to any point in
time.
Bourne and Caddick Bourne also conclude that it is of little use to judge
whether a given fictional event is present in relation to our timeline, nor can we
claim that this moment is fictionally present (2016, p.37). Moreover, they object to
the conclusion drawn by Currie and Le Poidevin, that fictional time must be a B-
series  for  the  reason that  we  cannot  say that  it  has  represented an A-series;
Bourne and Caddick Bourne instead assert  that  it  is  indefinite  in  most  fictions
whether they are a B-series or an A-series (2016, p.38). This is an important point
of theirs, as we must distinguish between ~F(p) and  F(~p); there is a difference
between saying that it is not true in fiction F that p, and, on the other hand, that it is
true in fiction F that not-p. This is also similar to Cardwell’s point, that our inability
to ascertain the fictional  past does not make a scene the fictional present;  we
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cannot  derive  the  existence  of  one  property  exclusively  from  our  inability  to
ascertain the existence of another, for that argument could easily be inverted by
opponents in order to prove the contrary: if we cannot assess whether a timeline is
exclusively a B-series,  it  does not  for  that  reason automatically become an A-
series.
In a related vein,  Le Poidevin explains that  a description using B-series
terms can be ‘translated into’ one using A-series terms, so that in  Don Quixote
(Cervantes,  1612-1620),  ‘when  the  adventure  of  the  windmills  is  present,  the
adventure of the galley slaves is past’ (Le Poidevin 2007, p.146). Similarly, Bourne‐
and Caddick Bourne explain that anachronies can be explained in both B-series
and  in  A-series  terms,  presenting  the  following  definition:  ‘Film F contains
anachrony  iff F contains  representations  of  fictional  events X and Y,  where  the
representation of Y in viewing time is past when that of X is present, but it is not
fictional  that  the  occurrence  of Y is  past  when  the  occurrence  of X is  present’
(2016, p.39). They concede that tenses are characterized relative to something
else, but emphasize that these relations are not determined relative to each other,
but to the present moment. 
However,  one  problem  with  Le  Poidevin’s  and  Bourne  and  Caddick
Bourne’s conceptions of anachronies is that they do not show why we should think
of a fictional time series as an A-series. Although we cannot relate fictional events
to  our  world  –  in  the  sense  that  we  cannot  say  whether  fictional  event  E is
posterior  to,  simultaneous  with,  or  anterior  to  events  in  our  world  –  we  are
nevertheless often able to ascribe B-series properties to fictional events in relation
to  one  another.  Even  if  we  assess  a  given  event’s  location  in  relation  to  the
fictional present, as suggested by Bourne and Caddick Bourne, that only allows us
to speak of  fictional  events’ properties  relative to one another,  which does not
reveal any more about a fictional event’s temporal properties at any given moment
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than its B-series properties do on their own. Hence, if we posit that in the series of
events XYZ, event Y is present when event X is past and event Z is future, we still
cannot  derive  from this  at  what  moment  Y is  present,  and  it  is  precisely  this
possibility we require if we are to say that the story takes place in the fictional
present.  In  Vice City,  Tommy Vercetti’s  arrival  in  Vice City is  past  when he is
confronting  the gangster  lord Diaz,  and when this  confrontation  is  present  the
game’s final mission is in the future, but we still cannot say when the confrontation
with  Diaz  is  present,  only  that  it  is  at  some point.  A description  with  A-series
properties can be reduced to a conditional statement (‘if Y is present, then X is
past’),  but  since  a  conditional  statement  like  this  one  does  not  assert  its
antecedent  or  consequent  it  remains  to  be  shown  is  whether  a  given  scene
actually is present.
Bourne  and  Caddick  Bourne  claim  that  explanations  of  anachronies  in
terms of  an  A-series  and a  B-series  respectively are  equivalent,  because if  Y
occurs after X, then Y is present when X is past; conversely, if Y is present when X
is past, then Y occurs after X (2016, p.39). However, Currie states that relations in
the  B-series  can  be  asserted  without  thinking  of  events  as  past/present/future
(1995a, p.207). This sounds reasonable, because we can know that event X  is
prior to event Y even if we do not know whether X is past or present (as illustrated
with the Vice City-example above). As should be evident by now, a time series can
have B-series properties without having A-series properties, but it cannot have A-
series  properties  without  having  B-series  properties.  Thus,  we  can say that  X
occurs later than Y or vice versa without positing that either of them is past or
present.  In  Vice  City  Tommy Vercetti  robs  a  bank,  and  we  can  say  that  the
missions preparing the heist necessarily take place before the bank robbery itself
without positing that one of these events is present. Conversely, we  cannot say
that the preparations are past events when the robbery is present without implying
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that the former occurs before the latter. 
One could object by saying that there are narratives that clearly indicate
whether the following scene is in the past, present, or future. Currie explains that
according to the CoP, contextual cues in a film (such as narration and/or dissolves)
‘override’ the default setting of presentness and represent past or future events
(1995a, pp.201-2). Yaffe presents an example of this, saying that in a film where
we see a gypsy looking into  a crystal  ball,  the events  seen by the gypsy are
presented as either future or past (2003, pp.126-7). However, this does not refute
my conclusion, because the events in the crystal ball are only presented as future
relative to the gypsy, so when her observation is present, the events she sees are
future. Yet again one can reduce the representation to B-series properties, and the
addition of a present does nothing to improve our comprehension.
This indicates the existence of an asymmetry that prevents the explanations
from being equivalent,  contra Bourne and Caddick Bourne. If A-series properties
can be arrived at  only  insofar  as  they reveal  the  same relationships  between
events that we have already uncovered by outlining B-series properties, there is
little  benefit  in  speaking  of  them,  instead  of  limiting  discussions  to  B-series
properties.  In  brief,  we  can  understand  that  a  fictional  event  takes  place
before/after another without knowing which one is present.
2.3.3 The absence of B-series properties
It could be argued that not all events in narratives can be approached as if they
constituted  a B-series,  and this  could  potentially strengthen the  defence of  A-
series properties in game stories. Currie explains that in some sequences in films,
temporal  relations  between  events  are  not  specified,  so  the  order  of  the
representation of events does not convey their order of occurrence (1995a, p.211).
As an example he mentions ‘summarizing’ sequences that may show, for instance,
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the arrival of aliens at various places on Earth: we see them land in Paris and then
Washington, but this does not mean that the former takes place before the latter,
but rather that it occurs at roughly the same time. Similarly, Bourne and Caddick
Bourne  argue  that  the  order  in  which  fictional  events  take  place  can  be
indeterminate  (2016,  p.240).  As  already  shown  in  section  2.1,  the  order  of
sequences in the narrative need not necessarily mirror the order of occurrence, so
this is nothing new in principle, but this particular example of Currie’s takes matters
one step further, as we cannot even ‘reconstruct’ the order of occurrence. Currie
does  not  seem  to  realize  that  this  potentially  undermines  the  necessity  of
considering fictional time as a B-series, because that would require considering
events in terms of their order of occurrence, and this is left indefinite in sequences
like the aliens arriving at Earth. In games, this is an even more recurrent feature,
but in a different respect: in  Vice City, one can often choose in which order one
wants to play missions; some have to be carried out before others, but there is
often a selection of different missions that can be completed in any order before
the story progresses. Moreover, some missions, side-quests, and miscellaneous
tasks can be undertaken at any time. In such instances, it becomes impossible to
judge which event precedes which in the fiction. 
Does this mean that the story must be an A-series? Certainly not, because
that would be to commit the fallacy mentioned above, of deriving the existence of
one property from our inability to ascertain the existence of another. As already
mentioned, Le Poidevin suggests that a fictional time series could have its own A-
or B-series disjoint from ours, and although he is right that our inability to assess
the existence of a fictional present does not in itself rule out its very existence –
that would be to confuse ontology with epistemology – this inability indicates the
futility of speaking of an A-series in game stories: everything that can be explained
requires only the B-series, and that which cannot be explained is not changed by
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the addition of a putative fictional present. If one accepts the existence of a disjoint
A-series beyond our assessment one must be equally open to a disjoint B-series
eluding our perception; even if we sometimes cannot structure events in relation to
one another – as in Vice City – it does not follow that no such relations exist; it is
unproblematic to say that either X took place before Y or vice versa without saying
that X is either past, present, or future. Moreover, normally we can determine how
a narrative’s events relate to one another in terms of priority,  simultaneity,  and
posteriority, and this is not altered in any way by claiming that an event is present. 
2.3.4 The absence of A-series properties
So far I have argued against  speaking of A-series properties, but this is different
from claiming that a fictional world  lacks these entirely. Before delving into this
topic, it is important to distinguish between arguing that game narratives represent
their stories as possessing any A-series property, as opposed to claiming that they
represent  a specific A-series property.  By maintaining that  games represent  A-
series  properties in  general,  one still  opens up the possibility  that  no A-series
property in question must be presentness, because as Yaffe himself speculates, it
could be the case that the narrative only represents, for instance, the story’s past
(2003, p.124). This would be in line with the standard conception of narratives as
conveying past events, as mentioned in the introduction. Regardless of which of
these  options  one  chooses,  if  presentess  is  a  prerequisite  for  making  stories
interactive it follows that a story without a present and one entirely set in the past
should be equally non-interactive,  regardless  of  medium.  The question  is  then
whether all stories must have a present, and if so, whether it must necessarily be
represented in the narrative. Yaffe argues that the pastness or futurity of a given
event is determined by its relation to the present, so that if one event is past, it
follows that some following event must be present, even if it is never shown (2003,
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p.130). I have three objections:
Firstly, it is important to note that it does not follow from Yaffe’s conclusion
that the present is ever  represented, only that it  exists; one must not forget the
difference between a narrative without a present and a narrative representing no
event as present. Yaffe is aware of this, but it cannot be emphasized enough.
Secondly, even if presentness is a necessary and inherent property of time,
there could still be examples of ‘impossible fiction’ in which it is not true that there
is a present. Yaffe dismisses this solution, arguing that representing something as
past  necessarily  entails  conveying  that  some  other  event  is  present  (2003,
p.130n23). The flaw of this line of reasoning is its assumption that the alternative
would be illogical and contradictory, but the very definition of impossible fiction is
that it does contain true contradictions. In impossible fiction it could be false to
claim that there is a present, or it could be indefinite (neither true nor false). One
could argue that the pastness and futurity of events is not defined in terms of their
distance to the present –  pace Yaffe (2003,  p.130) – but their  distance to one
another. However, we cannot consider all fictions to be impossible by default, so
we cannot presume that any story lacks a present unless there is good reason to
do  so.  It  is  nevertheless  important  to  keep  in  mind  that  if  one  insists  on  the
existence of a fictional present with reference to the inconceivability of impossible
fiction, one must also – for the sake of  consistency – refute all  other kinds of
impossible fiction, such as those including time travel. If one does not accept that
Majora’s Mask may lack a present, one cannot accept paradoxes following from
Link’s time-travelling. If, on the other hand, one accepts time-travel as a concept in
fiction, one must invoke other reasons for rejecting the nonexistence/indefiniteness
of a fictional present.
Thirdly, even if we accept that the representation of a fictional past entails
the existence of a fictional present, and that A-series properties are necessary in
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any conceivable  time-series,  there  is  still no  persuasive  reason  for  describing
events  in  terms  of  past  and  present,  as  we  get  the  same  results  by  limiting
ourselves to B-series properties. If fiction F consists of events XYZ it is evident that
Y  must  possess  the  B-series  property  of  posteriority in  relation  to  X,  but  is
redundant to posit that Y be present and X past; to do so anyway presumes rather
than proves that  fictional  events  have A-series properties.  This  becomes even
more evident in  Sands of Time. In the game, the player regularly experiences
flash-forwards  depicting  the  Prince  traversing  obstacles  the  player  has  yet  to
traverse. Applying the same logic as in Yaffe’s case of the gypsy looking into her
crystal  ball,  it  seems intuitive  to  say that  the  flash-forwards  are  presented  as
future. However, the entire game is the Prince’s narration of past events, so the
flash-forwards are only presented as future relative to the moment at which the
Prince experienced them.  In  other  words,  the events  in  the flash-forwards are
posterior to the moment he had the vision of them, but the same events are in the
past  relative  to  his  narration.  This  means that,  contra Yaffe,  not  even obvious
cases of flash-forwards necessarily prove the existence of a fictional present, for a
flash-forward can represent events that are not necessarily in the future, but in a
less distant past. The opposite narrative structure could be said to obtain: in a
story entirely made up of  flash-forwards representing  the  future relative to  the
moment of narration, a flashback could present an event in a less distant future,
not necessarily in the past. In neither of these cases is it necessary to say that the
story takes place in the fictional present.
Thus, there is no reason to presume that a story in any medium represents
a  fictional  present.  This  can  be  either  because  the  story  only  possesses  or,
alternatively,  only represents a past and a future but no present. In a narrative
where either of these options obtains, it follows that the recipient never sees the
fictional  present.  If  either/both  of  these  options  are  possible  in  literary  and/or
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cinematic stories, there is no reason why the same could not apply in games.
Yaffe, however, contends that a film cannot lack A-series properties entirely,
arguing that it would fail to represent duration homomorphically (2003, p.131), but
this is not a valid argument. It is true that if A-series properties are represented
automorphically,  then duration must also be represented automorphically,  since
the  presentness  of  the  representation  would  move  at  the  same  rate  as  the
presentness  of  the  fictional  event.  This  correlation  between  presentness  and
duration, however, does not obtain inversely: even if we were to concede, only for
the sake of the argument, that the duration is always conveyed automorphically –
which  it  is  not,  as  shown in  section  1.3 – it  does not  follow that  the  putative
presentness  of  the  event  is  also  conveyed  automorphically;  if  five  minutes  of
screen/play time conveys five minutes of story time it does not follow that these
five minutes must therefore be the in the fictional present. 
More importantly, Yaffe seems to forget that a homomorphic representation
of duration only conveys the fact that a given event has some duration, but this
fact does not entail that a given event must have any A-series properties, nor that
it has said properties in virtue of the medium conveying it. As mentioned earlier, it
is an essential property of the A-series that the relations move, but I have already
given examples of when this is not the case: whenever the player pauses the
game to reach the inventory screen in  Ocarina of  Time  or  Resident Evil  4,  or
chooses a response in conversations in an RPG, the putative present ceases to
move.  These  examples  could  still  count  as  homomorphic  representations  of
duration, since the duration of the pause can be seen as representing that the
event of Link choosing a weapon has some duration, but the fact that temporal
progression is sometimes interrupted should rule out the possibility of it being an
A-series. Otherwise one would have to describe the flow of time as erratic and
arbitrary, and that would be an  ad hoc move with the purpose of defending the
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existence of A-series properties in game stories.
In conclusion, if neither our comprehension nor our experience is influenced
by the introduction of A-series properties, it seems superfluous to speak of them to
begin with. Either it is not possible to locate the fictional present in video games,
and therefore irrelevant to speak of it, or there is no reason to assume that games
are the only medium able to convey a story taking place in the present. In both
cases, game stories do not differ fundamentally in terms of temporality from stories
in  other  media,  and if  interactivity supervenes on temporality,  then there is  no
reason to claim that game stories are interactive and that literary or cinematic ones
are not.
To return to the three claims in the introduction: 
1) game stories are in the present
2) temporal  properties  of  game  stories  are  different  from  those  of
stories in other media
3) the conjunction of  1)  and 2)  in  game stories allows the player  to
interact with them
As has become clear in the last two chapters, all three claims can be rejected.
Games are not in the present, temporal properties of game stories are not different
from  those  in  other  media,  and  since  neither  of  the  premises  obtain,  the
consequence in 3) does not obtain either.
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Chapter 3 – Authorship and actual intentionalism
In  the  first  half  of  the  thesis  I  examined whether  the  player  could  be  said  to
influence  the  story  because  of  video  games’ temporal  properties;  the  obvious
counter-argument  is  that  authorship  in  other  media  does  not  depend  on  a
medium’s  temporal  properties.  An  author/director  controls  the  story  of  her
novel/film regardless of when the events are said to take place, so players could
be authors of game stories even if  this cannot be supported with  reference to
temporal properties. In the following two chapters of the thesis I examine possible
defences of why players have some authorship of the narrative. Game scholars
often  mention  authorship  but  rarely  (if  ever)  explicitly  refer  to  so-called
‘intentionalism’,  although  their  arguments  are  redolent  of  (sometimes  almost
identical  with)  this  school  of  interpretation,  according  to  which  fictional  truth  is
determined by the author.  The fact that  they do not use this particular term is
irrelevant,  seeing  how their  reasoning  corresponds  to  it  so  well.  This  chapter
adopts the premise that the player is an author and sees what consequence it has,
whereas the next one examines the more modest claim that the player is merely a
coauthor.
3.1 Authorship and intentionalism in game studies
Before discussing the player’s purported authorship I will present a brief overview
of what has been said about authorship in general as well as specifically in relation
to  video  games.  In  this  section  I  first  present  scholars  who  emphasize  the
comparatively  fixed  nature  of  video  game  stories,  then  those  who  stress  the
collaboration  between  player  and  designer  and,  lastly,  scholars  with  a  more
nuanced view of the authority of players. This is a rough distinction, and several of
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these scholars present so diverse (almost contradictory) theories that they could
belong in more than one of these groups.
It  has been argued by some that games have an  ‘ideal  path’ which the
player should follow, or that there is an overarching structure/framework created
by the designer within which the player is offered a limited amount of control and
interactivity, but from which she cannot deviate significantly (King 2002, p.51; King
and Krzywinska 2002, p.23;  Atkins 2003,  p.41; Aarseth 2004b,  p.366-7;  Schott
2006,  pp.133-4;  Saklofske 2007,  p.142).  For  instance,  Murray emphasizes the
distinction between authoring an environment and playing a creative role within it,
and argues that  players are not  authors,  since the system they use has been
created  by  someone  else  (1997,  pp.152-3).  Similarly,  Simons  argues  that  the
player ‘is not able to form any intentions within the dramatic world that actually
matter’ (2007), and that although other scholars have argued that the player can
influence a game’s outcome, this is actually not the case; the player may not know
the outcome, but it is still clear which ones are possible. Lorenzo Servitje suggests
that most action, adventure, and shooter games allow players to interact with the
diegetic  game world  (2014,  p.381),  but  nonetheless asserts  the game  Dante’s
Inferno (Visceral Games, 2010) has a ‘preprogrammed narrative’ (2014, p.378).
Betty Kaldamanidou and Maria Katsaridou argue that players shape the narrative
within  limitations  of  the  manufacturer  but  also  that  the  narrative  is  scripted
beforehand (2013, p.266), and, drawing on Bernard Perron, claim that players of
Silent Hill (Konami, 1999) perhaps choose one of several alternative paths (2013,
p.267).  They  draw  parallels  to  literature,  and  say  that  although  players  may
construct  different  stories,  readers  may  likewise  visualize  things  differently
(Kaldamanidou  and  Katsaridou  2013,  p.273).  Contrariwise,  Gonzalo  Frasca  is
sceptical about narratological approaches to games, but nevertheless maintains
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that  players  cannot  know the  outcome of  their  session  since the sequence of
events  is  not  fixed,  although the  creator  of  the  game ultimately  has the  most
authority in matters of which events will occur and how frequently (2003b, pp.227-
8).
Contrary  to  the  aforementioned  scholars,  others  have  stressed  the
collaborative nature of video game narratives and how they offer more interactivity
than ‘traditional’ ones, even if  opinions vary as to how much control  the player
really  has.  Several  scholars  argue  that  games  blur  the  distinction  between  a
passive audience and active participant  (Wolf  2001a,  p.3,  2001d,  p.93, 2001e,
p.114;  Pearce  2004a,  pp.151-3,  2004b,  p.147;  Buckingham  2006,  pp.182-3;
Davidson 2008, pp.27-30; Holmes 2012, pp.1-4, p.41; Laurel 2014, p.27). Laurel
compares human-computer interaction with improvisational theatre (2014, pp.86-
7) and contends that players create their own distinct paths and outcomes not
necessarily  foreseen  by  the  designer  (2014,  pp.110-11),  even  if  designers
implement constraints (2014, p.131).  Similar to this,  Bob Rehak argues that in
video  games,  spectatorship  and  participation  are  merged  in  the  avatar  (2003,
p.103). Reed suggests that players are endowed with agency in the construction
of the game narrative (2016, p.626). Similarly, Barry Atkins argues that the player
is engaged in the construction and telling of the story (2003, pp.43-4), that each
text is unique (2003, p.72), and that every player is an author (2003, p.153). In a
related vein, Erwin Warkentin argues that it is not the people creating the game
mechanisms but rather the players who author the narrative (2011, p.274). In a
similar fashion, Backe asserts that the way one plays the game determines what
kind  of  character  becomes  the  protagonist  of  the  story  and  how  the  story
progresses (2012, pp.255-8). Contrary to this, Carr suggests that some events in a
game  are  determined  by  the  player,  although  these  acts  are  shaped  by
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parameters within the game, which precludes the player from a complete authorial
role (2006, p.39, p.43). A similar claim is made by  Hanson, according to whom
players partly determine what is part of the game world, and therefore cocreate
their experiences with the designers (2018, p.104).  Contradicting some of his own
claims, Aarseth claims that if there is a story in a game, the player can be seen as
its creator (1997, p.112). Chris Bateman does not think that the player ’s agency
precludes authorial intent (2011, pp.85-6), but nonetheless suggests that the game
designer ‘has authorial control over the player’s experience’ (2011, p.88).
Some scholars note that the amount of control the player is given can differ
between games and argue that the player can influence the outcome  (Egenfeldt-
Nielsen Smith, and Tosca 2008, p.170; Ulas 2014, pp.80-1; L. Joyce 2015, p.48,
p.53, 2016; Thabet  2015, pp.5-6).  Ryan distinguishes between exploratory and
ontological interactivity, the latter meaning that user interaction becomes part of
the story world and that in some kinds of games the player ‘writes’ the history of
the  fictional  world,  which  is  created  rather  than  enacted  (2004,  p.349,  2015,
pp.162-4).  Similarly,  Dubbelman  claims  that  different  games  offer  the  player
different roles, either as an ‘implied author who guides the hero through his trials
and tribulations’, or ‘an embodied participant in the world of the story’ (both quotes
from 2011, p.158), which allows the player to have adventures on her own in her
capacity as hero (2011, p.169). Zachary Wendler makes a similar distinction, not
between player-roles, but between narratives in the  Portal-games (Valve, 2007-
2011),  ‘the  overt,  scripted  narrative,  and  the  subsumed,  implied,  unscripted
narrative which the player must actively engage with to cocreate’ (2014, p.354),
and contrasts the Portal-games with other games, which merely allowed the player
to choose between predetermined paths (2014, p.366). Ekber Ulas argues that
narratives in interactive media have to be approached differently from other media,
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since a crucial  point  in the former is that the user is granted the possibility to
manipulate  narrative  sequences  (2014,  p.76).  In  a  related  vein,  Barry  Ip  has
argued that the level  of  interaction stands in direct proportion to the perceived
influence the player has on the game story (2011, p.105). Jenkins distinguishes
between, on the one hand, enacted and embedded narratives, where the player
merely  advances  or  reconstructs  the  plot,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  emergent
narratives, the stories constructed by players themselves (2004, p.129). According
to Mata Haggis, the extent of the player’s control is decided upon by the designer,
and the player’s actions may be out  of  place in the narrative setting (such as
guiding the character clumsily) (2016, p.22-4). Related to this, Perlin argues that
characters in video games differ fundamentally from those in novels and films in
the sense that the agency belongs to the player (2004, pp.12-15).
Thabet goes into more detail than many others discussing these matters.
He is  aware that  readers also create meaning in  the encounter  with  a literary
narrative, but nevertheless emphasizes the difference between reading a novel
and playing a game, arguing that in the former case, one assembles textual clues,
piecing together factors embedded in the text, whereas in the latter, ‘the player
projects his or her own narrative voice through his or her own expression, which
leaves  a  personal  mark’  (2015,  p.21).  Like  some  theorists  mentioned  above,
Thabet is aware of how the game-world limits and guides the player (2015, pp.6-7,
p.17), and asserts that the player’s narrating ability is subordinate to that of the
program code (2015, p.43). Thabet vacillates between claiming that the player is
the protagonist (2015, p.7, pp.58-9), and that she  impersonates him/her,  telling
his/her  story (2015,  pp.32-3,  p.41).  Regardless,  he  maintains  that  the  player’s
influence on the events and characters is not imagined, they really change (Thabet
2015, p.8). Thabet refers to the player as a ‘discourse producing narrator’ (2015,
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p.24) who can produce a ‘counter-discourse’ which defies that of the game system
(2015,  p.41).  She  can  include  information  that  changes  the  meaning  of  the
narrative, and he mentions how in  Penumbra Overture (Frictional Games, 2007)
the player decides whether the protagonist is a victim avoiding confrontation or
someone who resists and faces his fears. Discussing  Max Payne and  Bioshock
(2K, 2007), Thabet asserts that if the player does not bother with finding certain
pieces of additional information, the outcome will be different (2015, pp.24-7). One
factor that allows selection and arrangement of information is the player’s control
of the camera, which Thabet likens to editing in films (2015, pp.26-7, pp.42-3).
When a person replays a game, Thabet  thinks that  the player’s own personal
development  as  well  as  her  familiarity  with  the  game’s  world,  events,  and
characters can give a radically different ending, meaning-making process, and plot
direction (2015, p.61, p.69).
Thabet also seems to place an emphasis on the perspective one adopts in
a  game,  arguing  that  in  first-person  games  the  player’s  personal  traits  and
interests replace those of the protagonist (except in cinematic sequences where
the  system takes  control)  (2015,  pp.40-1).  This  he  contrasts  with  third-person
games, where the player is still a narrator of a discourse conflicting with that of the
game world, but here the player is absent from the story (2015, pp.40-1). One
reason for this is the lack of camera-control, since the camera constantly centres
on  the  avatar,  emphasizing  its  centrality  in  the  story  (Thabet  2015,  pp.41-2).
Thabet still maintains that the player controls the protagonist, but she becomes
more distanced from the narrative, she tells someone else’s story (Thabet 2015,
p.42).
Philosophical approaches to authorship in video games exist,  but do not
differ significantly from what game scholars say. Cremin asserts that the game is
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only realized through the collaboration between player and the artist (2012, p.73).
Mukherjee contends that the player can be told of events, but also that she can
orchestrate  them,  thus  becoming  an  author,  and  he  mentions  first-person
shooters, like Doom (id Software, 1993), as examples of games without a single
ending (2015, p.55), but later on, being more hesitant as to whether the player or
game designer is the author of Sands of Time, concludes that authorship in games
is  a  complex  matter  and  that  the  player’s  control  is  limited  by  the  game’s
algorithms  (2015,  pp.146-8,  p.155).  Similar  to  Wolf  (2001e,  114), Mukherjee
considers death in a game as a possible ending (2015, p.136). He is aware that
this  raises  the  question  of  whether  the  same story  is  told  when  the  game is
replayed, and paradoxically enough he thinks that the story is the same and that
all  narratives  emerging  from  a  given  game’s  narrative  are  actually  the  same
narrative, whilst still believing that each playthrough is singular and has its own
unique outcome (Mukherjee 2015, pp.139-43). Tavinor claims, drawing upon Berys
Gaut  and  Dominic  McIver  Lopes,  (similar  to  Laurel)  that  the  player  is  a
combination of audience and performer, who can determine the game’s narrative
content as long as its narrative is not too fixed (2005, p.34,  2009, p.59, 2017,
pp.25-6). He maintains that a player is nevertheless unlike a performer of a theatre
play, as players lack a script and the specified performance in it, and are therefore
able to determine fictional events, meaning that a violent playthrough will generate
a  bleaker  narrative  (2009,  pp.58-60;  2017,  p.27).  Like  several  game scholars,
Tavinor  too  acknowledges  how  authorial  decisions  impute  the  game  with
constraints  on  what  narrative  can  be  created  by  the  player  (2017,  p.29),  but
nevertheless maintains that ‘the player is able to manipulate and interact with the
fictional environment’ (2005, p.26). The conception of games as more interactive
than other media is also shared by Willis (2019), Nathan Wildman and Richard
Woodward (2018), and Ali (2015).
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In brief, although views of player authorship are somewhat diverse in game
studies  and  in  philosophy,  in  general  the  player  is  ascribed  some  kind  of
authorship, even if it is often readily acknowledged that she does not possess full
and/or consistent authority. This does not undermine my claim that they see player
intentions as determining narrative content, because firstly,  the assumption that
the designer is also an author says nothing about the extent of her authorship, and
secondly, to repudiate the necessity of the player’s intentions whilst retaining the
conception  of  the  player  as  an  author  would  constitute  an  odd  definition  of
authorship; if an author can never realize her intentions, it is unclear in what sense
she  is  still  an  author.  More  importantly,  if  one  does  not  believe  that  authorial
intentions have any bearing  on the  narrative  it  would  not  matter  to  whom we
ascribe authorship, making it superfluous to defend the conception of the player as
author.
Note that if each player is an author and fictional truth is determined by the
author’s intentions,  it  follows that each player  generates a unique narrative by
playing  the  game.38 This  is  problematic,  and  should  fundamentally  undermine
video game criticism if an infinite number of stories can be generated by every
game, but in this chapter I presume that game scholars are prepared to ‘bite the
bullet’ and accept this. There are other reasons why intentionalism is problematic if
the player is the author, and these will be examined in this section.
3.2 Criticism and defence of actual intentionalism
In this section I examine actual intentionalism and its applicability in video games
when  the  player  is  seen  as  the  creator  of  the  story.  The  reason  why  this  is
38 This view is similar to so-called ‘radical constructivism’, according to which all 
interpreters create their own fiction through their interaction with a narrative. I 
will not discuss this school of interpretation any further since it is outside the 
scope of the thesis. For more on constructivism, see Stecker (2005, p.11ff).
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important to the thesis is that if player intentions have no impact on truth in fiction,
it would be pointless to declare players authors of stories in games; i f authorial
intentions do not matter, it does not matter to whom they belong. In this section I
thus adopt the assumption that the player is the author of the story and therefore
has the final say regarding fictional truth, and I examine what consequences this
has.
Actual  intentionalism  comes  in  different  variants,  and  according  to  the
extreme kind, the meaning of an artwork is defined entirely by the author (Carroll
2002, pp.322-3). Not all scholars adhere to the most extreme version, and  I will
distinguish between Extreme Actual Intentionalism (or EAI for short) and Moderate
Actual Intentionalism (MAI). Some of the scholars referred to in this section are
moderate  intentionalists,  but  I  only  refer  to  their  theories  insofar  as  they
correspond to EAI; problems unique to MAI will be discussed in the next section.
EAI  is  usually criticized by modern scholars and regarded as  untenable
(Stock  2017,  pp.13-14).  One  common challenge  to  EAI  is  what  is  sometimes
referred to as the ‘Intentional Fallacy’, that is, the thought that a work obtains a
meaning only because the author  intended it  to;  the objection is that  authorial
intentions are not desirable for interpretations, because those intentions are fallible
insofar as a work (or a part of it) may not convey what an author wanted it to, and,
conversely,  it  may express things she did  not intend (Beardsley 1992, pp.26-7;
Walton 1995, pp.333-4; Currie 1990, p.115ff, 1995a, pp.243-9, 2003, p.299, 2004,
p.124; Nathan 1992, p.187; Shusterman 1992b, pp.168-9; Carroll 1997a, p.305,
2000, pp.76-80; Rosebury 1997, p.19, p.28n11; Phillips 1999, pp.276-7; Trivedi
2001, p.196, 2015, p.704; Livingston 1998, pp.831-2, 2003, p.281, 2005, pp.146-
50; Irvin 2006, pp.114-16;  Sellors 2007,  p.268, Stecker 2008, pp.38-9; Mikkonen
2009; Kindt and Müller 2011, p.71; Davies and Stecker 2010, p.311; Bourne and
Caddick Bourne 2016, p.102, pp.213-15). The theory that a work means whatever
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the author intended is sometimes referred to as ‘The Identity Thesis’ (Dickie and
Wilson 1995, p.234; Carroll 1997a, p.305; Wilson 1997, p.310; Dickie 2006, p.77;
Stecker  2005,  p.149,  2008,  p.38;  Davies  and  Stecker  2010,  p.309),  a  notion
coined  by  Monroe  Beardsley  (1992,  p.25).  It  is  sometimes  compared  to  how
Humpty  Dumpty  in  Through  the  Looking-Glass,  and  What  Alice  Found  There
(Carroll, [1871]1999) claims that words mean whatever he wants them to when he
claims  ‘glory’  can  mean  ‘nice  knock-down  argument’  (Iseminger  1992a,  p.79,
1996,  pp.321-3;  Livingston  1998,  p.831,   2003,  pp.283-4;  Leddy 1999,  p.226;
Carroll  2000,  p.76;  D.  Davies 2004,  p.85n3;  Irvin  2006,  p.116;  Levinson 2010,
p.145; Gover 2012,  p.170).  It  has also been argued that although the author’s
intentions are inevitably connected to  the  construction of  the  story it  does not
follow that they are as pertinent to the work’s meaning (Wimsatt and Beardsley
1954, p.375; Chatman 1990, pp.82-4; Shusterman 1992a, p.66; Lyas 1992, p.144;
Phillips 1999,  p.275; Trivedi 2001,  p.195n7;  Livingston 2003,  p.281;  Kiefer 2005,
p.276; Mikkonen 2009).
A practical problem is that the author’s intentions may not be available to
us. The author may be dead, the artwork may be too vague to make the intention
graspable, and no surviving documents may exist to elucidate the interpreter; if the
author is alive we may still not know her intentions for certain, because she may
wish to deceive her readers, or may not remember or have a good grasp of her
own intentions (Carroll 1992, p.99; Iseminger 1992a, p.86; Lyas 1992, pp.141-2;
Stecker  1997  p.201;  Bronson  2002,  p.207;  Currie  2004,  pp.107-8;  Livingston
2005,  p.32;  Irvin  2006,  p.117;  Abbott  2008,  p.229;  Mikkonen  2009;  Lamarque
2009, p.116; Fernflores 2010, pp.71-3; Trivedi 2015, pp.705-6).
Another criticism directed against EAI is its exaggerated focus on intentions
to the detriment of work-meaning (Currie 1993, p.418, 1995a, p.246, 2003, p.295,
2004, pp.124-7; Livingston 1998, p.833; Leddy 1999, p.228; Carroll  2000, p.77;
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Kiefer 2005, p.280; Stecker 2005, pp.128-30, p.148; Irvin 2006, p.116; Lamarque
2009, p.162; Stock 2017, p.37). An intentionalist response to this is that the work is
the  best  (or  at  least  adequate)  evidence  of  authorial  intentions  (Stecker  1997
p.201, 2002a, p.131; Irwin 1999, p. 61; Carroll 2000, pp.77-8, 2002, p.326, 2011,
p.128; Lintott 2002, pp.69-70; Irvin 2006, p.116; Trivedi 2015, p.702).39
EAI  is  rarely  endorsed  by  modern  scholars,  but  there  are  noteworthy
exceptions. Stock claims that authorial intentions are both necessary and sufficient
for determining fictional content (2017, p.14). Her definition of fictional truth goes
as follows: ‘An author Au’s utterance x (or set of utterances S) has fictional content
that  p, if and only if:  Au utters x (or  S) intending that i)  x (or  S) should cause F-
imagining that p in her intended readership R; ii) R should recognize this intention;
and iii) R’s recognition of this intention should function as part of R’s reason to F-
imagine that p’ (Stock 2017, p.15).40
Stock  forestalls  some  objections  pertaining  to  the  Identity  Thesis  and
Humpty-Dumptyism: if one believes an action to be impossible, one cannot intend
to do it (2017, p.17). An author who expects readers to find a meaning for which
there is no evidence in the text did not really intend the text to have this meaning
(Stock 2017, p.88). Thus, an author cannot intend readers to interpret a sentence
in a particular way if she does not expect them to recognize this meaning and her
intention for them to grasp it (Stock 2017, pp.40-2).41 Stock claims that extreme
cases – such as a highly irrational person intending a completely arbitrary sound
to mean something – are exceptional, and that her theory still applies to works by
39 Carroll later contradicts himself when he says that sources outside the work 
may ‘supply a more effective means to our ends’ (2000, p.83).
40 What ‘F-imagine’ means is irrelevant for our purposes; Stock explains that there
is no harm in thinking of it as imagining in general.
41 Walton says something similar (1990, p.110).
Cf. Leddy (1999, pp.225-6) and Stecker (2006, p.431) who similarly emphasize 
that words can acquire unconventional meanings, provided that these can be 
grasped in the context.
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people without such irrational beliefs (2017, p.44n31).
William Irwin, similar to Stock, emphasizes how intentions are constrained
by the belief that one could possibly be understood (2015, pp.141-5).42 Moreover,
an intention only determines truth in fiction if the author intended to communicate it
to  the  reader  (Irwin  2015,  pp.145-6).43 Contrary  to  Stock,  Irwin  contends  that
intentions determine meaning even when an agent intends a word to  have an
unconventional meaning no rational person would expect others to grasp, provided
that this agent sincerely believes her listener will grasp it; thus, Humpty Dumpty
can make ‘glory’  mean ‘nice  knock-down argument’,  provided that  he  has the
requisite belief that he could be understood, otherwise he merely  wills it (1999,
pp.58-60,  2015,  pp.142-3,  p.146).  Neither  Irwin  nor  Stock  see  authors  as
completely  reliable  sources  of  information,  either  because  authors  themselves
may  not  know  their  true  intentions  or  because  they  attempt  to  deceive  their
readers  (Irwin  1999,  p.12,  p.41,  p.64,  2002a,  pp.193-4,  2015,  pp.142-6;  Stock
2017, pp.17-18).
EAI is usually discussed primarily in relation to literary works, but has been
applied to some extent to visual art-forms. Noël Carroll  argues that the lack of
conventions  in  non-literary  arts  forces  the  interpreter  to  focus  on  the  artist’s
intentions instead, and mentions film as an example (1997a, p.306).44 However, he
nevertheless maintains that images cannot mean whatever the artist wants them
to (2011, p.120). Hans Maes applies intentionalism to contemporary visual arts,
such as paintings and sculptures, with the motivation that this is an area where
42 The difference between belief and intention has also been noted by Livingston 
(2003, p.277).
43 A similar point is raised by Trivedi (2015, p.704).
44 However, Walton mentions examples of conventions in both theatre and 
cartoons  (1990, pp.171-2).
Carroll later conceded that dance has conventions but nevertheless acquires 
meaning ‘by way of imitating human actions rather than by means of a code’ 
(2011, p.126). Why codes and imitation of human actions are mutually exclusive
he does not say.
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actual and hypothetical intentionalists45 reach different conclusions about the work-
meaning (as opposed to literature, where the similarities between their respective
interpretations make it hard to settle who is right); critics favour the intention of the
artist, and the intuitive, reasonable answer to questions of what a work means is
the one taking into account the intentions of the artist (Maes 2010, pp.134-5). A
common objection from opponents of EAI is to underscore the difference between
the  meaning  of  an  utterance and that  of  the  utterer,  and  the  fact  that  not  all
intentions  are  successfully  realized,  but  Maes  refers  to  actual  practice,  where
people  in  the  art  world  support  EAI  by  considering  artists’  intentions  in  their
analyses  of  their  works  (2010,  pp.136-7).46 As  an  example  he  mentions
Pietromarchi’s artwork consisting of over-sized light bulbs purportedly referring to
the artist’s childhood, an interpretation not arrived at by people disregarding artistic
intentions (Maes 2010,  pp.131-2).  This  does not  mean that  a  work  can mean
practically  anything:  drawing  upon  Carroll  and  Gary  Iseminger,  Maes  posits  a
minimal  success condition  which  must  be  fulfilled,  that  the  artist’s  intention  ‘is
utterance meaning-determinative if  it  is compatible with and supportable by the
text or artefact taken in its intended context’ (2010, p.137n61). 
K.E. Gover objects to Maes defence of EAI in the visual arts. He notes that
if it is only because of the artist’s intentions that light bulbs refer to childhood, it is
unclear how one could separate successful attempts at artistic expressions from
failed ones; the fact that there is no clear connection between the work and the
artist’s childhood – save for the artist’s own explanation – means that a work can
mean  almost  anything  (Gover  2012,  p.174-5).  Maes’s success-condition  is  so
small  that the work can mean whatever the artist  claims; one must distinguish
45 Hypothetical intentionalism ‘holds that the interpreter is to surmise what a 
hypothetical author could have intended the work to mean’ (S. Davies 2006, 
pp.223-4).
46 Carroll (2011, p.132) and Stock (2017, p.13) also claim that people often invoke 
authorial intentions, but neglect that this is descriptive.
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between artworks where an artist’s explanation clarifies how the work embodies
the purported meaning and those where the ‘explanation’ consists of the artist’s
personal associations elicited by the work (Gover 2012, p.175). Another objection
is that Maes is begging the question by presuming that one accepts the artist’s
explanation as the true interpretation of the work (Gover 2012, p.176). Gover also
notes that a sculpture, as opposed to a word, has objective features which can be
verified empirically but lacks any conventional meaning, and he is sceptical of how
the difference between literary and other kinds of works has been ignored in the
debate on actual intentionalism, which makes him wonder to what extent debates
pertaining  to  literature  can  elucidate  questions  pertaining  to  non-literary  works
(2012, pp.178-9). 
3.3 Extreme intentionalism in games
If we accept the premise that the player is in some sense the author of the story,
does that mean that her intentions can be decisive when determining the work-
meaning?  Although  Maes  primarily  discusses  contemporary  visual  art,  his
discussion can be applied to all  visual arts, even those imbued with narratives,
such as films and video games. Even Gover should accept it to a certain extent
since he admits that films have some conventional meaning in their capacity of
representational  medium (2012, p.180) (a feature they share with games),  and
since both actual and hypothetical intentionalists agree that the principles arrived
at  can  also  be  applied  to  the  non-linguistic  arts  (Carroll  1997a,  p.306,  2002,
p.331n17; Stecker 2005, p.152; Trivedi 2015, p.699).
One fundamental problem of Maes’ reasoning is that he underscores the
fact  that  actual  and  hypothetical  intentionalism will  reach  different  conclusions
about  the  work-meaning  and  then  presumes  that  for  this  reason  the  actual
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intentionalists must be right, since they take authorial intentions into account.47 The
disagreement  between actual  and hypothetical  intentionalists  is  contingent  and
descriptive, it does not prove anything, let alone settle the dispute in the actual
intentionalist’s  favour.  On  the  contrary,  hypothetical  intentionalists  may  equally
refer to the disagreement as an argument in their favour, as they do not accept the
premise that authorial intentions determine work-meaning, and would argue that
an artwork which cannot be understood without  elucidation from the artist  is  a
failed artwork, one that does not convey what the artist intended. Likewise, if we
cannot understand the story in a game without the player explaining it to us, it
hardly proves that intentionalism must be adopted, but rather that the player does
not successfully convey the intended story. We can still accept EAI in visual arts
such as video games, but Maes shows that this acceptance is axiomatic, it does
not follow from his arguments but must be assumed prior to any interpretation. If
we do accept  EAI  we are still  left  with  the question of  how to  avoid  Humpty-
Dumptyism, an issue which Maes, Stock, and Irwin fail to resolve satisfactorily.
3.3.1 Infallibility of authorial intentions
Maes, Irwin, and Stock acknowledge the need for a minimal success condition.
Both Stock and Irwin distinguish between actually intending and merely willing a
string of words to mean something, and insist on the possibility of inferring the
author’s intention if that intention is to obtain. This is in principle quite similar to
what Maes says about his condition (that the work be compatible with authorial
intentions), but more refined. Maes does not explain what it means for a work to
be compatible with artistic intentions, and as Gover notices, his condition is so
small that we cannot distinguish between an author’s explanation of meaning and
mere projection. This flaw in Maes’ reasoning becomes more clear in one of his
47 The same fallacy can be found in Carroll (1992, pp.119-24).
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other articles – not cited by Gover – where he argues that any explanation by an
artist will be sufficiently compatible with the work to obtain (Maes 2008, pp.87-8).
Maes goes so far as to argue that the meaning of an artwork is what the author
intended it to be, even when the artist does not successfully communicate it (2008,
p.93). If work-meaning is always equivalent to artistic intentions it does follow, as
Maes indicates, that the failure to communicate these does not alter the meaning;
meaning is a metaphysical matter, the interpreter’s uptake is an epistemic one.
However,  this  makes  Maes’  minimal  success-condition  so  small  that  artistic
intentions become infallible. Any meaning can be said to have been expressed by
virtue of being attached by the artist to a particular artefact, effectively Humpty-
Dumptyism.  In  video  games,  this  would  mean  that  the  player  would  always
successfully  endow  gameplay  with  whatever  story  she  wants,  because  any
gameplay is in and of itself sufficient evidence of her intention. She could play the
zombie-game Resident Evil 4 and intend it to have the story from The Godfather
because the slaughtering of zombies evoke the same feelings in her as when she
saw  that  film,  similar  to  how  light  bulbs  convey  a  message  about  childhood
because those are the emotions elicited in Pietromarchi. The advantage of Maes’
intentionalism is that it would make it possible for the player to be the author of the
narrative and to make choices meaningful to the story, but it would also preclude
any ‘proper’ interpretation of art  if  works may possess meanings impossible to
grasp only because the artist claims they do. Thus, EAI as it is conceived by Maes
is untenable, and cannot be used to defend the idea of player as author.
Stock’s  and  Irwin’s  distinction  between  intending  and  willing  adds  a
reasonable success-condition which can be adopted without difficulties in visual
arts such as films and games. If we posit that meaning must be inferable we avoid
the arbitrary ascription of elusive meaning that Maes seems to defend. Hence, a
player cannot intend Resident Evil 4 to have the story of The Godfather, because
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this meaning cannot be inferred. Their requirement is problematic, however, since
it does not specify to whom the meaning must be reasonably inferable. It has been
noted that an artist may intend a given work to be seen by no one except herself
(Gaut 1997, p.171n34), and several game scholars above claim that the player is
both author and audience. If the player is the only audience, does that not mean
anything she does can convey practically any intention, since she will always be
able to grasp what she herself intends to do?48
Stock claims that the author cannot intend a text to carry a certain meaning
if she believes it to be impossible for the interpreter to decipher said meaning, and
draws  the  conclusion  that  for  this  reason  completely  arbitrary  and  private
meanings are not possible (2017, pp.74-5). However, this is a non sequitur: if the
player is the only intended audience and she believes herself to be able to grasp
the  meaning,  it  should  allow  her  to  include  arbitrary  and  private  meanings.
Furthermore, even if the author intends no one to read it, Stock explains that she
may still intend the work to encourage certain acts of imagination, should someone
read it anyway (2017, pp.29-30). The same argument has been put forward by
Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen (1994, p.46) and Currie (1990, p.34).
Similarly, Paisley Livingston has argued that as soon as the creator makes her
intentions  manifest  (for  instance  by  writing  down  her  thoughts)  they  become
publicly  observable  (2005,  p.71).  Their  arguments  do  not  entirely  solve  the
problem, but they do show that video games are not unique in this aspect: we
could grant that the creator of a work can use any means to convey her intentions
48 Kania (2018, p.193) doubts that players communicate with themselves when 
playing, and Dickie and Wilson (1995, p.243) criticize the very concept of 
communication directed at the speaker. Dickie and Wilson’s argument is 
dubious – people do arguably communicate with themselves through personal 
notes –  and Kania uses a board-game to prove his point, neglecting the 
difference between these and video games.
Furthermore, my argument does not hinge on whether players do communicate 
with themselves, but whether they could grasp their own intentions if they did.
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if  the  work  is  directed  at  herself  –  since  she  is  the  only  person  intended  to
appreciate it, so she can expect herself to understand an idiosyncratic means of
communication – but that applies to all art-forms, not only games. It would entail
that an author could indeed mean ‘glory’ to mean ‘nice knock-down argument’, if
she knows her future self  will  understand this,  so neither Stock nor Livingston
obviate Humpty-Dumptyism in any medium.49
Does  EAI  lead  to  Humpty-Dumptyism when  the  author  is  also  the  only
interpreter? Not necessarily, but a better refutation than the ones above would be
to question the idea of whether we can intend even ourselves to grasp intentions if
the relation between meaning and artwork is too arbitrary. Thomas Leddy argues
that even when writing for ourselves we are still constrained by what we find to be
plausible (1999, p.223). This indicates that although an author writing to herself
may know her own intentions, it does not follow that her future self will be able to
grasp,  for  instance,  that  ‘glory’  means  ‘nice  knock-down  argument’  through
engagement with the literary work, and if the future self cannot be expected to
grasp this through the writing, the present self cannot intend it. It could be objected
that the player interprets her own story in the act of playing and so the story is
directed at her present self, but that does not change the principle of what can be
intended. A player claiming that her playthrough of  Resident Evil 4 conveys the
story of  The Godfather does not grasp this by virtue of her engagement with the
narrative; instead, she performs two separate acts of wanting the game to possess
a  certain  meaning  and  being  aware  of  this  intention,  but  that  knowledge  is
49 One could argue that we should rather speak of an appropriate audience, 
determined in relation to the work and its provenance (Levinson 1992, pp.227-
8). However, that would not solve our current issue, since the author could be 
the only appropriate audience. One could then object with reference to concepts
such as private language, but like Irwin (1999, pp.71n117) I merely consider 
alternative uses of a semiotic system to convey one’s intentions, I do not defend
the notion of a language which could be understood by a single person (i.e. it is 
contingent that the author is the only appropriate audience).
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unrelated to her engagement with the narrative. Rejecting the distinction between
these  acts  would  entail  unwarranted  ascription  of  causality  to  events  with  no
necessary correlation:  there  would  be  no  difference  between  imagining  that  p
whilst engaged with the narrative, and imagining that p because one is prescribed
by the narrative to do so (recall: recognition of the intention to imagine p is part of
Stock’s definition of fictional truth). To take a literary example: if a person writes
‘feed the cat’ she will be reminded to feed her cat because of the note, but if she
also happens to remember that she has to make dinner for her children she is
reminded  of  this  whilst reading  the  note,  but  the  note  as  such  only  has  a
necessary impact on the first act of remembering. In the same way, a player can
think of the story from Godfather whilst playing Resident Evil 4, but not because
she is playing it (barring personal associations not prescribed by the game itself).
Therefore she does not intend the game to have this story, she only wants it and
happens to know about this intention, similar to how we may know that an artist
wanted two light bulbs to represent childhood without granting that the artwork
manages to convey this. Hence, Humpty-Dumptyism is not tenable even in works
directed at the author’s present self, and therefore does not obtain in games (at
least not for this reason), because there is a limit to what we can intend ourselves
to understand by engaging with a work. This shows that a player’s intentions can
be fallible and that the gameplay cannot convey any conceivable meaning.
 
3.3.2 Reasonably inferable intentions
However, whether EAI is still a fruitful mode of interpretation is a different matter,
and  if  it  is  not  it  becomes  irrelevant  whether  players  are  authors,  since  their
intentions would not matter either way. There are problems with EAI that could
undermine  it,  and  it  is  questionable  whether  these  problems  are  obviated  in
games.  For instance, the requirement that an author must expect her readers to
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grasp her intentions places too high an emphasis on the artist’s own expectations.
It  would  follow  that  an  author  who  writes  a  perfectly  comprehensible  novel
produces nothing meaningful if she doubts the reader’s capacity to understand it,
irrespective of how well it conforms to conventional meaning.50 In that case, an
author writing in impeccable French for a unilingual  English-speaker would  not
produce  a  meaningful  work  only  because  she  lacks  the  required  intention.
Likewise, a player with doubts about what a potential spectator could grasp could
play in such a way that everyone would fully understand the story, but it would
nonetheless be meaningless only because she doubts anyone will understand it. It
also follows that a text could vacillate between being meaningful and meaningless
as the author  vacillates  between convictions.  By accepting  Stock’s  and Irwin’s
criterion of necessary belief on the creator’s part we get what could be labelled as
‘inverse Humpty-Dumptyism’, i.e. an act of depriving an intelligible narrative of its
obvious meaning only because of the artist’s lack of intentions.
Conversely, it also means that a highly irrational person can endow a work
with any meaning if she believes others will grasp it. If the author is irrational Irwin
contends  that  the  meaning  still  obtains  whereas  Stock  dismisses  it,  and  their
respective solutions are both problematic. If we agree with Irwin we get Humpty-
Dumptyism,  and  that  would  undermine  all  interpretative  practices,  since  any
content could convey practically anything. Stock limits herself to rational agents
(2017, p.44n31), but this runs the risk of creating a circular definition: a rational
agent is someone whose intentions can be grasped by others, and they can be
grasped by others because she is a rational agent. Perhaps we can ignore such
cases,  if  only  for  the  sake  of  discussion,  and  assume that  most  authors  and
players are sane. The problem of irrational agents and their intentions still persists
50 Cain Todd similarly argues that fictional truth should not be limited by the 
author’s beliefs about the reader (2009, pp.199-200).
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and does pose a serious challenge that makes EAI lead to Humpty-Dumptyism
and  could  make  video  game  stories  arbitrary,  but  irrational  agents  are
nevertheless not representative of authors in general.
Another problem relates to what it means for an intention to be reasonably
inferable. In the case of Resident Evil 4, Stock and Irwin would probably hold that
a sane player could only will but not intend it to have the story of The Godfather.
This,  however,  looks  circular.  A person only  intends  p to  mean  x if  it  can  be
reasonably  inferred,  and  the  reason  it  can  be  reasonably  inferred  is  that  the
person  intends  p to  mean  x.  Further,  whenever  a  person  supposedly  fails  to
convey her intentions, Stock claims that she did not really intend it, but Stock begs
the question by assuming that if one fails to convey x one did not intend x for the
reason that one does not intend what one fails to convey.
This definition is too biased in the author’s favour, and would make authorial
intentions infallible: authors could intend to convey anything they want, because if
they fail to convey a given proposition, they merely  wanted to convey it without
intending it. When applied to video games, the principle only further undermines
the significance of attributing the player with an authorial role. Suppose a player of
Ocarina of Time intends young Link’s green clothes to be pink. Since there is
nothing in  the game indicating that  they are pink,  both Stock and Irwin would
probably claim that since she cannot convey this, she cannot intend the clothes to
be pink. However, if one maintains that work-meaning is determined by genuine
authorial intentions it places a strict limit on what can effectively be intended by the
players, since games restrict what players can do. It is still viable to claim that the
player is the author and that she can successfully realize all of her intentions, but
only  because  a  significant  number  of  intentions  are  ‘renounced’,  labelled  as
impossible to possess. If we instead reject the player as author in favour of the
game designer we retain the same principle to the same extent (all intentions can
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be realized because if not, they are not genuine intentions), but the quantity of
intentions that can be realized is increased considerably. A player can only intend
young Link’s clothes to be green, but the designer can intend them to be of any
colour  she  can  programme  them  to  be;  the  player’s  intentions  are  limited  to
content that is ultimately included in the game, the designer’s intentions are limited
by what could be included.
However, if fictional truth is defined by authorial intentions, it means that a
proposition  obtains  only if  the  author  intended it;  this  seems to  be  implied  by
Stock’s explanation of how no intentions specify whether Hamlet has an Oedipus
complex, and that this matter is therefore indeterminate (2017, p.103). A reader
may still imagine things not specified by the author’s intentions, Stock explains, but
it  is not part  of the fictional content.  This suggests that authorial  intentions are
necessary  for  fictional  truth  to  the  extent  that  no  proposition  acquires  a
determinate truth-value unless intended by the author, but Stock does not realize
that this would make EAI untenable in all media. In literature, it would mean that
Fleming could write that Blofeld poisons Bond’s Martini and that Bond drinks said
Martini, but it would not follow that Bond drinks poison unless Fleming intended it;
it could be that Fleming only intended the first two propositions, but for whatever
reason (forgetfulness, incompetence) did not intend their consequence, resulting
in a paradox. Likewise, in Ocarina of Time, the mysterious person Sheik turns out
to be princess Zelda in disguise. The player may then intend Link to talk to Sheik,
and intend Sheik to be Zelda, without it following that Link talks to Zelda (unless
the player intended this as well). 
Stock indirectly attempts to solve such conundrums when she argues that a
given belief can entail inferences when related to other beliefs, so that a person
who believes that a given lake contains water and that water contains oxygen will
also believe that the given lake contains oxygen, even though the person may be
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unaware of this belief (2017, p.20). Regardless, this reveals nothing about whether
the third belief following from the first two is held or not; like Stock says, the person
may be unaware of this belief, but she may also be unaware that she does  not
have it, which could instead lead to a revision of one of the premises when the
ineluctable  conclusion  is  discovered  (e.g.  saying  that  not  all water  contains
oxygen). Further, this argument of Stock’s may contradict  her later assertion that
‘co-referring terms cannot be freely substituted into their content without a change
in the nature of  the intention’ (2017,  p.103).51 Her  example is  that  if  an agent
intends to kick an object that unbeknownst to her is a Stradivarius, it does not
follow that the agent intended to kick a Stradivarius. This example is in principle
identical to mine. If the game would have allowed the player to kill Zelda/Sheik it
could have entailed the paradox that the player can intend to kill Sheik but not
Zelda,  so  the  same  character  will  be  dead  and  alive  at  the  same  time!
Furthermore,  Currie  has  argued  that  one  usually  does  not  imagine  all
consequences following from the content of our make-believe, and even if  one
should try it would not be possible, since infinitely many consequences follow from
non-tautological propositions (1995a, p.177). Stock overlooks this consequence,
but Currie’s argument has the added advantage that it is also more reconcilable
with  Stock’s  own  emphasis  on  fictional  content  being  what  the  interpreter  is
intended to  imagine;  an  author  probably does  not  intend us  to  imagine every
consequence of all propositions in the narrative, only currently relevant ones. This
is also more in line with what Stock says later, when she is at pains to refute the
concept  of  automatically  and  unintentionally  generated  fictional  truths  (2017,
pp.71-4). A better reply from intentionalists would be that the paradox cannot be
reasonably inferred, because no one would draw the conclusion that Zelda is alive
and Sheik is dead, and therefore the player cannot intend it.  However, that does
51 Beardsley agrees (1992, pp.27-8).
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not really solve the problem. The inability to intend the negation of a proposition
does not necessitate intending the affirmation of its converse; the player may be
unable to intend that Zelda does not die when Sheik does, but it does not follow
that the player is therefore compelled to intend that Zelda survives. 
In an audiovisual medium the problem is aggravated: unless the director
intends everything in the image to be part of a film it  follows that some of the
content, although visible, does not exist in the story and should be disregarded by
the audience.  In  games,  this  problem is  exacerbated because of  two kinds of
content (hinted at above) for which EAI cannot account: content the player did not
intend to include, and content she intended  not to include. A player completing
Resident Evil 4 does not intend each character and object to occupy such-and-
such location, and she certainly does not intend any of the content in cut-scenes. It
has been argued that if the author lacks intentions on a particular matter the story
is  indeterminate  on that  point  (Livingston 2005,  p.199),  but  if  the  player  lacks
intentions on these matters it follows that most of what happens in the game –
apart from the protagonist’s actions – is indeterminate, since the player has no
intentions on these matters. It could be countered that players, once they see what
is onscreen, form the intention to include the content (so the content still ends up
in the story), but this ad hoc argument raises the question of why we should still
see players as authors when their intentions have a minimal impact in relation to
those  of  the  designer  (and  seem  to  follow from  them,  making  the  players’
intentions a redundant addition to those of the designer). It could also be argued
that  the  player  cannot  even  have intentions  about  other  things  than  her  own
avatar, since she does not think it is possible for her to control other factors apart
from her  own playable character.  The designer,  on the other hand,  can intend
things to behave in a certain way since she programmed them to, so it is clearly
the designer who has authority in this case.
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 Another  aspect  of  this  problem  is  that  a  player  cannot  merely  want
everything she does, she needs to intend every single event to be part  of the
story.52 Irwin mentions the example of a basketball  player taking a last-second
shot, where a player who perfunctorily throws the ball does not really intend to
score if she thinks it impossible, even if the shot is successful (2015, pp.144-5). In
games the  same phenomenon is  probably common.  The sheer  difficulty  could
make a player doubt that she could possibly win, even if she eventually does. In
that case the player did not intend to win but merely wanted it, but if intention is
necessary for a proposition to be true in the story, it follows that it is not true in the
story that the hero won. Likewise, a player who does not care for the story may
have no intentions as to what is true within it, but it seems counter-intuitive that a
complete and comprehensible narrative is meaningless only because the creator
lacked the necessary intention at the time of creation.
Also, much of the content is actively  not intended by the player, such as
failure. The actual intentionalist could argue that failure is not part of the story, so
the  hero  never  gets  hurt  or  dies,  but  players  may actually  intend  to  lose  for
possible strategic advantages in terms of gameplay: if you die too often in  Max
Payne 3 and in The Last of Us (Naughty Dog, 2013) you receive a healing item.
When watching the gameplay it can be hard to ascertain whether the player is
taking damage because of  ineptness or  for  strategic  reasons,  but  if  the game
designer is the author we get the more consistent reading that taking damage is
always at variance with the intended interpretation; the designer intends the player
to get past the given section, and she further cements that taking damage works
52 Carroll argues that focusing on intentions is too narrow, and that meaning is 
‘determined by relevant elements [of] the mental stock of the artist’ (2011, 
p.122). However, assessing what belongs to the set of relevant elements may 
be an even bigger endeavour than the interpretation itself, and would arguably 
undermine the distinction between what the artist intended to be a part of the 
story and what she only considered.
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against that intention by, for instance, providing the player with a healing item to
counteract a severe loss of health-points. Moreover, a player who gets hurt on
purpose is most likely concerned primarily with the  ludologic dimension and not
the narratological one – you take damage as a means of improving your strategic
advantage, not to create a better story – so by seeing the designer as author we
get the added bonus of aesthetically superior stories (if  only because they are
more consistent in how taking damage is always negative). Thus, this version of
EAI, though still flawed, is considerably less problematic if we see the  designer
and not the player as the author of the game story. 
3.3.3 Retroactive alteration of meaning
Another problem stems from which intentions that  are thought  of  as definitive.
Stock says that intentions could change before or whilst being executed, but that
intentions regarding the final version determine fictional content (2017, p.16). In a
related vein Irwin says that an author cannot will something about the fiction when
it  is  finished  (2015,  p.145).  When pushed  to  the  limit,  this  principle  becomes
absurd and introduces questions of which intentions matter and in what relation
they stand to  the  finished work,  perhaps leading to  Humpty-Dumptyism.  If  we
found out that J.K. Rowling’s initial intentions were to write a fantasy-story, but the
moment before writing the last full stop she changed her mind and intended it to
be a science fiction story, deeming everything she had written to be sufficiently
compatible with these new intentions (so she does not merely will  it,  but fulfils
Stock’s and Irwin’s criterion of genuine expectations required for intentions), we
would be obliged to accept that hundreds of pages written with the intention to be
fantasy change meaning only because the author  changes her  mind,  and that
people who read them before Rowling’s change of mind have to interpret them
differently when reading them again. One could solve this by saying that the work
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as a whole changes, so when Rowling reads her first draft (sans final full stop) she
was in fact interpreting a different work, not the science fiction-story it would end
up as.  This would be a valid explanation, but it  nevertheless remains counter-
intuitive that hundreds of pages could change their meaning so easily. 
The same principle applies to games. A player of Snake Eater could intend
to kill  all  guards throughout  the game and successfully do so up until  the last
minute of the game when she changes her mind and retroactively intends it to be a
non-lethal playthrough with no kills. Naturally we would not want fictional truth to
depend on sudden whims of capricious creators. Here intentionalists could argue
yet again that said person could will  but not intend this, but as already argued
above  it  is  question-begging  to  say  that  p was  intended  because  it  can  be
grasped, and if not it was never intended to begin with. 
Intentionalists  could  insist  on  their  case,  claiming  that  the  second-order
intention of changing the first-order intention pertaining to fictional content does
not  obtain;  Rowling  did  not  really intend to  change her  intentions from writing
fantasy to writing science fiction,  she merely  willed it,  but  without  the required
second-order  intentions the  first-order  intentions will  not  change.  Likewise,  the
player of Snake Eater only wanted to change her intentions without intending it. If
the player merely wills to intend it, it must mean that we are not able to grasp this
second-order intention, because if we would have been able to grasp it she would
have successfully intended it. 
This does not necessarily solve the problem; we could create an infinite
regress of n-order intentions, introducing orders of intentions ad infinitum until we
find an intention that  is  successfully realized and,  by consequence,  allows the
other intentions to be realized as well. Thus, if the first-order intention fails we can
still claim that she intended to intend, but if readers  can grasp the second-order
intention of changing the first-order  intention they automatically grasp the first-
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order intention too (since it is a constituent of the second-order intention), and if
we grasp the first-order intention it means that it too was successfully conveyed
and therefore realized. Intentionalists could turn this argument on itself by adding
yet  another  tier:  for  every  n number  of  intentions  we  introduce,  intentionalists
construct a chain with n+1 tiers where the last tier is occupied by volition and not
intention. This would be a valid objection on their part, but we could counter with a
chain containing n+2 tiers ad infinitum, ultimately ending up in a stalemate.53 
We  could  grant  that  an  infinite  chain  of  n-order  intentions  renders
interpretation unnecessarily obtuse, and concede that one cannot intend to modify
intentions  in  such  a  whimsical  fashion,  but  the  cogency  of  the  intentionalist’s
argument comes at the price of the author’s ability to change her mind with regard
to her creation. It ultimately means that intentionalists cannot maintain that it is the
intentions regarding the final version that obtain, since the author’s early intentions
to such a high extent limit what can be intended afterwards, depending on what
intentions can be grasped through the current state of the book. The intentionalist
may say that only the first intentions were  genuine intentions, the following ones
were  only matters  of  volition,  but  that  would  aggravate  epistemic  problems by
precluding appeals to the author’s (purported) intentions regarding the final version
of the work. Likewise, we cannot appeal to the player’s purported intentions at the
end  of  the  playthrough,  because  these  may  be  no  more  than  mere  volition,
meaning that the player herself does not successfully separate what she intends
and wants respectively.
It  could  also  be  that  the  author  wavers  between  various  intentions
concerning the meaning, even if her intentions concerning which string of words to
include remains consistent, but then it follows that the intentions that happen to be
53 A similar problem pertaining to how first- and second-order intentions may lead 
to a regress is noted by Dickie and Wilson (1995, p.238).
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graspable by virtue of being conveyed through that exact string of words will be
the ones that obtain, regardless of when they were held during the process of
creation.  To illustrate this with  an example:  suppose that when writing the first
Harry Potter-book, Rowling intended to write the line of dialogue ‘You’re a wizard,
Harry’. However, not having fully decided on Harry’s character, she has numerous
thoughts on what this string of words is supposed to convey, first intending it to
mean  ‘You’re  a  woman,  Harry’,  then  ‘You’re  an  unemployed  accountant  from
Exeter, Harry’ etc. Intention number 27 may have been that Harry is a wizard, but
this intention is soon replaced by other intentions, all equally incompatible with the
conventional  linguistic  meaning  of  said  string  of  words.  Then  Stock  and  Irwin
would have to assert  that it  is intention number 27 that obtains and that other
purported intentions are only examples of volition, since they cannot reasonably
be inferred. However, from that it follows that the intention which obtains is the one
best supported by the text and linguistic conventions, regardless of when during
the writing it  appears,  raising the question of  why we should devote so much
attention to finding out intentions at all. 
In  games  this  problem  is  even  more  pertinent  as  oscillation  between
intentions is more prevalent, seeing how players often alter and/or fail to realize
their intentions. A player is constantly modifying and updating strategies during a
playthrough as a response to unforeseen events and outcomes of her actions, but
it is not necessarily the last intention held that will correspond to what happened
on-screen up until then, it could be the penultimate one, or the one at the start of
the game etc. A player could successfully realize some instrumental intention in a
session that ultimately fails, and then fail to recreate those instrumental intentions
in  the  next  session  but  successfully  realize  the  ultimate  of  winning  the  game
instead.  As an  example,  a  player  of  Snake Eater could  intend to  not  kill  any
guards, but as she is about to win she accidentally dies herself. In the next session
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she has to kill several guards because of her less skillful gameplay, but she wins
the game. Then the last attempt would make it fictionally true that the protagonist
Snake kills several guards, even though the player did not initially intend this (this
kind of repetition and revision of the game story is not even possible in games that
save  player  progress  automatically,  rendering  player  intentions  even  less
pertinent).
It has been argued, however, that if an author changes her intention it does
not  mean  that  the  result  is  a  failed  attempt  at  realizing  the  first  (provisional)
intention, but a successful attempt at realizing the second one (Huddleston 2012,
p.246n15). Therefore, the intentionalist could argue that the player of Snake Eater
does not fail to complete the game without killing anyone, for this is no longer her
intention by the end of the game; instead she succeeds in completing the game by
killing  n  number of guards. This is not a satisfactory solution for intentionalists
considering players as authors. Not only does this explanation seem to be invoked
primarily for the purpose of saving the conception of the player as author, it also
renders  the  player’s  intentions  infallible,  as  she  can  always  add  that  the  last
intention, no matter how different from the initial one, was successfully conveyed,
and we would hardly believe that a player who just died in Snake Eater changed
her intention at the last moment before Snake’s death. A game designer could also
change her intentions in a similar fashion, but it is possible for her to change the
code in the same way that an author can rewrite her book (or a director re-edit her
film), so if we instead see the game designer as author we can at least reduce
problems arising from indecision and retain the notion of authorial intentions as
fallible.
This relates to the question of when a work finished. It has been argued that
it is the artist who determines this (Livingston 2008, p.394; Livingston and Archer
2010,  p.443;  Livingston and Trogdon 2014,  p.227,  2015,  pp.460-2; Killin  2015,
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p.335).54 If  the  player  is  the author,  and the author  decides when the work  is
complete, it follows that any game can end after five minutes with the accidental
death  of  the  protagonist  as  long  as  the  player  sincerely  intends  this.  Some
scholars presented earlier seem to accept this when they consider player death as
a potential end of the story. However, not only would this produce a vast number of
aesthetically inferior stories, it is also counter-intuitive that we should accept that
the  story  is  over  when  there  are  many  potential  tasks  left  to  complete.  If  a
novel/film  does  not  end  because  the  reader/spectator  stops  reading/watching
when there are still some pages/images left to read/see, it seems inconsistent that
we should grant that the game story is over when the player no longer wishes to
play.
3.3.4 Using unrealized intentions as evidence
Moreover, it is debatable whether the player’s intentions could still be inferred if
they are not realized. If a player intends to finish Snake Eater without killing any
guards but accidentally kills all of them in the process, we could not access the
initial intention. Stock attempts to answer such objections by saying that in a chain
of  intentions it  is  not necessary that  all  of  them be realized (2017, p.85).  She
presents the example of a person who successfully raises his arm and throws a
dart, making those actions intentional, but fails to realize the intention of hitting the
target. This does not mean that the ultimate intention will be completely hidden,
Stock explains, because the instrumental intention can nevertheless indicate what
the person attempted. Another example of hers is of someone who attempts to
bake a cake but ends up making a mess which nevertheless allows anyone who
sees the cake to infer what the original intention was; likewise, an author’s actions
will  constitute  sufficient  evidence  for  readers  to  work  out  the  original  intention
54 For more on artwork completion, see Hick (2008) and Gover (2015).
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(Stock 2017, pp.88-9).55 This line of reasoning only ostensibly solves the problem
of the player’s intentions in video games. One could claim that just as we can work
out an author’s failed intentions, we could conclude that a player who, for instance,
kills a guard in Snake Eater did not intend this, meaning that it is not true in the
story  of  Snake  Eater that  Snake  kills  a  guard,  even  if  it  ended  up  in  the
representation. However,  that seems to presuppose an evaluation of intentions
that will always work in the favour of EAI, where realized intentions are given more
attention than unrealized ones, so that our assessment of which intentions that
provide us with an understanding of the work will always be biased so as to grant
that the author’s ultimate intentions are invariably realized. I see two significant
problems with this.
Firstly, it may presuppose that we already know the ultimate intention before
interpreting it, because otherwise we would not know which instrumental intentions
are the most relevant for the ultimate intention, making the process circular. To
illustrate this with a concrete example: towards the end of 300 (Snyder, 2007) the
Spartan  leader  Leonidas  (Gerard  Butler)  throws  a  spear  towards  the  Persian
emperor  Xerxes  (Rodrigo  Santoro),  but  misses.  It  is  intuitive  to  assume  that
Leonidas intended to hit Xerxes, but that Gerard Butler intended to miss.56 This
means  that  the  very  same  act  conveys  two  diametrically  opposed  intentions
regarding the ultimate goal of the spear-throw, but that raises the question of how
we ascertain the intentions of Leonidas and Butler respectively. Selecting which
parts of the chain of instrumental intentions that matter the most  presupposes
knowledge of the ultimate goal, it does not necessarily lead to it.57 We know that
the Spartan leader has the ultimate intention of killing Xerxes, and so we ascribe a
55 Similar points about how works provide evidence of failed intentions have been 
raised by Carroll (1992, p.100) and Lintott (2002, p.70).
56 Assuming for the sake of argument that the actor actually threw a spear.
57 Lamarque makes a similar observation (1990, p.341).
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higher value to the instrumental intention of throwing the spear than to the fact that
it misses. Conversely, when we evaluate the spear throw of Butler we incorporate
the miss into our evaluation and deem that the ultimate intention of missing was
successful.  Pace Stock, in this example we do not conclude what the ultimate
intention was by studying the instrumental intentions, because our evaluation of
Leonidas’ and Butler’s respective ultimate intentions presupposes that we already
know  which  instrumental  ones  are  more  important  to  our  comprehension.  In
literature this may not be a prevalent problem, seeing how authors can rewrite
passages,  but  in  games  failure  is  ubiquitous  and  harder  to  rectify,  rendering
interpretation unnecessarily complex if the player is seen as author. If we instead
see the game designer as author we still retain the more fundamental problem of
knowing which intentions to ascribe a higher importance to (just as in literature and
cinema), but at least this problem will not be as prevalent as when the  player is
regarded as author.
The  second  problem with  allowing  intentions  to  be  conveyed  by  ‘failed’
artworks  is  that  Stock  overestimates  the  possibility  of  inferring  intentions from
unsuccessful realizations thereof, and makes the success-condition so minimal we
yet again risk ending up with Humpty-Dumptyism and infallible intentions. Stock
says  that  something must  convey the intentions,  but  grants  that  even a failed
attempt  can suffice  to  do this.58 This  does not  hold.  Stock  merely argues that
authors can fail  in terms of  instrumental  intentions,  but  maintains that ultimate
intentions will  be  conveyed  nevertheless,  although differently,  meaning that  no
author  can  ever  truly  fail  to  convey  her  intentions.  This  makes  the  success-
condition as minimal as that presented by Maes, where practically anything counts
as evidence,  making any intention reasonably inferable. Likewise,  a game can
then mean whatever the player intends, any gameplay will count as evidence of
58 Carroll also says this (1992, p.100).
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the player’s intention. One wonders whether this is really reconcilable with Stock’s
and  Irwin’s  conceptions  of  embodied  intentions.  Recall:  if  an  intention  is  not
conveyed properly,  Stock and Irwin say that it  was not intended to begin with.
Thus,  Stock seems to  say that  whatever  is  manifest will  count as evidence of
intention, meaning that there cannot even be a case where the reader is unable to
grasp  the  intention,  because  regardless  of  what  the  author  writes  this  will  be
sufficient for a potential reader to grasp the original intentions. The only intentions
that  can fail  are thus instrumental,  not  ultimate ones.  This  is  merely a  refined
version of Humpty-Dumptyism.
A paradoxical  consequence  of  this  is  that  the  paucity  of  evidence  for
intending to convey p could  in itself be the evidence that the author intended to
convey p (because everything in the work necessarily conveys ultimate intentions),
so the work will mean p either by virtue of the text conveying this, or because it
does  not convey  this.  Stock  cannot  say  that  the  author  fails  to  convey  any
intention, because his goal was to convey  p, and the text conveys  p through a
failure to communicate p.  If  both successful  and unsuccessful  conveyance are
sufficient for the work to mean p, authorial intentions become infallible.
Even if  we accept  appeals to instrumental  intentions one would have to
answer to what extent intentions can change actual matter of facts, if Stock wants
to avoid making her position redolent of Maes’s when he makes work-meaning
equivalent  to  authorial  intentions  even  when  these  are  not  successfully
communicated (a consequence Stock tries to avoid). Suppose someone intended
to make brownies and accidentally made a sponge cake instead, but that it was
still  possible  for  anyone to  reasonably infer  what  her  intentions were.  No one
would then conclude that the cake she ended up making was actually a brownie,
in spite of the evidence that she intended to bake one.59 Likewise, if she intended
59 Dickie and Wilson similarly argue that although we may recognize what a 
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to play  Devil May Cry  (Capcom, 2001) impeccably without taking damage even
once,  few  would  accept  her  intended  version  irrespective  of  how  poorly  the
gameplay conforms to these intentions. If one does not think a sponge cake could
be brownies in disguise, one cannot claim that a failed playthrough conveys the
content of a successful one. Currie asserts that by studying private documents in
search for authorial intentions one actually interprets  another work, the one the
author (unsuccessfully) attempted to create (2004, p.125), and the same principle
applies to playthroughs when we try to comprehend what the player attempted to
do without succeeding.
It is also dubious whether Stock’s chain of intentions really solves anything.
It would be convenient to divide actions into several steps, but that sidesteps the
issue of whether an overarching intention can truly be realized if not all of the ‘sub-
intentions’  of  which  it  consists  are  realized  as  well.  Let  us  use  Stock’s  own
example:  ‘Very  often,  agents  intend  to  pursue  their  goals,  both  ultimate  and
instrumental. So: just as practical reasons may nest—an agent may do C in order
to bring about  B, and B in order to bring about  A (and so on)—so too intentions
may nest. An agent may intend to C in order to B in order to A (and so on)’ (2017,
p.16). She further adds that if a person intends to A, then the intention to B can be
imputed as well if it is reasonable that said person intends to A and he considers B
to be a good means of  A-ing; one intention can thus act as partial evidence of
another. This argument is problematic for several reasons.
Firstly,  it  has been argued that requiring intentions for each intermediary
step  before  the  ultimate  intention  leads to  a  regress of  ‘preintentions’ (Sellors
2007,  p.269).  From this  it  follows that  regardless of  which link in  the chain of
preintentions  is  not  realized,  the  intentionalist  could  introduce  a  successfully
person intended to say, we can still maintain that she did not actually say it 
(1995, p.237).
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realized  preintention  preceding  the  failed  one  and  argue  that  this  realized
preintention is sufficient evidence as to what the ultimate intention was.  
Secondly, by creating chains of intentions we get a dilemma where the first
horn is that if intentionalists appeal to parts of a chain of instrumental intentions in
their evaluation, it follows that if so much as one of these fails, the author fails to
realize her intentions, since she did not intend to convey p with a chain containing
failed  instrumental  intentions.  The  second  horn  is  that  the  intentionalist  can
disregard chains of instrumental intentions and allow for the ultimate intention to
be realized nonetheless, with the consequence that the artist’s ultimate intention
cannot be inferred only with reference to the instrumental ones, since these are
ignored  (and  it  would  be  ad  hoc to  ignore  only  the  unrealized  instrumental
intentions;  doing  so  would  also  be  question-begging  for  the  reason  explained
above, that we would have to know the ultimate intention in order to know which
instrumental intentions to ignore). From this it follows that if the ultimate intention is
not realized we cannot appeal to instrumental intentions as a means of inferring
what the ultimate (unrealized) intention was.
The more fundamental problem in Stock’s line of reason is that although
she  is  aware  that  intentions  may  nest,  she  seems  to  neglect  their
interdependence. There is a fundamental difference between an agent with the
three separate intentions to A,  B, and C, and one with a single intention of A-ing
through  B-ing by means of  C-ing,  where  the realization of  this  larger  intention
depends on the successful realization of each and every step that constitutes it;
whenever  each  step  depends  on  the  preceding  one  a  second-order  ‘meta-
intention’ cannot be realized unless each step is. Thus, if a person does not intend
to A,  B, and C, but rather intends to  A in order to  B in order to  C, and fails to  A
(which precludes B and C), she cannot be said to have conveyed her intention. In
games this is quite prevalent, as most of them require chains of intentions making
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up a larger ‘meta-intention’. In Ocarina of Time, players may intend to complete a
large number of tasks and defeat certain enemies in a determined order before
they can finally defeat the main villain Ganondorf, and if one of these steps should
fail they cannot reach the final one. Many players inevitably fail to realize some of
these sub-intentions due to lack of skills or loss of interest, but failing to realize an
early  sub-intention  prevents  realizing  later  sub-intentions,  which  gives  little
indication  as  to  what  they  intended  for  the  remainder  of  the  story.  Suppose
Ocarina of Time consists of 100 small tasks, but a given player only performs the
first one; we would then be unable to infer intentions pertaining to the remaining 99
tasks, which leaves Stock two options. The first is to claim that the player willed
the subsequent 99 steps but only intended the first one, as only that one can be
inferred.  However,  Stock  also  says  that  no  text  produced  by  a  rational  agent
contains no evidence of her intentions (2017, p.91), so Stock’s second option is to
claim that the first step is sufficient evidence for the remaining 99, but this renders
the success-condition too small, leading to Humpty-Dumptyism. If we instead see
the  designer as author this problem is reduced dramatically, as different parts in
the chain of intentions do not depend on each other in the same way. Even if a
player  does not  realize  the  first  intention,  which  is  necessary for  realizing  the
remaining 99,  the designer could still  have realized her intention of writing the
code for  all  100 steps;  the fact  that  the player  does not  always access these
intentions  is  no  different  from  a  reader/spectator  who  does  not  grasp  all  the
intentions of an author/director.
Hence, EAI suffers from inherent flaws that make it an untenable mode of
interpretation in general and in video games in particular. It ascribes too high an
importance to  the  beliefs  of  the  author,  allowing for  meaningless  narratives  to
acquire meaning and meaningful  ones to  lose it  only by virtue of  the author’s
belief.  If  one allows for  narrative  content  to  restrict  what  could be  intended,  it
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makes players less viable candidates for authors insofar as their intentions are
restricted by what  the designer included in the game, and since they possess
intentions pertaining only to a small amount of the game’s content. Furthermore,
games actively work against the realization of the players’ intentions, forcing them
to  incessantly  alter  these.  This  fact  also  risks  either  preventing  a  majority  of
intentions from being realized, or making success-conditions so small that they are
always realized (resulting in Humpty-Dumptyism). Should one nevertheless insist
on endorsing EAI,  its  issues are alleviated if  one regards the  designer as the
author.
3.4 Moderate actual intentionalism
Having  dealt  with  EAI,  we  can  move  to  moderate  actual  intentionalism.60 The
essential difference between EAI and MAI is that the latter sees artistic intentions
as  determinant of work-meaning only insofar as these intentions are compatible
with the linguistic meaning of the work; if word-meaning and authorial intentions
diverge,  authorial  intentions  do  not  change  the  meaning  of  the  words.  When
linguistic and/or literary conventions make  several meanings compatible with the
same string of words, the author’s intentions determine which of these is correct.
In brief, authorial intentions are only authoritative insofar as they are supported by
the work (Iseminger 1996, pp.320-1; Livingston 1998, p.835; Carroll 2000, pp.76-
7,  2002,  p.323,  2011 p.119;  Trivedi  2001,  pp.196-7,  2015,  p.700;  Lintott  2002,
pp.66-7; Irvin 2006, pp.118-19; S. Davies 2006, pp.227-8; Mikkonen 2009; Gover
2012,  p.170). In contrast to EAI, MAI allows for a work to have meaning beyond
artistic intentions (Livingston 1993, p.107, 2003, p.284, 2005, p.142; Trivedi 2001,
p.196; Lintott 2002, p.68; S. Davies 2006, p.234, p.238; Stecker and Davies 2010,
60 Sometimes referred to as ‘modest actual intentionalism’ or ‘partial actual 
intentionalism’. Whenever criticism and/or defense applies equally to EAI and 
MAI I refer to both as ‘intentionalism’.
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pp.309-11).  If  artistic  intentions  are  not  supported  by  the  word-sequence,
adherents of MAI either claim that the given sequence is meaningless, or that it
acquires the conventional linguistic meaning (Iseminger 1996,  p.322; Irvin 2006,
pp.118-19; S. Davies 2006, p.228; Stecker 2003, p.42, 2006, p.429; Sellors 2007,
p.265; Carroll 2011, p.131). As for visual media, the image acquires the meaning
intended  by  the  artist  only  insofar  as  this  meaning  can  be  ascertained  by  a
sensitive and informed viewer (Carroll 2011, p.120).
What  it  means  for  an  artist  to  successfully  convey  her  intentions  is
debatable.  One view says  that  the  artistic  intention  is  realized when the  work
conveys a meaning that an appropriate reader is most likely to grasp; another is
that the intention is realized as long as it is compatible with the work-meaning, but
not  necessarily  the  only  possible  (or  most  plausible)  interpretation,  (S.  Davies
2006, p.228;  Carroll 2011 pp.119-20). Moderate intentionalists’ lack of clarity on
this matter has been criticized (D. Davies 2007, p.193n32; Maes 2008, pp.87-8).
However, some defenders of MAI have argued that mere compatibility with work-
meaning is not enough for an intention to obtain, the intention must be relevant, so
as not to become an extraneous addition with no bearing on the text (Lintott 2002,
p.71; Livingston 2005, p.155,  p.199; S. Davies 2006, pp.229-30; Stecker 2008,
p.40). 
Another theory, presented by Robert Stecker, is that work-meaning is not
defined by linguistic conventions alone, the relevant context can allow for a non-
conventional meaning insofar as it provides evidence that permits the author to
convey her intention (2006, p.431). This does not apply only to linguistic artworks,
because  nonliterary  artworks,  though  not  literal  utterances,  are  nevertheless
analogous to utterances, from which it follows that work-meaning is in some sense
analogous to utterance meaning (Stecker 2006, p.430). Similar observations have
been made by Livingston (2005, pp.148-9) and Currie (1995b, p.28n12).
161
As mentioned in  the  previous section,  intentionalism has been criticized
since it seems to lead interpreters away from the text and compels them to look for
the artist’s intentions elsewhere. However, moderate intentionalists maintain that
extratextual sources such as journals and interviews can be used if they improve
our understanding of the artist’s intentions, provided that they are supported by the
work  (Carroll  2000,  p.83).  MAI  thus  avoids  the  dilemma  of  making  authorial
intentions infallible, because if an author intended to write ‘black’ but wrote ‘green’,
according to MAI the text does not mean ‘black’ only because the author intended
it to (Carroll 2000, p.85; Gover 2012, p.170, pp.175-6).
MAI has been criticized since it introduces problems absent in EAI. One
common criticism is  that  if  intentions  only  determine  work-meaning  insofar  as
these are compatible, it would seem as if intentions are superfluous. We then have
to identify both work-meaning and artistic intentions independently before we can
determine  whether  they  match,  but  if  we  can  identify  work-meaning  without
knowing the intentions it raises the question of why we should bother with grasping
the intentions to begin with; if work-meaning and intentions cannot be separated
we have no way of knowing whether the intentions were successfully conveyed
(Trivedi 2001, p.198, 2015, pp.700-2; Kiefer 2005, p.272; Livingston 2005, p.146;
Stecker  2005, p.154, 2006,  p.432, 2008,  p.43; D. Davies 2007,  p.72; Levinson
2010,  pp.145-6).  If  the  intentions  are  not  realized  they  become  equally
superfluous,  as  intentions  alone  are  not  sufficient  to  endow  the  work  with  a
meaning it does not support (Livingston 2005,  p.146). Briefly, the dilemma thus
has two horns: either artistic intentions become superfluous – since we can know
work-meaning without them – or we cannot assess how well the intentions fit with
the meaning (Trivedi 2001, pp.198-9). Related to this is the dilemma that either the
intentions were realized – in which case one need not refer to them, as the work
conveys its meaning on its own – or they were not realized, meaning that claims
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about work-meaning cannot refer to intentions, as intentions and work-meaning do
not coincide (Wimsatt and Beardsley 1954, pp.375-6; Livingston 1998, pp.831-2,
2003, p.283).
Moreover,  if  a  given  part  of  the  artwork  becomes  meaningless  when  it
cannot support the artist’s intention, it follows that interpreters are prevented from
appealing to linguistic conventions even in cases where a word does have an
actual meaning (albeit not the one the artist had in mind) so they are mistaken if
they believe it to be meaningful, even if there is no evidence to prove the contrary
(Irvin 2006, p.119). Further, if the string of words supports more than one possible
interpretation  it  raises  two  questions:  why  the  author should  decide  which  is
correct, and why we could not allow for a work to be ambiguous (Beardsley 1992,
p.31; Lyas 1992, p.147; Leddy 1999, p.228; D. Davies 2004, p.86, p.95; Irvin 2006,
p.120;  Trivedi  2015,  p.721).  Yet  another  criticism  is  that  it  would  be  more
economical to categorically appeal to conventional or intentional meaning instead
of  the  disjunctive  solution  of  MAI,  where  both  conventional  and intentional
meanings are applied alternatively (Irvin 2006,  p.120; Irwin 2015,  p.141;  Stock
2017, p.14). 
Stecker’s answer to the dilemma of intentions either being superfluous or
infallible is that both can be identified through a process of mutual adjustment;
they  determine  one  another,  and  our  understanding  of  one  may  alter  our
understanding of the other (2005, p.155,  2006,  p.432, 2008,  p.43). Sheila Lintott
argues in a similar fashion, saying that ‘we approach the artwork with the idea in
mind that the artist has been at least partially successful in realizing her semantic
intentions in the work and that we try to understand the work accordingly’ (2002,
p.67). Intentions are not redundant since the search for meaning and intentions
are not two separate endeavours (Lintott 2002, p.72). It has also been argued that
if the artist presents intentions irreconcilable with the work, one might question her
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honesty (Lintott 2002, p.71n14; Maes 2010, p.130). Lintott further adds that it is a
false dichotomy to separate work-meaning and artistic intentions, since intentions
determine work-meaning insofar as the latter supports the former (2002, p.68). In
a related vein, Iseminger argues that work-meaning is a function of both the word-
sequence  and the  utterer’s  meaning (1996,  p.322).  According  to  Lintott,  if  we
cannot identify intentions it means either that they were not successfully realized
or that the interpreter failed to identify and add a possible interpretation (2002,
p.68). However, she emphasizes that although intentions may help the interpreter
discover  work-meaning,  the  latter  must  still  support  the  former;  intentions  and
work-meaning are not identical (Lintott, p.68n8). 
Defenders of MAI have also criticized the binary conception of successful
realizations of intentions. Lintott argues that it is a false dichotomy to offer only the
two options of complete failure/success, and it is rather a matter of degree, with
few artists completely succeeding or failing to express their intentions (2002, p.69).
An artwork with no indication of the artist’s intention is analogous to a completely
failed  conversation  where  what  the  speaker  says  gives  no  hints  at  what  she
intended to say (Lintott  2002,  p.70).  Similarly,  Stecker argues that although an
entire work can have a single utterance-meaning, each constituent of the work
(e.g. sentences in a literary work) also has meaning which make up the larger
meaning of the whole (2006, p.432).61 Further, Lintott adds, drawing upon Carroll,
that evidence of failed intentions can still be found in a work (2002, p.70).62 
3.4.1 Advantages of MAI in video games
At a first glance MAI seems to be more in line with what game theorists say about
the player’s ability to influence the text, since several of them mention that the
61 For criticism of equating artworks with utterances, see Kiefer (2005, p.273-5).
62 Recall that Stock says the same.
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player can only influence the game within parameters set by the designer. This
sounds like what moderate actual intentionalists say about work-meaning, since
they maintain that the text can mean only what is supported by conventions (e.g.
linguistic ones),  and in cases where authorial  intentions deviate from the text’s
meaning, the latter has a higher authority. Moderate actual intentionalists display a
laudable  desire  to  salvage  intentionalism  from  devastating  criticism  directed
towards it without ‘throwing out the baby with the bathwater’, and it would indeed
be a hasty decision to do away with actual intentionalism as a whole only because
the most extreme version does not bear scrutiny. If artistic intent had been all that
mattered, engagement with artworks would have been futile, since artists could
provide more accurate and less ambiguous interpretations through other means.
MAI retains the importance of the work, making it worthwhile and meaningful to
engage  with  the  artwork  and  not  just  the  artist’s  journals  and  notes,  without
categorically rejecting authorial intentions. 
Moreover, critics of MAI misconstrue one aspect of the alleged epistemic
dilemma. As already mentioned above, one common criticism directed at MAI is
that if we can know work-meaning independently of artistic intentions, the latter
become  superfluous.  Saam  Trivedi’s  conclusion  is  that  knowledge  of  work-
meaning  renders  intentions  extraneous,  but  he  may  have  misconstrued  MAI,
because  one  point  frequently  raised  by  intentionalists  of  all  stripes  is  the
dependence of meaning on artistic intentions. MAI does not renounce this principle
entirely, it only presents a more moderate version of it. Trivedi’s criticism is cogent,
but  only in  cases where artistic intentions are not  realized; it  is  only then that
intentions have to make way for conventional meaning. However, if we know the
intention  and that  it  is  not  successfully  expressed,  defenders  of  MAI  would
concede that those intentions are irrelevant to the work-meaning, that is the very
premise of their interpretive approach! Whenever the work does support artistic
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intentions, MAI states that the meaning is determined by the artist’s intention, and
then Trivedi’s criticism no longer holds. He speaks of work-meaning as if all works
had but  one possible  and evident  meaning, but  most  works are likely to have
several, perhaps equally plausible ones, and then the moderate intentionalist may
appeal to the author’s intention to evaluate these meanings; we have to identify
independent meanings and the author’s intention so we can make the necessary
comparison to see how well they fit, we cannot do away with either. The author ’s
intentions may not be compatible with any of the possible work-meanings, but if
they are, they are essential to identifying the correct interpretation; this means that
intentions are not surplus, as some opponents believe. 
Moreover, opponents of intentionalism have exaggerated their criticism of
how this directs the interpreter’s attention away from the work. Consultation of
private documents does not contradict the claim that the work is the best evidence
for  the  author’s  intention  so  long as  one distinguishes between necessity  and
sufficiency, and acknowledges the extent to which a given source augments our
understanding.  Not even the best  evidence is  necessarily unambiguous and/or
infallible,  so  a  document  such  as  an  author’s  journal  only  acts  as  a  ‘second
opinion’, not a more reliable and preferable indicator of authorial intentions. This is
something  critics  seem  to  neglect,  and  which  defenders  do  not  sufficiently
elaborate upon; a work may be necessary but insufficient for full comprehension,
and  still  contribute  with  more  information  than  extratextual  sources,  thereby
retaining its status as the best source of information.
There are other advantages with MAI and the importance it grants the role
of  conventions,  so long as we grant  that  conventions need not  be  exclusively
linguistic in nature. As mentioned in the previous section, Gover explains that film
has conventions of similarity and representation (2012, p.180). Similarly, there are
conventions unique to video games which arguably cannot be ‘overruled’ by player
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intentions, meaning that when the intended and the conventional meaning diverge,
the  latter  obtains.  For  instance,  many  (if  not  most)  games  clearly  distinguish
between when a player has successfully completed the game and when she has
lost. The latter often entails some kind of game over-screen (reading, for instance,
‘game  over’,  ‘you  died’,  ‘mission  failed’  etc.),  but  games  that  lack  such  texts
nevertheless signal that the player did not successfully complete the task at hand
and should try again: if you die in Half-Life 2, pressing any key will automatically
reload the last save-game; when you reach the end, end-credits redolent of those
from  films  start  rolling.  Similarly,  Max  Payne lacks  a  game  over-screen,  but
confirms  the  player’s  victory  at  the  end  with  a  text-box  with  the  message
‘Congratulations! You have completed Max Payne.’ If we grant that there can be
nonlinguistic  conventions  in  nonliterary  media,  then  a  game  over-screen  (or
equivalent)  conventionally  means  that  the  game  is  not  finished  and  that  the
gameplay is not ‘canonical’,  i.e.  should be disregarded and has no bearing on
fictional  truth.  This  is  a  significant  advantage  for  video  game  interpretation,
because  this  acknowledges  that  intentions  are  fallible,  and  therefore  cannot
categorically override textual evidence, so we avoid Humpty-Dumptyism.
The fallibility of intentions is an essential matter in video games. In literary
narratives, it is comparatively easy, from a practical perspective, to realize one’s
intentions: it is not harder to write one word than another (whether it conveys the
author’s intention is a separate matter). In film, a given intention can be conveyed
with  the  appropriate  image,  even  if  technological  and/or  economical  factors
constrain the means by which those images are created. Games are a different
matter. As explained in the previous section, the challenge of realizing an intention
is an essential factor implemented to enrich the player’s experience. If the player is
an  author,  she  is  perhaps  the  only  kind  of  author  who  works  with  a  medium
actively  working  against her  intentions,  since  the  game’s puzzles,  enemies,
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challenges in timing etc. are programmed to prevent her from achieving her goal,
and so there is arguably a greater necessity of allowing for intentions to be fallible
in this medium. Note that  this simultaneously resolves several  temporal issues
discussed in previous chapters: many games could not take place in the present
since textual evidence contradicts this, irrespective of what the player may intend.
There are even more advantages with MAI applied to games. As mentioned
by Lintott, success and failure should not be regarded in as binary a fashion as is
often done by opponents of intentionalism, that would be a false dichotomy. In
games, this is all the more pertinent as players are unlikely to realize all of their
intentions.
3.4.2 Problems with MAI in video games
In spite of these advantages, there are several potential problems with MAI. First
of all, depending on how one construes EAI and MAI respectively, there may be no
essential  differences  between  these  interpretative  schools  and  their  respective
results.  EAI,  which  holds  that  authorial  intentions  categorically  determine  the
meaning of a work (i.e. Humpty-Dumptyism), does indeed differ from MAI, but as
already  shown  in  the  previous  section,  not  all  extreme  intentionalists  defend
Humpty-Dumptyism anyway. This means that moderate intentionalists attack more
of  a  ‘straw  man’ than  an  actual  interpretative  school  when  they  highlight  the
alleged strengths of MAI in relation to EAI.
Extreme intentionalists provide several strategies of how to avoid Humpty-
Dumptyism, and these ultimately render EAI and MAI practically indistinguishable.
As explained in the previous section, EAI can be salvaged partly by emphasizing
the difference between  intention and  volition.  Moderate intentionalist’s failure to
acknowledge these limitations of intentions has already been noted by Irwin (2015,
pp.141-2). One can want ‘black’ to mean ‘green’, but one cannot intend it, meaning
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that  defenders  of  MAI  may have taken unnecessary steps to  resolve  conflicts
between  work-meaning  and  intentions,  a  strategy  based  on  a  deficient
understanding of the nature and inherent limits of intentions. From this it follows
that, in practice, EAI and MAI will not yield different results in many cases. J.K.
Rowling wrote that Harry Potter has green eyes, but if she actually meant that he
had blue eyes, Stock and Irwin would reply that this does not make Harry’s eyes
blue, since Rowling could not have intended it. Defenders of MAI could argue that
Rowling did intend it, but would nonetheless agree with Stock and Irwin that this
does not change the fictional fact of which colour his eyes  really  are. Likewise,
when playing Ocarina of Time a player may intend Link to wear a pink dress, and
a moderate intentionalist would reply that textual evidence speaks against this (the
game  does  not  allow  players  to  wear  pink  dresses)  whereas  an  extreme
intentionalist would say that the player could not intend this to begin with; both
groups get the same result, that Link does not wear a pink dress.
Note that the primary difference is the conception of the nature of intentions,
but that is a matter independent of truth in fiction. Cases in which MAI and EAI
may get different results are extreme ones where someone does possess proper
intentions to mean ‘black’ when saying ‘green’, or that Link wears a pink dress in
spite of what we see on-screen. An extreme intentionalist like Irwin would argue
that the work means whatever the irrational agent intends it to, since she fulfils the
requirement of  sincere belief,  but  MAI,  placing a higher emphasis on linguistic
conventions, would not grant that the work obtains a new meaning even when the
author  possesses  sincere  belief.  Although  such  cases  allow  EAI  and  MAI  to
display their fundamental differences they are probably so rare that we can ignore
them most of the time.
In brief, both EAI and MAI can avoid Humpty-Dumptyism, and though the
strategies may differ, in many cases they may yield the same result. Since MAI
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seems to be primarily concerned with avoiding Humpty-Dumptyism and problems
derivative  of  it,  one  may ask  why we  should  prefer  it  to  EAI  when  the  latter
provides its own solution.
3.4.3 Success conditions
Another problem is how to construe the success condition required for an intention
to obtain. One problem related to this is noted by Sherri Irvin: an intention entails a
disposition towards a specific behaviour in the relevant circumstances, but if those
circumstances do not obtain the intentions will, as a consequence, not be revealed
(2006, p.117). To illustrate this with an example: if an author meant to write ‘green’
but instead wrote ‘black’, we may nonetheless expose this error if we were to ask
her what objects possess this colour, and she were to answer ‘grass and frogs, but
not coal and pitch’.  Here Irvin is primarily concerned with possibly idiosyncratic
and undetectable intentions within a work, but she – and Beardsley (1992, p.29) –
argue that in long works the possible misunderstandings will be few and marginal
to the work-meaning. However, one could argue to the contrary. 
To see why, let us consider possible solutions to this problem: it has been
argued that it does not suffice for an intention to only be compatible with the text in
the sense that it is consistent with it, it must also have some stronger relevance
and reveal features that up until then had not been detected (Lintott 2002,  p.71;
Livingston 2005,  p.155,  p.199; S. Davies 2006, pp.229-30; Stecker 2008,  p.40).
This does not necessarily solve anything, because it  could be argued that  any
intention  invariably  enriches  the  story  somehow,  which  would  make  intentions
infallible; all intentions enrich the story in some way, so all obtain. If we modify the
demand and say that intentions have to be relevant to overarching themes and
motifs, intentions that may be consistent with the work are nevertheless precluded
if they are marginal and undetectable. Though we solve that small problem a much
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larger one consequentially appears: by demanding that an intention be compatible
with and enrich the text somehow, we get the awkward consequence that the more
absurd an interpretation is, the higher the relevance for our interpretations. 
To illustrate this: Livingston presents the example of an author of a realist
novel  who  claims  that  his  protagonist  is  a  Martian,  and  thinks  it  is  a  ‘daft
interpretation’ (Livingston 2005, p.155), whereas Maes argues that if this intention
is sincere, it is likely to be of value (Maes 2010, p.130).63 One could argue that any
story would be enriched by claiming that the protagonist is a Martian, because it
adds yet another element opening up for even more interpretations.64 Maes also
notes this consequence when he says that ‘even the most extravagant hypothesis
will prove revealing in this sense, if only enough effort is put into it’ (2008, p.88).
Some intentions would arguably be irrelevant, such as the exact number of hairs
on Harry Potter’s head, but the intention that Harry Potter be a vampire changes
everything, and would add a new meaning to many passages (the fact that he
spends most of his time in a castle would open up for parallels with Gothic vampire
stories).  Thus,  we  would  not  want  intentions  to  obtain  only  because  they are
compatible  with  the  text,  or  even  because  they  enrich  it.  These  factors  are
necessary but not sufficient, and further requirements need to be formulated, lest
the moderate intentionalist unwittingly legitimize some kind of value maximization
where extravagant intentions invariably obtain because they are relevant to the
work-meaning  somehow;  it  would  allow  players  to  postulate  the  most  absurd
things  about  the  story  they  supposedly  create,  and  a  player  who  claims,  for
instance,  that  Super  Mario  is  a  vampire  could  obviate  possible  objections
regarding incompatibility with the text by adding the caveat ‘in disguise’. The fact
63 See also Currie (1990, p.63) for a related point.
64 Note that this is not a case of so-called ‘value maximization’, i.e. of claiming that
a work of art ‘is to be interpreted in ways that maximize its value as a work of 
literature’ (S. Davies 2006:223-4); Livingston admits that the new interpretation 
need not be better (2005, p.155).
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that Mario not only has a thirst for blood but also has to hide it from the public
would arguably have an even bigger impact on the work-meaning. What criteria
one should postulate in order to negate such intentions is outside the scope of this
section, my point is simply that defenders of MAI need to further develop their
theories in this area.
One thing can be noted though, with regard to what implications this has for
video games. If we assume that the player intends Super Mario to be a vampire,
no  circumstances  in  the  game might  obtain  where  her  behaviour  reveals  this
intention, and since it is a sincere intention which enriches the story it fulfils the
requirements  postulated  even if  it  remains  undetectable.  The game may even
contain segments that provide circumstances which could  potentially reveal her
disposition  to  change  her  behaviour,  but  her  play-style  guarantees  that  these
never  obtain;  if  Super  Mario  is  a  vampire he would have to  die  if  exposed to
sunlight,  but  the player’s  awareness of  this  compels  her  to  keep Mario  in  the
shade. The game designer, however, has all the possibilities in the world to alter
the code so as to convey her intentions about fictional truth. If Mario is a vampire,
she could programme the game so that Mario dies in sunlight, can transform into a
bat, has a thirst for blood etc. Just like a literary author or a cinematic director, her
intentions may only be partially realized, but at least she can provide interpreters
with more (reliable) information than a player. The general criticism against MAI
still stands, but is attenuated if the designer is the author.
An important point related to this is how to treat sections where intentions
are not realized. MAI has one obvious advantage in literary narratives, since it is
possible  for  an  author  to  produce a  string  of  words that  does not  conform to
linguistic norms at all,  and in such cases we could state with certainty that the
given sentence is meaningless. Since the string of words lacks semantic meaning
it cannot be said to express anything, let alone the author’s intention. Seeing how
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audiovisual  narratives  –  such  as  films  and  video  games –  do  not  depend  on
conventions to the same extent as linguistic ones, it may be less common for them
to be completely void  of  meaning;  as a consequence,  they may contain  more
sequences with a meaning not compatible with the artist’s intentions. Arguably,
films and video games, so long as they present anything identifiable, cannot fail to
convey  some kind  of  meaning,  albeit  not  the  one  intended  by  the  artist;  the
audiovisual  equivalent  of  a meaningless string of  words would be a stream of
images with no discernible content (perhaps because the image is too blurry and
the sound too scrambled), but whereas an author can easily misspell a word, thus
failing to produce a meaningful semantic unit, the majority of a player’s failures
consist  in  failing  to  produce  the  intended content,  not  failure  to  produce  any
content. This leads to an important question: how are we, in general, to interpret
segments that convey meaning incompatible with the artist’s intention?
There are two solutions on offer: either the segment is meaningless, or it
acquires  meaning  supported  by  linguistic  conventions  (Iseminger  1996,  p.322;
Irvin 2006, pp.118-19; S. Davies 2006, p.228; Stecker 2003, p.42, 2006, p.429; D.
Davies 2007, pp.79-80). The first version Irvin calls MAI1, the second MAI2. Both
are problematic.
MAI1, stating that non-intended sections are in fact meaningless, has its
advantages. A common criticism against MAI is that authorial intentions are either
superfluous or infallible, but critics have failed to notice that this argument does not
apply  to  this  version  of  MAI,  possibly  since  they  fail  to  distinguish  between
conventional/linguistic meaning and work-meaning. First of all, intentions are not
infallible,  because  MAI1  concedes  that  a  given  segment  does  not  express
authorial intentions if they are not compatible with the text’s conventional meaning,
which  allows  for  an  independent  assessment  of  intentions  and  conventional
meanings  without  presuming  that  either must  be  equated  with  work-meaning.
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Secondly, MAI1 retains the importance of authorial intentions, since it is only by
knowing these that we can know whether a given section is meaningful  at  all.
Without  them,  we  might  erroneously take the  conventional  meaning to  be  the
work-meaning.  Thirdly,  it  does away with  the  problem of  unintended meaning,
which can be prevalent in audiovisual media like films and games. If the director
did not intend us to see the boom-mic but it accidentally drops into the frame, or if
the player did not intend her character to die, we can claim that since neither is
intended, neither is part of the narrative, in spite of the textual evidence. In brief, in
MAI1 authorial intentions are neither superfluous, nor infallible, and thus it avoids
pressing issues noted by some of its opponents.
On the other hand, MAI1 has some issues. Firstly,  it  gives the awkward
consequence that, in practice, interpreters will  mistakenly ascribe meaning to a
section  that  it  actually  does  not  support  (with  no  evidence  to  indicate  their
interpretive error), since the section, unbeknownst to the readers, deviates from
the author’s intention (Irvin 2006, p.119). As inescapable as this consequence may
be, in a novel and a film this is not necessarily a big problem in practice, if we
agree with Lintott that success is a matter of degree, but even if we assume that
most of an author’s semantic intentions are realized we are still left with what Irvin
calls ‘strange islands of meaninglessness in the midst of works that appear to be
meaningful’  (2006,  p.119).  The  author  is  probably  sufficiently  successful  to
minimize the  number  of  such ‘islands’,  although they remain  an awkward and
inevitable  consequence.  Irvin  has  objected  to  this,  referring  to  moderate
intentionalists’ concession that meaning is fixed to some extent by conventions,
but  her  criticism is  somewhat  misdirected.  If  we  distinguish  between  linguistic
meaning and work-meaning, then MAI1 does not renounce the role of conventions
with regard to the former, only the latter; MAI1 does not seem to claim that the
word ‘black’ lacks linguistic meaning, only that it lacks meaning in the narrative. If
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Rowling  meant  to  write  that  Harry Potter  has black  eyes,  the sentence ‘Harry
Potter has green eyes’ still conveys, linguistically, the colour of a certain person’s
eyes, but  is meaningless in the narrative context as it  does not  correspond to
Rowling’s  intentions.  This  means  that  MAI1  retains  one  problematic  aspect  of
Humpty-Dumptyism,  that  meaning  is  too  intimately  connected  to  authorial
intentions without necessarily being accessible to the interpreter. We could grant
that Rowling’s intention is partially realized insofar as the sentence successfully
conveys that Harry’s eyes have some colour, but we retain the issue of how the
text lacks the meaning one would intuitively ascribe to it with nothing in the text
allowing readers to realize this. MAI1 thus remains problematic, but not entirely for
the reason Irvin thinks.65
However, by applying this version of MAI to video games the problem is
compounded, since most of a player’s intentions are not realized, partly because
she has no intentions on matters beyond her limited control,  but also because
gameplay is typically replete with failed attempts. A challenging game like  Dark
Souls could consist to a large extent of failed attempts of avoiding enemies and/or
inflicting damage on them, and games in the  Zelda-series abound with puzzles
where players may spend much time trying to figure out the solution, with only a
fraction of that time being devoted to actually solving the puzzle once the solution
is  found.  This  version  of  MAI  would  render  the  majority  of  such  gameplay
meaningless, equivalent to a book where most pages are covered with nonsense.
Add to this the epistemic dilemma noted by Irvin (we may have no way of knowing
that these passages fail to express the artist’s intentions) and it becomes evident
65 Carroll tries to answer related objections by saying that hypothetical 
intentionalism will produce more indeterminacy than MAI (2011, p.131); 
however, he does not explain why hypothetical intentionalism produces 
indeterminate meanings at all, let alone more than MAI. Furthermore, he 
neglects that according to MAI, we do not know which meanings are 
determinate (since we may not recognize when linguistic meaning and authorial
intentions diverge).
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that MAI1 becomes untenable in video games if the player is seen as the author. If
we on the other hand regard the designer as the author the number of  ‘strange
islands of meaninglessness’ will  be reduced significantly. The designer may still
have overlooked parts of the code that do not convey her intentions, just as an
author/director may have overlooked equivalent parts in a novel/film, but these will
be substantially less than if  the player is the author. The problem persists,  but
becomes more manageable.
MAI2  –  where  the  work  acquires  the  conventional  linguistic  meaning
whenever the artist’s intentions are not realized – is somewhat more complex than
MAI1, and we have to address several aspects of it before we can see why this
view is equally (if not more) problematic when regarding the player as author. One
problem is  that  MAI2  either  renders  art  interpretation  meaningless,  or  renders
intentions infallible. The reasons are as follows:
Authorial intentions may become infallible, since by permitting use of extra-
textual documents, all intentions we can assess necessarily obtain insofar as they
appear  in  said  documents.  Stecker  explains  that  one can convey an intention
irreconcilable with the conventional meaning of an utterance ‘but only by supplying
evidence for a hypothesis about what that intention is’ (2006,  p.431). One could
argue that the author’s private documents, if admissible when interpreting, supply
such  evidence.  However,  this  means  that  the  most  absurd  intentions  can  be
conveyed by any work as long as they are outlined somewhere else. For instance,
Fleming  could  have  intended  the  James  Bond-books  be  fantasy-stories  about
wizards and dragons, and this intention would be successfully conveyed by the
books as long as we are allowed to use Fleming’s private notes where this is
clearly stated. Likewise, a player may imagine that Super Mario is a vampire, and
as long as she provides a clear extra-textual source confirming this, her intention
would obtain. Thus, any conceivable narrative can convey any meaning in virtue of
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extra-textual evidence justifying the unconventional interpretation, and it is this that
makes  artistic  intentions  practically  infallible,  that  the  permissible  extra-textual
sources legitimize the very meaning they were supposed to only evaluate. This is
close to Humpty-Dumptyism, in the sense that any conceivable fiction can convey
any content the author wishes. This flaw of MAI seems to have been overlooked
by advocates and critics alike.
A moderate actual intentionalist may add that extra-textual evidence alone
is  not  sufficient  evidence  and  that  the  text  must  be  able  to  support  this
interpretation on its own, but that raises the question of how we may use private
documents and to what extent. Firstly, it bears repeating that the work may in fact
not be the best evidence, as already mentioned in the sections on EAI. Secondly,
it  has  been  argued  that  an  author  maybe  does  not  intend  readers  to  use
extratextual sources such as private journals when interpreting the work (Nathan
1992, p.198, 2005, pp.39-40, 46; D. Davies 2007, p.84). However, if the author
intends  the  work  to  be  non-ambiguous  and independent  we  have  no  way  of
knowing whether our interpretation is correct, which in itself should show that the
artistic intention failed. The moderate intentionalist may reply that we may use the
journal to verify our interpretation once we have read the work, which is essentially
different from using it as a tool whilst interpreting it; Lintott says something like this
(2002, p.68n8). Also, it has been argued that the author’s intention is realized if a
reader with knowledge of the intention considers it to be the best interpretation (D.
Davies  2007,  p.83),  which  could  mean  that  the  author’s  intention  should  not
influence our interpretation, only illuminate its validity. However, we then return to
the same problem once more: if the artist intended the work not to be ambiguous,
but ambiguity is supported by the work, the moderate intentionalist would have to
allow for the conventional meaning to obtain instead, making consultation of the
artist’s private journal pointless. Moreover, the artist may have intended us to use
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biographical information but not made this clear in her journals, so the application
of  extra-textual  documents  is  in  itself  an  interpretative  matter  where  artistic
intentions may fail. Likewise, a player may intend to convey something through her
gameplay  without  needing  to  explain  it,  which  would  make  questions  an
illegitimate  form of  interpretation.  Last  but  not  least,  intentionalists  argue as  if
private  documents  were  simple  and  elucidating  means  towards  correct
interpretations,  neglecting  that  those  documents  in  themselves  have  to  be
interpreted.66 Fleming could have written in his diary that he thought of Bond as a
vampire and remained silent on whether he intended to convey this in his books, a
necessary requirement for the proposition to obtain, leaving some passages more
ambiguous than they would have been otherwise.
3.4.4 Ambiguity
More important for games is the topic of ambiguity. The moderate intentionalist
claims that the work has several possible meanings and that the author decides
which one is correct, but then a question is raised by opponents: if the work has
several possible interpretations, why not allow for the work to be ambiguous (Irvin
2006, p.120; Trivedi 2015, p.721)?67 However, Irvin’s and Trivedi’s question seems
to  be  concerned  with  the  premises  of  intentionalism in  general,  not  problems
unique to MAI, which weakens the force of the argument in this particular matter (it
would be a poor strategy to question all  facets of MAI by appealing to general
criticism of intentionalism).
Two more relevant question are posed by Irvin when she wonders why the
author has the authority to settle interpretative disputes, and why she (the author)
66 This is also noted by Beardsley (1992, p.38).
67 Trivedi and Irvin neglect that MAI1 avoids this question as it does not allow for a
work-meaning – and, by extension, ambiguity – independent of artistic 
intentions.
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would  not  write  a  less  ambiguous  work  (2006,  p.120).  The  first  question  is
indicative  of  lack of  understanding of  actual  intentionalism and is  ruled out  by
definition;  that  the author  has this  authority is  a  premise in  intentionalism and
constitutes a more fundamental problem, not one exclusively related to ambiguous
passages.  The second question,  however,  is  devastating.  She emphasizes the
epistemic  aspect  of  this  problem, that  we  lack  sufficient  evidence to  ascertain
which of the possible meanings that was intended, and by so doing she unwittingly
points to the more problematic metaphysical aspect of textual ambiguity. That we
cannot  adjudicate  between  competing  interpretations  is,  as  Irvin  notes,  an
epistemic dilemma which may render interpretations rather pointless, but if the text
is truly ambiguous and the author did not intend it to be, it follows that her intention
was, in some sense,  not  successful, which Irvin does not sufficiently elaborate
upon.  As  mentioned  earlier,  intentionalists  have  argued  that  conveyance  of
intentions is rarely a matter of complete success or failure and that if the author
intended to convey F(p) but F(p v q) appears to be better supported by the work,
the author only failed in conveying p unambiguously, the text still has the intended
content  (Stock  2017,  pp.90-1).  Trivedi,  who  argues  against  intentionalism,
nevertheless agrees when he asserts that unintended ambiguity is not an example
of failed, but of partly realized intentions (2015, p.712). This is too charitable an
approach to ambiguity, biased in favour of intentionalism. The author intended the
text to clearly convey F(p) and nothing else, but instead created a text conveying
F(p v q), which is not what she intended, and depending on what p and q stand for,
interpretations could deviate radically from what the author intended.68 We may
ask  ourselves  whether  ghosts  truly  exist  in  The  Turn  of  the  Screw  (James,
[1898]1998),  but if James intended it  to be an unambiguous story he evidently
failed, since their existence has been hotly debated. We cannot claim that James
68 Currie similarly argues that ambiguity is a ‘communicative failure’ (2004, p.129).
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was partially successful in conveying the ‘supernatural’ version of the story without
introducing questions of which success-conditions we may posit and thus return to
the discussion above regarding compatibility and ‘meshing’.
This also ties in to the epistemic dilemma noted by Irvin and how we cannot
know if F(p) or F(q) was intended, but to that one can also add the problem of how
to approach ambiguity per se. We have no way of knowing whether the work is
intended to  be  ambiguous  or  if  James  simply  failed  to  make  it  unequivocal,
whether he intended F(p), F(q), or F(p v q). This indicates that ambiguity is not so
much a partial  conveyance of intended content as it  is a failure of making the
intended content the most plausible interpretation.
This problem is alleviated in video games if  the designer is seen as the
author, since her intentions can be tested. Sometimes we are not supposed to be
able to solve a particular task: in Dark Souls there is a bridge guarded by a dragon
that kills the player if she tries to cross. If the player is the author, we could get a
narrative where the hero repeatedly tries to cross a bridge but is killed each time,
so the player’s intentions are not realized, but we cannot know for certain that she
failed without resorting to extra-textual sources (e.g. asking her). If the designer is
the  author,  we  understand  that  she  does  not  intend  us  to  cross  the  bridge.
Ambiguity is still possible, but becomes more manageable.
The fact that we can test the designers intentions partly solves the problem
with ambiguity, especially when combined with the fact that intentions in games
can often be analysed in terms of numerical values. When presented with two
possible choices, we can try both and see which is successful  (or, if  both are,
which is the  most successful).69 If both are equally good, we may presume that
ambiguity was intended. In Resident Evil 4 we may often choose which weapon to
69 Cf. Jenkins, who also argues that players test hypotheses by playing (2004, 
p.126).
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use, and since no one weapon is superior in most cases, we may presume that
the story is intentionally ambiguous; the designer has no intention about which
specific weapon we should use. Other parts are much harder (if not impossible) to
get  past  if  we  refrain  from  using  certain  weapons  –  distant  enemies  can  be
impossible to kill without using the sniper rifle – and from that we may conclude
that the designer intends us to use a particular weapon.
3.4.5 Partial success
Another problem is Lintott’s conception of artworks as partially successful. This
conception  has  already  been  criticized  by  Trivedi  for  the  reason  that  we  can
neither assume nor know that intentions are even partly successful for the same
reason we cannot know if they are fully realized – that is, because we would have
to compare intentions and work-meaning independently – even if he does concede
that it would be erroneous to think of success in such a binary way (2015, p.702). I
have  already  explained  why  comparing  work-meaning  and  intention  is  not  as
problematic as Trivedi claims, but there are deeper problems with partial success
that Trivedi neglects, more specifically whether partial success is conceivable at
all,  and  how  we  are  to  interpret  cases  of  partial  success.  Firstly,  to  further
elaborate on what Trivedi only hints at, it is questionable whether we can really
presume success on the part of the artist by default. Moreover, one must add that
this assumption neglects issues of which parts are successful and to what extent.
We cannot assume even partial success when discussing any particular part of the
work, but if we cannot do it when dealing with any single passage, it adds little to
our interpretation of the work as a whole; the fact that some intentions have been
realized says nothing about which these intentions are, so we are none the wiser
as to the meaning of the work. My objection also undermines Stecker’s thought
that  work-meaning and intentions are determined through a process of  mutual
181
adjustment, because in cases where the intention has not been realized at all it
cannot adjust our comprehension of the work, nor can our comprehension of the
work adjust our understanding of the author’s intention.
The dilemma appears more clearly when we compare a given interpretation
regarding  a  specific  fictional  truth  F(p)  and  the  artistic  intention  F(~p),  or,
alternatively, ~F(p). The proposition will have to be rejected, since it is the polar
opposite  of  the  author’s  intention;  the  interpretative  claim  and  the  authorial
intention  thus become diametrically  opposed and therefore  mutually  exclusive.
This is not a partial success, it is complete failure, and indicates that the division of
complete success/failure is no false dichotomy after all  in the evaluation of any
given proposition.
It could be objected that partial success cannot be measured in terms of
individual intentions and singular fictional propositions, but must be evaluated as a
whole  in  a  single  conjunction  (i.e.  an  artist  is  partially  successful  if  a  certain
quantity of intentions are realized), but then one has to answer which intentions
are more ‘essential’ and how many must be realized for a work to be a success.
One also has to answer what is most important: that a certain number of intentions
is realized, or that the most essential intentions are.
The problem with the latter, a qualitative evaluation, is how to assess which
fictional truths are essential to the story. These matters may seem intuitive, but
then one forgets that this evaluation is in itself an interpretative statement (which
may  be  erroneous).  In  games  it  may  seem  evident  that  the  victory  of  the
protagonist  is the most important part,  but to ignore all  the gameplay before it
would be like only focusing on the last page of a book, or the last minutes of a film.
Bond would  not  seem heroic  if  the  last  shot  of  him was preceded by a most
incompetent and poor performance as a secret agent, such a triumph would seem
rather ridiculous. Similarly, if a player of  Hitman: Contracts wants to generate a
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narrative where Agent 47 kills only the designated target and remains undetected
but fails to do so, and has to resort to an aggressive approach – killing anyone in
sight in order to complete the mission – the narrative will  retain the successful
completion of the mission, but arguably lack the essential aspect of Agent 47’s
skills as a silent assassin. Conversely, if we opt for a quantitative evaluation of
realized intentions one has to answer how many intentions must be realized, and
any number seems arbitrary; furthermore, such an interpretation could ignore what
is  intuitively  more  significant  to  the  story.  It  could  be  that  all  intentions  were
realized but the most significant one, so everything in the Bond-fiction would be
realized but the final victory, and Agent 47 remains undetected but ultimately fails
to kill the designated target. Even though all intentions but one are realized in both
stories,  we  would  intuitively  not  say  that  the  fictions  correspond  well  to  their
respective authors intentions.
Moreover,  evaluation of any given proposition is also problematic for the
reason that fictional propositions are interconnected and influence one another. In
Silent  Hill  2  (Konami,  2001),  combat  against  monsters  is  a  cumbersome  and
clumsy  activity,  which  reinforces  the  impression  given  by  other  parts  of  the
narrative,  that  the protagonist  James Sunderland is  just  an ‘average Joe’ in  a
surreal and hostile environment he is unqualified to handle.  Devil May Cry also
features combat against monsters, but here it is supposed to be acrobatic, fluid,
and impressive, so an unskilled player whose performance is reminiscent of that in
Silent Hill 2 instead creates the contradictory (or pathetic) image of the protagonist
Dante  as a person with  unjustified confidence in  his  skills  as  a warrior.  Thus,
partial realization of intentions may lead to a radically different narrative,  not the
intended one sans particular unrealized intentions.
It has been argued that most intentions are at least partially realized (Lintott
2002,  pp.66-7).  Exactly what  it  means for  a  work  to  partially  convey authorial
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intentions is debatable, but one can accept it (if only for the sake of argument) in
the  sense  that  alternative  but  equally/more  possible  interpretations  are  not
radically  different,  even  if  they  are  not  exactly  what  the  creator  wanted;  for
instance, if the author writes ‘Cadillac’ instead of ‘Chevrolet’ it could be argued that
this still conveys that the object in question is a car. However, if partial success is
sufficient  for  granting  that  a  given  work  conveys  an  author’s  intentions,  it  is
questionable  whether  authorial  intentions are  truly  fallible  in  the  way that  MAI
requires them to be; it is reminiscent of the cake-example in the sections on EAI,
and how a creator can never completely fail to convey her intentions. An unskilled
player  may  realize  but  a  fraction  of  all  her  intentions,  not  providing  sufficient
evidence. If we regard the designer as author the textual evidence is nevertheless
there, accessible to anyone with sufficient skills; not getting to the end of a game
due to lack of skills is akin to not making it to the end of a novel/film due to lack of
patience, it does not influence fictional truth as much as the interpreter ’s access to
it. Further, it may still be the case that the work is not the best evidence for the
authorial intentions, since the skills of a designer can be as limited as those of an
author/director, but at least this way those flaws will be reduced to a minimum.
3.4.6 Changing intentions
As noted earlier, MAI has been criticized for vacillating between prioritizing work-
meaning and intentions respectively (Irvin 2006, p.120; Stock 2017, p.14). This is
in  itself  a  devastating  critique,  since  hypothetical  and  extreme  intentionalism
categorically prefer  one of these factors. In games, however, this criticism gains
even more force, since the two factors we switch between are not intentions and
conventional meaning, but, in fact, two different intentions. If a player is killed by
an enemy we may presume that she failed to realize her intention of getting past
the enemy. However, the fact that one should get past the enemy is intended by
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the designer (she put the enemy there and programmed the right path), so when
the player fails we do not necessarily analyse the conventional meaning, but rather
someone  else’s  intention.  If  artistic  intentions  are  important  to  moderate
intentionalists, it would make for a more economical interpretation to focus on one
person’s intentions instead of switching back and forth. We would still be left with
the  inconvenient  switch  between  intentions  and  textual  meaning  when  the
designer fails to realize her intentions, but at least this way we avoid exacerbating
this  issue.  Otherwise,  we  would  have  to  start  with  interpreting  the  player’s
intentions, and if these fail we move our focus to the designer’s intentions, and
finally, if both of these fail, to the conventional meaning. Since the first one fails so
often, it would be better to begin with the designer’s intentions.
It may be objected, as mentioned earlier, that after a number of attempts the
player will alter her intention, which means that her intentions will all be realized
eventually. However, this is problematic for several reasons, some of which have
already  been  mentioned  in  the  section  on  EAI:  firstly,  this  means  that  the
designer’s  intentions  limit  which  intentions  the  player  can  adopt,  raising  the
question  of  how the  player  is  an  author  at  all;  secondly,  this  means  that  the
player’s  intentions  will  change  constantly  throughout  the  playthrough  as  she
adapts, alters, and rejects intentions depending on their success. If the designer is
the author, we get a realized, unvarying intention, which is much easier to interpret
than the constantly modified intentions of the player. Moreover, we find this out by
engaging with the text alone, without having to consult extra-textual sources.
Thus, MAI is not a viable alternative to EAI. Although some criticism of MAI
has been misdirected and some of its  features may alleviate issues unique to
video games, MAI nonetheless remains problematic, introducing issues absent in
EAI. According to MAI, certain parts of a given narrative would either be void of
meaning (unbeknownst to the interpreter), or acquire a meaning supported by the
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work but not intended by the author (rendering authorial  intentions redundant).
Moreover, ambiguous passages raise questions of why authorial intentions should
settle  interpretative  disputes  when  meaning  is  not  conveyed  clearly,  and  why
ambiguity not intended by the author should nevertheless be regarded as partial
success.  The  topic  of  partially  realized  intentions  also  introduces  questions  of
whether  evaluations  of  realized  intentions  should  be  primarily  qualitative  or
quantitative, both of which have their own problematic consequences; this is an
even  more  pressing  issue  in  video  games,  where  the  player ’s  intentions  are
seldom fully realized.
In  brief,  both  extreme and  moderate  intentionalism are  flawed,  and  the
issues  inherent  to  them  are  nothing  but  compounded  when  applied  to  video
games.  There  are  several  difficulties  in  asserting  that  authorial  intentions
determine fictional truth, and these are retained and exacerbated in video games if
players  are  seen  as  authors.  Should  one  nevertheless  insist  on  adopting
intentionalism, it becomes more tenable if the designer is seen as the author.
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Chapter 4 – Collective authorship
It was shown in the previous chapter that it is problematic to regard players as
authors whose intentions determine fictional content. However, even the moderate
version could be criticized for the assumption that the player is the sole author, so
a counterargument would be to diminish her authorship, attributing it to both her
and the designer, maintaining that a player has at least some authority. This could
allow for game stories to be interactive, and the viability of this solution is the topic
of this chapter. 
What game scholars claim about authorship in general has already been
presented  in  the  previous  chapter  and  requires  no  repetition,  but  it  is  worth
emphasizing  how  little  they  elaborate  on  the  concept  of  authorship  per  se.
Whereas the last chapter focused on consequences following the premise that the
player is the author, in this chapter I consider arguments for seeing video games
as a collaborative project where both the designer and the player contribute to the
creation of a story and the narrative conveying it.  Some game scholars would
argue that the player is more of a coauthor, but although no one can doubt that the
player does participate to some extent in the narration of the story, it is debatable
whether  this  suffices  to  endow her  with  genuine  authorship;  control  over  the
presentation  of  the  narrative  does  not  necessarily  translate  into  control  of  its
creation,  let  alone its  content. Collaborative  authorship  has been discussed in
relation to cinema, where a common assumption is that the director is some kind
of equivalent to the author (Bacharach and Tollefsen 2010, p.23). It has also been
argued that the traditional conception of authorship is not applicable to cinema
because of fundamental differences between cinematic and literary authorship, or
at least that it is not applicable with regard to studio-produced films but perhaps in
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independent films (Livingston 1997, p.132). It could be argued that the number of
people involved in film production poses a challenge to the idea of a single author,
a so-called auteur, but recently analytic philosophers have engaged with questions
of authorship and how to distinguish coauthors from mere contributors (Hick 2014,
p.147). Even if we accept the (debatable) premise that the player is a collaborator
it  does  not  follow that  she  must  be  a  coauthor, and  the  failure  to  distinguish
between the two could be what has lead game scholars to elevate the player to
the status of author; Livingston and Carol Archer distinguish between a person
who controls the art-making process and one who contributes to it (2010, pp.454-
5), and several theorists agree that the caterer at a film set is not a coauthor, even
if she does in some way contribute to the production of the film (Sellors 2007,
p.269; Bacharach and Tollefsen 2010, pp.27-8; Livingston 2011, p.223). 
However, arguments have primarily been directed at novels and films, and
have not been applied to video games. The question to be treated in this section is
whether there are good reasons to see the player as a coauthor without making
the definition of authorship so wide as to encompass readers and film spectators
as well, as that would make literature and film equally interactive. Note that I adopt
some unspecified version of intentionalism in order to examine who should be
ascribed authorship of the narrative; whether intentionalism is an adequate mode
of interpretation is a different matter.
4.1 Defining coauthorship
Gaut asserts that the common view in film studies is the auteurist one, that a film
has a single author (1997, p.151). He objects to it, saying that there cannot be a
single author of a film because of the collaborative nature of film production (Gaut
1997,  p.150).70 He  then  criticizes  various  strategies  of  defending  auteurist
70 Similar arguments have been presented by e.g. Petrie ([1973]2008), Kawin 
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conceptions.  For  instance,  one could claim that  the author  controls  the work’s
‘artistically significant features’, but Gaut objects that this could potentially include
any feature, leaving nothing to do for the collaborators (1997, p.155, 2003, p.632).
Further,  many  of  these  features  –  acting,  editing  etc.  –  are  not  exclusively
attributable to the director anyway (Gaut 1997, p.156). Nor can one argue that the
director, if not in total control, at least has sufficient control over the production of
the work whilst making use of others’ talents – similar to how an architect designs
a building which he lets other people build for him – because first  of all,  Gaut
contends  that  people  who  make  significant  artistic  differences  should be
acknowledged as artistic collaborators, and secondly, collaboration is of a higher
importance  in  cinema than many other  art-forms (1997,  p.157).  Moreover,  the
director lacks precise control over many factors, such as the minute details of an
actor’s performance (Gaut 1997, p.158, p.171n33,  2003, p.632).71 Gaut asserts
that theatre differs in some respects, that the performance may be collaborative
without  vitiating  the  exclusive  authorship  of  the  playwright;  characters  are
controlled  by  the  playwright  and  are  therefore  not  influenced  by  the  actors’
performance in the way they are in films, where visual and auditory features of the
recording further specify properties of the given character (1997, p.163).
Livingston  notes  that  it  is  taken  for  granted  that  people  have  a  shared
understanding of what authorship is (1997, p.132). His own definition is that an
author is ‘the agent  (or agents)  who intentionally make(s)  an utterance, where
“utterance” refers to any action, an intended function of which is expression or
communication’ (Livingston 1997,  p.134).  A work  of  art  does not  have  several
authors only because its creation involves more than one person, it depends on
([1987]2008), Bernstein ([2006]2008), and Christensen ([2006]2008).
For similar arguments applied to the production of literary works, see Inge 
(2001).
71 The same argument is used by Kawin ([1987]2008, p.191, p.198).
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the contribution they make (Livingston 2005, p.62). Livingston emphasizes that the
person one considers to be an author depends on how much one values different
kinds of involvement, so that one can always claim a given discourse has multiple
authors if authorship merely requires endowing it with any of its properties (1997,
p.134,  2005,  p.68).  Furthermore,  Livingston contends that  an author  needs an
intention to express some kind of attitude and an idea of which means with which
to express it, and he therefore rules out completely private authorial acts as they
lack  the  intention  to  express  anything  (2005,  pp.70-1).  He  also  distinguishes
between genuine ‘joint authorship’ and other kinds of collaboration: the fact that
several people contributed to the making of the utterance does not mean that they
worked together (Livingston 2005, pp.75-7). According to Livingston, authorship
can be a matter of hierarchy, where one person’s contribution is ranked higher
than  others;  it  can  also  be  that  the  contributions  of  others  do  not  amount  to
authorship, but assistance (2005, pp.77-8). If a single person delegates to others
what  should  be  done  and  how,  the  work  is  not  coauthored  (Livingston  2011,
p.223).
Livingston’s  definition  of  joint  authorship  is  that  there  are  two  or  more
contributors, A1,  …, An,  who share responsibility for a single utterance.  Further,
they must share the aim of contributing to said utterance, as well as the control of
the making and shaping of the work when relevant decisions are made; it must
also  be  possible  for  their  respective  plans  to  be  realized  simultaneously
(Livingston  2005,  p.79).  This  means,  Livingston  explains,  that  joint  authorship
requires the work to be compatible with the authors’ respective intentions and their
mutual belief on this matter (2005, p.80). To summarize:
(1) A1 intends to contribute to the making of utterance U as an expression of A1’s
attitudes.
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(2) A1 intends to realize (1) by acting on, and in accordance with sub plans that‐
mesh with those of  the other contributors,  including sub plans relative to the‐
manner  in  which  the  utterance  is  to  be  produced  and  to  the  utterance’s
expressive contents.
(3) A2 intends to contribute to the making of utterance U as an expression of A2’s
attitudes.
(4) A2 intends to realize (3) by acting on, and in accordance with sub plans that‐
mesh with those of  the other contributors,  including sub plans relative to the‐
manner  in  which  the  utterance  is  to  be  produced  and  to  the  utterance’s
expressive contents (and so on for other contributors).
(5) A1,…, An mutually believe that they have the attitudes (1)–(4).
(Livingston 2005, pp.83-4)
Sondra  Bacharach  and  Deborah  Tollefsen  object  to  Gaut,  underscoring  the
difference  between  contributing  to  a  work  (including  its  ‘aesthetically  relevant
properties’) and authoring one (2010, p.25). They also object to Livingston and his
application  of  Bratman’s  conception  of  shared  intention,  arguing  that  it  mainly
applies  to  a  small  group  of  agents  working  face-to-face,  not  large-scale  film
productions,  nor  to  improvisations  where  few  intentions  are  shared  between
agents prior to the performance (Bacharach and Tollefsen 2010, pp.26-7). In sum,
they claim that Livingston’s analysis is too strong, excluding too many, whereas
Gaut’s excludes too few (Bacharach and Tollefsen 2010, p.28). Instead, they utilize
Margaret Gilbert’s plural subject theory, which states that in order for two persons
to be a plural subject, they need to be ‘jointly committed to doing something as a
body’ (Gilbert  2006, p.145).  This entails working as a unified subject,  as if  the
group were a single author (Bacharach and Tollefsen 2010, pp.28-9). This does
not require specific, unchanging plans about each member’s contribution and its
expressive content,  as not  even a  single  author always has specific  intentions
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about  this;  nor  do  their  respective  sub-plans  have  to  mesh  (Bacharach  and
Tollefsen 2011, pp.226-8). For these reasons the caterer on a film set is not a
coauthor,  since  she  lacks  the  joint  commitment  of  making  a  film;  nor  does  a
saboteur become a coauthor when she inserts her own images into the film, since
the film crew is not committed to doing something together with the saboteur as
part of the group (Bacharach and Tollefsen 2010,  p.30). Moreover, if a group of
authors write a chapter each of a book, taking credit only for their own chapter, we
would instead have a case of multiple authorship, as the authors merely contribute
with independent works to a collective product, quite different from when a group
cooperates in the writing of a book as a singular, holistic work, since in the former
case ‘there is  no joint  commitment to write the book together ’ (Bacharach and
Tollefsen 2015,  p.332; original emphasis). This also means that if an unfinished
work is completed posthumously the original author  OA and the new author  NA
are not coauthors as there is no joint commitment (Bacharach and Tollefsen 2015,
p.332). Further, if NA exerts himself so as to make a work corresponding to OA’s
intentions – for instance in terms of content and style – NA has no real control over
his own section’s significant aspects, apart from assuring that they are consistent
with what OA would have wanted (Bacharach and Tollefsen 2015, p.333).
Darren Hudson Hick emphasizes the importance of responsibility,  saying
that  the  author  is  responsible  for  what  a  work  expresses and how,  since she
selects and structures the work’s content (2014,  p.151). A saboteur who inserts
new footage in a film does not become a coauthor, he explains, as we would not
hold the director responsible for the sabotage; if the saboteur is an author at all,
she  has  authored  a  new work  (Hick  2014,  pp.151-2).  Hick  objects  to  the
importance of joint intentions, and like Bacharach and Tollefsen he argues that
multiple  authorship  differs  from coauthorship  since  in  the  former,  each  author
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takes  responsibility  only  for  his  own  contribution  (2014,  p.152,  2015,  p.340).
Another difference is that a multiply-authored work has ‘discrete, identifiable units’,
whereas a coauthored one is unified (2014, p.153).
4.1.1 Player as contributor
Using these theories as a point of departure, can the player be regarded as a
coauthor? Gaut notes several problems with retaining the concept of a singular
author in art-production including several contributors, and these could apply to
games.  Much  of  what  the  player  does  can  be  considered  to  be  ‘artistically
significant features’,72 as gameplay has an impact on the representation of the
story; the aesthetic appeal of the way a player rhythmically chains together attacks
in  Batman:  Arkham  Asylum (Rocksteady  Studios,  2009;  henceforth  Arkham
Asylum) or Devil May Cry adds much to the image one gets of Batman and Dante
(the respective protagonists of the games) and can be compared to a professional
performance  of  an  actor.  As  Gaut  argues,  the  actor’s  performance  cannot  be
attributed  to  the  director  alone;  likewise,  the  player’s  performance  cannot  be
attributed to the designer, because just as the director lacks precise control over
the actor’s performance, a designer lacks control over the player. However, it is
important to note the discrepancy between Gaut’s accounts of the impact of an
author’s performance in film and theatre respectively,  as he does not think the
authorship  of  the  playwright  is  subverted  by  an  actor’s  performance.  This
conception of theatre is, in principle, identical to what Stock and Currie say about
each reader’s unique imagining and how it has no impact on literary content: a
theatre  actor’s  idiosyncratic  interpretation  of  a  character  (manifest  in  her
72 Gaut himself notes the problem of ascertaining what is to count as an artistically
significant feature; so does Livingston (2005, p.90). One could argue that this 
has to be assessed in each individual case, but this fact does not obviate 
general discussions.
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performance) does not influence the character, nor does a reader’s interpretation
of  a  literary  narrative  influence  its characters.  Game scholars  who  argue  that
gameplay affects the game story’s protagonist erroneously and implicitly analyse
games as if they were like film in the respect that the representation determines
the  truth-value  of  fictional  propositions.  However,  as  mentioned  at  the  end  of
section 3.1, this would mean that each playthrough generates its own story, which
precludes the possibility of discussing any given game. A more intuitive approach
is  to  see  games  as  a  set  of  instructions  on  what  to  perform,  akin  to  a  play
instructing actors, where the interpretative engagement of the interpreter – i.e. the
gameplay – has no impact  on  fictional  truths.  Just  as a playwright  may leave
certain  fictional  propositions  indeterminate  so  as  to  endow  actors  with  more
performative liberty, a game designer could offer the player a range of choices in
her ‘performance’.73 In that case the player does not coauthor a unique narrative in
her  playthrough  only  because  she  makes  Batman/Dante  use  a  different
item/weapon or a different combination of attacks; she is in principle no different
from a theatre actor  who chooses different  gestures and intonation in  a  given
performance.
It  could  be  objected  that  theatre  actors  are  coauthors  too,  that  their
performances are artistically significant features and that the playwright has no
more control of this than a film director, making the distinction between films and
theatre  arbitrary.74 That  would  yield  the  awkward  consequence  that  each
performance of a play would be a unique narrative, which likewise would allow
each playthrough to be its own narrative, allowing for players to be coauthors.
However, this illustrates the very flaws with Gaut’s conception of coauthorship, as
73 See Kania (2018) for criticism of viewing players as performers. What is 
pertinent for my reasoning is not whether they are performers, but whether they 
partake in the production and/or instantiation of the work.
74 For criticism of the distinction between a theatre play and a screenplay, see 
Koivumäki (2010).
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this  would  also  mean  that  a  saboteur  becomes  a  coauthor  when  she  makes
aesthetically significant contributions to someone else’s film and the director is
unable  to  stop  her  (lacking  control  over  her  actions).  A definition  that  allows
anyone to become a coauthor is a deficient one, so we had better turn to other
alternatives instead.
4.1.2 Control over work-creation
As Livingston explains, the involvement of several people in the creation of a work
is not necessarily equivalent to artistic cooperation (2005,  p.62).  A person who
supervises others on what to do, whose staff does not add anything ‘artistically
significant’,  and who discards material  not  conforming to her vision is the sole
author of the work (Livingston 2005, p.84). In films, the author is the person who
has the final say in what is to be included in the film, even if she may delegate
tasks to others (Livingston 1997,  p.142). In other words, the author is ‘a person
who has played the role of the dominant coordinating collaborator in the creation
of the work’ (Livingston 2009,  p.77). One could also see the game designer as
someone who delegates to the player the task of performing the narrative, just as
a director does with actors. 
Livingston provides some examples that illustrate his point further, which
can be applied to games.  He mentions how Harriet  Andersson stares into  the
camera in Sommaren med Monika (Bergman, 1953), and explains that even if this
gesture was her idea, it was the director Bergman who ‘decided to change the
lighting and camera position quite dramatically as the shot continues’ (Livingston
2009, p.79), and who chose to include it in the final cut. In a related vein, Hick also
notes that although others may make suggestions, the author decides whether
alterations to the work should be kept (2014, p.154). Livingston argues that even
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when Bergman took other people’s advice or used music composed by someone
else, it was nevertheless he who decided what to use and how, so he remains the
author  (1997,  p.144,  2005,  p.85).  Andersson’s  performance  is  arguably  an
artistically  significant  contribution,  so  Gaut  would  probably  regard  her  as  a
coauthor,  but  that  would  be  to  neglect  that  it  is  up  to  Bergman  whether  her
performance  is  to  be  included  in  the  final  cut.  Likewise,  players  can  make
artistically significant additions not originally thought of by the designer, but it is the
latter  who  decides  beforehand  what  may  be  included  by  programming  the
mechanics and tasks to be completed; failed sessions are rejected, and the player
has to try again. A player may devise a specific combination of attacks in  Devil
May Cry, but the player’s actions must ultimately contribute to the completion of
the mission’s goals. It could be argued that the designer is not able to cut and re-
shoot scenes like a director, and therefore has no say in which performance to
include as long as it leads to victory, but as already mentioned in the introduction
of this chapter several game scholars speak of an ‘ideal path’ in games. In some
games, this ‘ideal path’ is evident by virtue of the game’s scoring system. Both
Devil  May Cry and  Arkham Asylum  display a gauge during combat sequences
indicating the number of points the player acquires; the better she performs, the
more points she earns. Many games contain similar systems for rating the player’s
performance, rewarding good performances. Note, however, that how gameplay is
evaluated  can  differ  radically  between  games:  in  contrast  to  Arkham Asylum,
stealth-oriented  games  like  Hitman:  Blood  Money (IO  Interactive,  2006)
discourage aggressive gameplay; players are rewarded for killing as few enemies
as possible. With such strict guidelines, one may ask in what sense players can
still  add  anything  artistically  significant.  Players  have  no  control  over  which
playstyle is rewarded/punished, it  is the  designer who has the final say on the
nature and details  of  the  ‘ideal  path’,  and even though she indirectly receives
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‘suggestions’ by players as they try different playstyles, the designer is not obliged
to conform; the designer of Arkham Asylum does not perform the stylish acrobatic
combat, but her ‘instructions’ are sufficient to make her the author.
4.1.3 Authorship as an expression of attitudes
Livingston further objects to Gaut and says that when several people are involved
in the making of a film, the author is the ‘dominant coordinating collaborator in the
creation of the work, provided, that is, that the work has been made by this person
with  the  aim  of  expressing  his  or  her  attitudes  (or,  in  the  absence  of  any
expressive  content,  with  the  aim  of  endowing  the  work  with  artistic  qualities)’
(2009,  p.77).75 Livingston  concedes  that  Andersson’s  intentions  mesh  with
Bergman’s,  but  she does not  express her  own attitudes even indirectly (2009,
p.79). This is yet another reason why the player can hardly be considered to be an
author: through playing she discovers a story already contained within the game,
so  she  does  not  intend  to  contribute  to  the  making  of  an  utterance as  an
expression of her attitudes, but rather discovers an utterance conveying those of
the designer. 
Note  that  this  consequence  does  not  only  follow  from  the  relationship
between Andersson and Bergman, but also from the motivation underlying her
performance.  Livingston  makes  a  distinction  between  producing a  text  and
authoring one,  where the former does not include the intention of ‘intentionally
expressing anything’ (2005,  p.72).  As an example,  he says that a  person who
practices typing by producing texts does not author anything. Likewise, one could
argue  that  one  does  not  necessarily  author  anything  when  one  produces  an
audiovisual text in the form of a film or a game, which is why Andersson is not an
75 I will only speak of expressive content/qualities, in which I include properties 
distinct from mental attitudes – such as aesthetic unity – as these qualities are 
also ‘expressed’ in some sense.
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author, in spite of her participation in film-production. Similarly, one could argue
that the playthrough is a kind of text, but if the player lacks this attitude she is no
more of an author than Andersson.
However,  Livingston’s  argument  can  be  criticized  by  suggesting  that
Andersson intended to express her own attitudes through her performance of a
role  that happened to fit  that intention.  Likewise,  a player  could claim that  the
gameplay expresses her intentions, so that the designer’s and her intention mesh,
meaning that  the requirement for expression would be met.  Nevertheless, it  is
questionable  whether  this  is  sufficient  for  elevating  a  person  to  the  status  of
author. The strategic choice on the player’s part to play a game she knows will
express what she wants it to cannot be enough to make her a coauthor; a person
can express her views on morals by reciting Aesop’s fables,  but this does not
make her a coauthor of them.
Livingston does consider performers who use the characters they portray as
a means of expressing their own views, but asserts that they still lack sufficient
control  over  the  film  as  a  whole  (2009,  pp.79-80).  Paul  Sellors  criticizes  this
argument since the notion of  control  does not  appear  in  Livingston’s  definition
(2007,  p.266).  Although  Sellors  is  right  that  Livingston’s  definition  does  not
mention it explicitly, he neglects that the necessity of control follows because, as
Livingston explains himself, sufficient control is necessary if an artist’s contribution
is  to  be  non-accidental  (Livingston  2005,  p.88).  Without  sufficient  control,  an
author could never make any contribution to the work. It may be difficult to define
what constitutes control over the production and when it is sufficient, but we can
nevertheless easily identify whether this requirement is met in extreme cases: if
the  author’s  collaborators  do  exactly  as  they are  told  in  order  to  express  her
attitudes, she can be thought of as the true author and, conversely, if they do not
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carry out any instructions – except when they happen to correspond to their own –
she hardly counts as an author. 
It  reasonable  to  assume  that  Andersson  and  Bergman  intended  to
contribute  to  the  making  of  Sommaren  med  Monika as  an  expression  of
Bergman’s attitudes, and both intended to realize this intention by acting on and in
accordance with his sub-plans, including those relative to the film’s production and
expressive contents. Bergman does not seem to have been acting in accordance
with  sub-plans  meshing  with  those  of  Andersson,  contrary  to  the  criteria  for
coauthorship.  If  Andersson  accepted  an  asymmetric  relation  where  Bergman
adapted  to  her  intentions  only  when  these  provided  a  superior  means  of
expressing his own it follows, implicitly, that she surrendered her potential authorial
power to Bergman.
This asymmetric relation also obtains in games, as the player’s ability to
express her attitudes is limited by the designer who has the final say in what can
be included in a game, not only since the designer programmed it, but because
the designer, when making the game, does not act in a way that meshes with the
player’s  sub-plans,  should  these diverge  from her  own.  Hence,  it  is  irrelevant
whether the game expresses what the player wishes. Should one insist that the
player does intend to express her views through gameplay it would nevertheless
not suffice to make her a coauthor, not only because there is no mutual agreement
that both the designer’s and the player’s attitudes be expressed, but also because
the player’s control is limited by mechanics implemented by the designer in a way
analogous to the director’s control over the film-production, so she cannot express
anything contrary to the designer’s intentions; any convergence of the attitudes of
the designer and the player is accidental. Andersson could have acted any way
she wanted, but Bergman could always stop the take or cut it in the editing room;
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in games this authorial control is more palpable in some respects, as the game
imposes restrictions on what the player can do. Similarly, even when assuming
that the player does attempt to express her own view she is nevertheless obliged
to make sure that these mesh with the designer’s sub-plans (if only because the
mechanics  of  the  game  do  not  give  her  any  other  option),  an  obligation  the
designer lacks, similar to how Andersson must express the attitudes of Bergman
but not vice versa.
Moreover, Livingston allows for coauthors to agree to disagree (2005, p.83).
It could be argued that the player and designer do this in some sense through the
gameplay,  but  this  possibility  is  precluded  by  the  lack  of  reciprocity  between
designer and player: the player is unable to ‘say’ things contrary to the beliefs of
the designer, she has to play according to the rules of the game, but the designer
does not have to adapt to the player. Whenever the player makes a suggestion as
to how the narrative should progress it has to be ‘approved of’ by the designer, so
she does not really contribute as much as she chooses one of several options, all
of which are authored by the designer.
Here one could say that the player has the power to select and arrange
information since, as noted by Thabet earlier, she controls the camera, and can
select which information to include. Further, Livingston concedes that authorship
can be a matter of degree (1997, p.143), so it could be that the player has some
authorship. This is problematic, however, because first of all, many games do not
allow the player to control the camera or to add/remove content significant to the
story,  and  secondly,  even  in  games  where  the  inclusion  and  arrangement  of
content  is  up to  the  player  one still  has to  answer  why this  would amount  to
authorship of the narrative, not simply a contribution to its making.76 A projectionist
76 One could argue that games with branching narratives differ from more linear 
ones, seeing how the former allow players to include content by letting them 
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selects and arranges the reels at  each screening, and readers select in which
order  to  read  chapters,  but  this  power  is  restricted  to  the  conveyance of  the
narrative, not to the narrative as such. This view fits with Livingston’s requirement
of meshing sub-plans, since even if a delusional projectionist would believe that
she contributed to the expression of the director’s attitudes by showing scenes in
the  wrong  order,  the  director  does  not  intend to  act  in  a  way that  allows  the
projectionist’s sub-plans to mesh with her own, so there can be no joint authorship.
Endowing the player with an authorial role but not the projectionist seems arbitrary.
4.1.4 Group membership
Similar to Livingston, Bacharach and Tollefsen assert that one does not become a
coauthor  only  by  virtue  of  sharing  the  expressive  intentions  of  an  author.  In
contrast,  they object to Livingston’s requirement concerning meshing sub-plans
since even a singular author may fail to have coherent sub-plans, and they argue
that meshing rather pertains to the quality of authorship, not its  existence (2011,
p.228). This argument may be based on a misunderstanding, since a charitable
reading of Livingston’s demand for meshing sub-plans could allow for failure to
shape intentions in a coherent way as long as one attempts to make them mesh; if
coauthorship depended on whether one  succeeds in making sub-plans mesh, it
would  follow  that  authorship  could  be  vitiated  only  because  a  member
misunderstands or forgets some aspect of another member’s intentions, and this
does not seem to be Livingston’s view. Moreover, they misconstrue Livingston’s
requirement for agreement between coauthors, as he says that it is enough that
dissenting coauthors at least agree to disagree (Livingston 2005,  p.83). This is
choose different outcomes, but this does not differ fundamentally from a 
spectator choosing between the theatrical and director’s cut of the same film; 
this would not count as altering the content of an interactive narrative, but rather
as choosing one of several linear ones.
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almost identical to what Bacharach and Tollefsen say themselves when they refer
to a group of artists whose members may ‘agree to engage in certain art-making
practices or to create an artwork with certain artistic properties qua members of
the group, even if they personally do not agree that this is the right thing to do’
(2010, p.31).
Bacharach  and  Tollefsen  further  criticize  Livingston’s  requirement  of
meshing  sub-plans  with  the  assertion  that  the  psychological  structure  in
Livingston’s definition is not likely to be present in the minds of all coauthors in a
large  group  (2010,  p.27).  They  add  that  detailed  knowledge  about  a  work’s
intended content is too strong a requirement for even a singular person to qualify
as author; it is not reasonable to expect people to be able to commit in advance to
the creation of a work with specific properties, as these are likely to change over
time, just as a single author may change his intentions over time (Bacharach and
Tollefsen 2011, pp.227-8).
This also seems like a misunderstanding, as Livingston explains that his
model requires ‘some measure of reciprocal awareness’ (2005, p.82), which is not
necessarily  equivalent  to  detailed  knowledge.  He  further  asserts  that  joint
authorship only requires that intentions possess a ‘significant level of compatibility
in the plans on which the various agents act’ (Livingston 2005, p.80), not that they
be entirely harmonious. A single author certainly has some awareness of her own
intentions,  even  if  they  do  not  fully  mesh,  and  she  will  retain  this  awareness
throughout the production of the work even as the intentions change, so what
Livingston implies is the need for coordination of sub-plans. His definition does not
seem to  require  that  all  properties  of  a  work  remain  unaltered throughout  the
creation – at least his definition is not incompatible with this possibility – so long as
all coauthors are aware of the change, and their sub-plans still mesh. That sub-
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plans mesh must  not  necessarily be taken to  mean that  they result  in  a  non-
contradictory narrative, nor that they remain the same from start to finish, only that
any contradictions and alterations must be intended by the authors.77 Moreover,
doing away with  the requirement of  meshing sub-plans and shared knowledge
would be contradictory, seeing how they themselves underscore the importance of
joint  commitments,  which  includes  coordination  of  individual  actions  so  that
members  ‘create  the  work  as  if  they  were  a  single  author’  (Bacharach  and
Tollefsen  2010,  p.29).  They  do  not  explain  how  such  coordination  could  be
possible without shared knowledge and intentions among the members. 
Furthermore,  Bacharach  and  Tollefsen’s  criticism  of  Livingston  also
contradicts their own refutation of Sellor’s application of ‘we-intentions’. Sellors,
drawing on John Searle, argues that an individual’s intention as to what she will
contribute is irrelevant; the performance of a symphony does not consist of ‘an
aggregate of individual performances motivated by the belief that by intentionally
performing part  of a score one is contributing to the performance of the piece’
(2007,  p.268). Instead, Sellor’s defends so-called ‘we-intentions’, that the actions
of an individual are included in – and have the goal of realizing – the collective
intention of the group (2007, pp.268-9). Drawing on Anthonie Meijers, Bacharach
and Tollefsen criticize the idea of we-intentions since such intentions need not be
shared; someone could erroneously see herself as a member of the authorial team
of a film whilst  contributing nothing (even if  her intentions could happen to  be
identical  to  the  ‘real’  author’s)  (2010,  pp.27-8).78 However,  if  Bacharach  and
77 Which is not to say that the author(s) intends to realize a contradiction as such, 
only that both conjuncts in the contradiction are intended.
78 They may have misconstrued Sellor’s argument. If we-intentions are collective 
by definition, it would be impossible for an individual to possess genuine we-
intentions unless she were part of the group (otherwise her actions/intentions 
would be excluded by the collective intention), although she could naturally 
have the erroneous belief that she possessed we-intentions; their objection is 
still relevant, albeit not entirely for the reason they seem to believe.
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Tollefsen  refute  Sellor’s  application  of  we-intentions  for  not  necessarily  being
shared by everyone, it seems contradictory to refute Livingston’s requirement that
intentions should be shared. Moreover, they contradict themselves even further as
they defend their own view by referring to Gilbert, according to whom all parties
not only must express their readiness to participate in the joint commitment, but
must also share knowledge about this fact and be aware that this knowledge is
shared by other  members of  the group (Bacharach and Tollefsen 2010,  p.29).
Drawing on Gilbert’s concept of plural subjects they explain that ‘individuals must
be jointly committed to creating a work of art as a body in order to count as part of
the  plural  subject  or  social  group’ (Bacharach  and  Tollefsen  2010,  p.31).  It  is
unclear how this formulation differs from Sellors and/or Livingston, as it could be
reconcilable with either. If this commitment can be ‘solipsistic’, possessed by an
individual not recognized by others to be a member, they effectively present the
same argument they criticize Sellors for defending, but as they show themselves,
such  a  theory  is  deficient.  If  this  joint  commitment  must  be  known  by  other
members their theory aligns with Livingston’s. Hence, not only do Bacharach and
Tollefsen  formulate  an  untenable  line  of  reasoning  that  refutes  the  only  two
possible  alternatives  –  subjects  either  have to  share  or  do  not  have  to  share
intentions – they contradict their own arguments by presenting a solution which
differs in no significant way from Livingston’s. It seems evident that there must be
some  shared  knowledge  among  the  coauthors  as  to  what  to  do  and  how,
otherwise  the  work  resulting  from their  contributions would  be accidental,  with
people working in such a way that their artistic production serendipitously results in
a  single  work  where  the  constituents  happen  to  converge  to  a  certain  extent
(because if they do not converge it would rather be a collection of works instead of
a singular one). Thus, although Bacharach and Tollefsen explicitly argue against
Livingston’s demands for common knowledge and meshing of sub-plans, it seems
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as  though  these  are  necessary  and  supported  implicitly  by  their  own  line  of
reasoning.
They  agree  with  Gaut  that  one  cannot  invoke  the  concept  of  sufficient
control as a means of attributing authorship to a single person when the creation
of the work (such as a film) involves several people, because that person still lacks
sufficient control over the film as a whole (Bacharach and Tollefsen 2010,  p.24).
However, they themselves raise the question of what would constitute ‘sufficient
control’,  and  note  that  the  notion  needs  further  elaboration  as  Gaut  does  not
provide  any  explanation,  but  nevertheless  insist  on  refuting  authorship  with
reference to this very notion without elaborating on its definition, saying that they,
like Gaut,  find auteur theory to be inadequate (Bacharach and Tollefsen 2010,
p.32n3). This is not a valid argument. They explain that they dislike auteur theory
with  reference  to  a  notion  they  themselves  note  to  be  deficient  as  it  stands
(‘sufficient control’), only because doing so supports their preferred conclusion. It
could  be  that  auteur  theory  seems  inadequate  because they  lack  a  proper
definition of sufficient control, so the strength of their argument is diminished by
the fact that they do not examine this notion further. I will not examine the notion in
detail either, but suffice it to say that if we construe ‘sufficient control’ as the control
to bring about the desired result and to prevent undesired ones, either directly or
indirectly (by having others realize one’s intentions), and everyone in the group is
committed to and aware of this, then it does seem like authors can have sufficient
control even when actors make artistically significant contributions. From that it
also follows that  the game designer  can be the only author  and that  she has
sufficient control insofar as players are required to realize her intentions.
Instead of speaking of meshing sub-plans, Bacharach and Tollefsen attempt
to define coauthors with reference to membership of the author group, so that
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even if,  for instance, a caterer happens to share the intentions of the authorial
team, this is not sufficient to make her a coauthor of the film. The strength of this
line of reasoning is that it makes it more clear why the caterer does not become a
coauthor  of  a  film  as  soon  as  she  shares  the  director ’s intentions  and,  by
extension, why players do not become coauthors when they share the designer ’s
intentions. Even if a player has the same intentions as the designer on all relevant
matters and does everything she can to realize them, we now have a reason as to
why she lacks the authority necessary for her contributions to be classified as
those of a coauthor: she is not a member of the authorial group. This addition is
significant, because otherwise any person could potentially become a coauthor as
long as she conformed to the ‘true’ author’s intentions, even when the latter has no
interest in cooperating with others. Although Livingston’s account of meshing sub-
plans are already sufficient to preclude a saboteur from becoming a coauthor, we
now have further reason not to ascribe her (or a player) the role of a coauthor.
The initial flaw with their conception is that it  is in part motivated by the
limitations they perceive in Livingston’s definition, regarding how it does not seem
possible for larger groups of people to meet the requirements outlined. Livingston
himself objects to this allegation, suggesting that his model can account for larger
groups  as  well  (2011,  pp.221-2),  but  his  defence  is  redundant.  They  accuse
Livingston  of  developing  a  theory  that  ‘by  default  (or  definition),  rules  out  as
authored all  artworks created by a large number of individuals’ (Bacharach and
Tollefsen 2010,  p.27)  but  fail  to  realize  that  they commit  the  same fallacy by,
conversely, developing a theory that by default/definition includes a large number
of individuals. Livingston doubts that his definition is as limiting as Bacharach and
Tollefsen make it out to be, but, contra Livingston, it could be preferable to ‘bite the
bullet’ and accept that, in practice, there are limits to the quantity of coauthors for
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any given work; we cannot change definitions to suit our own preferences. This
does not influence the conception of players as authors – since I work with the
assumption  that  authorship  can  be  assigned  to  a  single  person  in  the  group
designing  the  game,  so  a  single-player  game would  only  have  two  coauthors
anyway,  including  the  player  –  but  it  is  nevertheless  important  to  note  that
Bacharach and Tollefsen have a questionable motive for constructing their model
as they do.
Another problem with their definition is that Bacharach and Tollefsen place
too high an emphasis on group membership at the expense of intentions. Their
notion of ‘working as one body’ can be construed in such a way that practically
anyone can become a coauthor, so the caterer could presumably be a coauthor
only by becoming part of the authorial team, regardless of what intentions she has
and  how  small  her  contribution  is.  That  would  also  allow  for  players  to  be
coauthors, even if they make no significant contributions. However, it  would be
absurd to claim that a caterer adding nothing to the ‘utterance’ that is the film, or a
player adding nothing of importance to the game, are both coauthors only because
of membership in the respective authorial groups. Conversely, the director could
potentially not be a coauthor if she is not a member of the authorial group, even if
she and the rest of the crew fulfil Livingston’s requirements of shared intentions
and meshing sub-plans. Bacharach and Tollefsen doubt that the caterer shares
this  joint  commitment  to  make a film,  but  it  is  problematic  that  the  only thing
required to change this fact is a mutual change of attitude in the caterer and the
authorial group. As Livingston notes, the decision to deny a caterer membership in
the authorial group is probably not arbitrary, but one based on what contribution
the  caterer  makes to  the  production  of  the  artwork  (rather  than the  authoring
thereof)  (2011,  p.223).  This  indicates  that  membership  is  perhaps  not  a
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prerequisite for authorship, but a consequence of it. Bacharach and Tollefsen try to
do away with the requirements motivating membership and then ascribe a causal
property to what is merely an effect.
Bacharach and Tollefsen seem to attempt to forestall such consequences
when they define what it means to be part of a joint body, but the way they do it
may invalidate their own idea that membership is both necessary and sufficient.
Drawing on Gilbert’s plural subject theory, they explain that to work as one body is
to ‘avoid saying things contrary to the group belief and to act in accordance with
the belief’, and further to ‘work in unity with others in order to construct, as far as
possible, a unified subject’ (both quotes from Bacharach and Tollefsen 2010, p.29).
To this they add that joint commitments differ from individual ones in that they are
possessed by groups. However, in order to avoid saying things contrary to the
group belief and act in accordance with it, it seems crucial that each author fulfils
Livingston’s demand for meshing sub-plans. Bacharach and Tollefsen dispute the
necessity of meshing, but it is unclear how a coauthor can act in accordance with
the group belief  if  sub-plans do  not mesh.  Another  option would be that  each
member of the team serendipitously happens to act in a way that is in accordance
with  the  group  belief,  but  if  there  is  no  coordination  whatsoever  it  raises  the
question  of  what  constitutes  membership.  It  is  questionable  how  one  is  truly
working together if Bacharach and Tollefsen’s definition of it is only some kind of
agreement with no necessary consequences for the artwork.
Bacharach and  Tollefsen also  attempt  to  explain  how people  in  a  large
group  can  be  coauthors,  in  spite  of  their  comparatively  small  contribution,  by
saying that a group can ‘jointly commit to a specified mechanism for determining
the shape of the film, namely the director’s say-so’ (2010, p.30). In that case the
player  could  be a coauthor,  as  one could  argue that  she is  committed  to  the
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designer’s say-so. Nevertheless, this definition is problematic, as it  could make
someone a coauthor only because of an agreement, even in the absence of any
real  contribution; a player could, theoretically,  be a coauthor even if  she never
played the game, as long as she was part of the author group. Bacharach and
Tollefsen are aware of such consequences, as they claim that authorship can be
attributed to a person whose contribution is nonexistent, and ascribe authorship of
a given song to both Paul McCartney and John Lennon even in cases where only
one of them worked on it, only because of the agreement that all they write be
attributable to  both (2010,  p.30).  Awarding someone the status of author even
when she is committed to someone else’s supervision, and irrespective of whether
said person made a contribution, is not only absurd and counterintuitive, it is hard
to reconcile with their own claim that joint commitments are had by groups and
cannot be made by a single person (Bacharach and Tollefsen 2010,  p.29). If the
author’s word is final, decisions regarding the film are individual commitments. The
only joint  commitment  is  the  one prior  to  the  start  of  the  film production,  that
everyone relinquish  their  authority  to  the  benefit  of  the  director;  it  was  a  joint
commitment to make no more joint commitments, and Bacharach and Tollefsen
seem to assume that the collaborative nature of this first commitment will ‘carry
over’ to subsequent decisions. In that case it  is unclear what is  not a case of
coauthorship;  even  coercion would  be  a  joint  commitment  and  a  case  of
coauthorship, since a person is committed to fully give up her choices.
Moreover,  one  could  argue  that  the  emphasis  on  membership  is  also
incompatible  with  Bacharach  and  Tollefsen’s  claim  that  coauthorship  involves
mutual  responsiveness  between  agents  (2015,  p.333).  As  for  Lennon  and
McCartney, it is true that if one of them remains inactive he does not say things
contrary to the other person’s belief, but is unclear how he acts in accordance with
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that belief if he does not act at all. If a person shows up at a film set and does
nothing to prevent the production she would hardly be elevated to the status of
coauthor only because she does not act in a way contrary to the belief  of the
director. Likewise, a player does not become a coauthor only because she does
not play the game in a way contrary to the intentions of the designer. 
Furthermore, this exaggerated emphasis on group-membership contradicts
Bacharach  and  Tollefsen’s own  distinction  between  authoring a  work  and
contributing to  the  making thereof,  a  distinction  they present  in  order  to  avoid
making authors out of ‘everyone who contributes aesthetically relevant properties’
(2010,  p.25).  These points are crucial,  as we would otherwise have to  include
saboteurs in author groups, but it also implies that membership is insufficient for
authorship, as is mere participation in the making of a work. For this reason we are
probably also  right  to  exclude players,  as  their  intended addition  of  artistically
significant features can be interpreted, at most, as a contribution to the making of
a  work,  if  even that  (since one could  argue  that  the  game is  complete  at  its
release, and that the player does not contribute to the making anymore than a
projectionist does to films screened in the cinema). 
Bacharach  and  Tollefsen  also  claim  that  two  authors  whose  respective
intentions  are  incompatible  can  still  coauthor  a  work  (2011,  p.228).  Livingston
counters by saying that ‘this broad commitment to the making of “a film” does not
suffice  to  constitute  a  group  that  actually  coauthors  a  particular  work’  (2011,
p.224). He is right, because this conception could potentially make anything into
coauthorship, regardless of how little interaction there is between agents: if two
people  are  jointly  committed  to  making  a  film,  but  their  intentions  are  so
incompatible  that  they end up making two  separate  films –  never  cooperating
throughout the production of either – we would hardly maintain that both films are
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coauthored only with reference to their initial agreement. 
Finally,  by doing  away with  the  requirement  for  meshing sub-plans it  is
unclear  how we  can  maintain  the  distinction  between  multiple  authorship  and
coauthorship,  which  seems  rather  important  as  Bacharach  and  Tollefsen
themselves criticize Sellors for neglecting it (2010, p.25). Authors writing one short
story each for a single volume have considerably less meshing sub-plans than
people authoring a single narrative together, but they have the same degree of
membership  in  an  author  group,  all  being  committed  to  the  creation  of  the
anthology.  This  is  yet  another  reason  why  group-membership  cannot  be  a
sufficient factor for making someone a coauthor, meaning that even if the player
would be part of the author group of a given game, that alone would not suffice to
make her a coauthor of the game’s story.
4.1.5 Responsibility
So  far  I  have  discussed  shared  intentions,  meshing  sub-plans,  and  group
membership as factors potentially allowing for players to become coauthors, but
there  is  one  more  element  to  consider:  responsibility.  Several  scholars  have
mentioned responsibility as an important factor in relation to authorship (Currie
1995a, p.262, 1995b, pp.20-1, p.27;  Gaut 1997,  p.157; Kania 2005,  p.48; Kiefer
2005,  p.46;  Livingston  2005,  p.83,  2009,  pp.72-3;  Nathan  2005,  p.36;  Sellors
2007,  p.267;  Thomson-Jones  2008,  p.77;  Livingston  and  Archer  2010,  p.440,
p.448; Fernflores 2010, p.69; Killin 2015, pp.335-6). Responsibility is mentioned by
some game scholars as well, who ascribe at least part of it to the player (Aarseth
1997, p.62, 2003, p.777; Atkins 2003, p.77-8; Grodal 2003, p.150; Davidson 2008,
p.372; Ryan and Costello 2012, pp.112-15, pp.121-3; Servitje 2014, p.379; Thabet
2015, p.59). Bacharach and Tollefsen assert that in a multiply-authored work, each
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contributor ‘takes responsibility and credit solely for their  individual contributions’
(2015,  p.332;  original  emphasis).  Livingston also  mentions responsibility  in  his
definition of joint authorship, and how it must be shared by coauthors of a given
work  (2005,  p.83).  Hick  argues  that  in  cases  of  sabotage,  the  director  is  not
responsible for the film created by the saboteur’s intervention, which is why she is
not a coauthor of the work resulting from the saboteur’s actions (2014, pp.151-2).
If  responsibility  constitutes  a  better  criterion  for  establishing  authorship
common practice  would  indicate  that  players  are  not  held  responsible  for  the
game’s  content:  some  games are  praised  for  their  stories  (which  would  be  a
narcissistic kind of praise if the one responsible for the creation of the story is the
player  herself),  and  law-suits  are  filed  against  designers  if  their  games  have
inappropriate content, not the players. However, it could be objected that this is
descriptive, and that both praise and law-suits have been misdirected, even if one
would  have  to  ‘bite  the  bullet’ and  accept  that  we  would  thus  invalidate  and
undermine all criticism directed at games.
Common  practice  aside,  there  is  a  more  fundamental  problem  with
introducing the notion of  responsibility,  as it  does not  solve any of our issues.
Bacharach and Tollefsen emphasize the importance of working as a body, so it
looks as if responsibility is an  effect of joint commitments, not a  cause  thereof.
Likewise, Hick seems to imply that responsibility follows from the power to select
and arrange content, yet again making responsibility a superfluous addition among
the concepts of joint commitment and/or control. Moreover, Hick’s explanation is
potentially  circular:  power  to  select  content  follows  from  responsibility,  and
responsibility  follows  from the  power  to  select  and  arrange  content.79 A more
charitable reading would be to see responsibility as indicative of authorial power.
79 For criticism of Hick, see Killin (2015) and Bacharach and Tollefsen (2015).
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This would free Hick’s reasoning of circularity, but it still does not answer whether
the  player  is  an  author,  since  the  problem is  displaced  rather  then  resolved:
instead of ascertaining whether players possess authorial power we now have to
answer whether they should be held responsible for their gameplay. 
Furthermore,  the  introduction  of  responsibility  potentially  makes  matters
even more complex and counterintuitive. A player  can only select and arrange
content in interactive parts of games but not text-segments or cut-scenes, and the
designer would only be responsible for text and cut-scenes but not the player’s
actions and choices,  so  according to  Hick’s  definition  this  would  make games
examples of  multiple authorship. What looks like a unified narrative is actually a
collection  of  ostensibly  related  segments,  some of  which  are  authored  by  the
designer and some by the player, but this consequence is absurd; when we play a
game we intuitively assume that both gameplay and cut-scenes narrate parts of
the  same  story.  Further,  Hick  himself  says  that  a  multiply-authored  work  has
‘discrete,  identifiable  units’ (2014,  p.153),  and since gameplay and  cut-scenes
make up a holistic  unity a game can only have several  coauthors or  a  single
author, it cannot be an example of  multiple  authorship. One could instead argue
that the player creates a new work in which she includes sequences originally
authored by the designer, but that would make the player the  sole author, not a
coauthor,  which in turn would lead to the same problems of intentions already
discussed in chapter 3.
Hick suggests, similar to Livingston and Bacharach and Tollefsen, that one
should distinguish between responsibility for a work’s content and for the acts that
lead to the creation of it (2015,  p.340). For this reason, he argues that an editor
may be the author of a  collection of essays, but not of the essays themselves
(Hick 2015, p.340n8). This explains why, for instance, a caterer is not an author, as
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her  responsibility  does not  extend beyond acts  bringing  about  the  film.  As for
players,  they could assist  in creating the game’s narrative,  but  the designer  is
nonetheless  responsible  for  its  content.  If  responsibility  is  essential  to  and
inseparable  from authorship,  and  the  player  lacks  responsibility,  she  also,  ex
hypothesi, lacks authority, meaning that game stories are not interactive. Game
scholars could object that players  do have responsibility for the content as well,
including  the  cut-scenes,  but  this  would  be  a  question-begging  assumption.  A
more fruitful approach would be to ascribe all responsibility for narrative content to
the designer, meaning that she alone is the author of the game story.
In conclusion, I have shown that all definitions of coauthorship have their
potential  flaws,  but  regardless  of  which  definition  one  chooses  it  is  doubtful
whether players can be called coauthors of video game stories as they do not
seem to meet the necessary requirements. I have also shown that if one maintains
that they  do, the definition of coauthorship becomes so wide that it endows too
many people with authorship.
4.2 The Conversation analogy
In the previous section I showed why players cannot be construed as coauthors,
but there is another solution which could allow players to interact with video game
stories nonetheless. Intentionalists often compare art and conversations, claiming
that  the  reader  ‘converses’ with  the  author  by engaging with  her  work.  In  the
following sections I adopt the intentionalist assumption that engagement with art
has as its primary aim to uncover the actual author’s intentions. The question to be
settled then is whether the conversation analogy is valid, and if so, whether it has
different ramifications for video games than other media. If narratives in all media
are  like  conversations  where  both  parties  can  contribute  in  a  reciprocal
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communicative act, it would mean that all narratives are interactive. If the analogy
only holds for video games it could make games more interactive than novels or
films, but if it does not hold at all, not even video games could allow their recipients
to be creators. I begin by outlining the conversation analogy, and in the following
two sub-sections I examine its strengths and weaknesses.
4.2.1 Art as conversation
It  is  common to  illustrate  art  interpretation  by comparing  it  with  conversations
(Carroll  1992, pp.117-18, 2002,  p.321; Westphal 2002,  p.26; Dickie and Wilson
1995,  p.237;  Dickie  1997,  p.311;  Livingston  1998,  p.835,  2005,  p.96; Stecker
2005,  p.146,  pp.156-7,  2008,  p.42;  D.  Davies  2007,  p.86;  Maes  2008,  p.89;
Fernflores 2010,  p.62). Similar comparisons have been made with reference to
game  design  (Pearce  2004a,  p.152). Intentionalism  has  been  defended  with
claims that interpreting a work is like having a conversation with the author, or at
least that interpreters have the same interest in discovering the utterer’s meaning
as one does in a conversation (Carroll 1992, pp.117-18,  1997a, pp.307-8, 2000,
pp.81-2, 2002, p.323, 2011, p.132; Iseminger 1996, p.324; Leddy 1999, pp.222-3;
Irwin 2002,  p.202n16; Nathan 2005, pp.35-7; Sellors 2007,  p.264; Stecker 2008,
p.42; Mikkonen 2009; Maes 2010, p.124; Stock 2017, pp.33-4). Similar views are
not unique to actual intentionalists, but can also be used, if only figuratively, by
those who deny that meaning is defined by the actual author’s intentions (Trivedi
2001, p.194; Currie 2004, p.119).
Comparisons between art and conversations have been criticized on the
grounds that engagement with artworks and conversations differ in crucial ways,
the  general  point  being  that  the  activities  are  engaged  in  with  different  goals
achieved with different means (such as the interest in the style and form of an
artwork) and/or that some artforms lack an equivalent to the conventional meaning
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found in language (Beardsley 1992, p.33; Levinson 1992, p.223, p.241; Rosebury
1997, pp.25-6; Wilson 1997, pp.309-11; Lamarque 2002b, pp.288-9, p.299; Currie
2003,  p.298,  pp.303-4, 2004,  pp.111-12,  p.119;  Kiefer  2005,  p.273;  Livingston
2005,  p.151; Nathan 2005,  p.43;  Stecker  2005,  p.147,  2006,  pp.429-32, 2008,
p.42;  S.  Davies  2006,  p.228;  Dickie  2006,  p.80;  Mikkonen  2009;  Maes  2010,
p.124; Huddleston 2012, p.247, p.255; Levinson 2016, p.142; Stock 2017, pp.67-
8). Some go as far as claiming that divining the utterer’s meaning is not even the
primary/exclusive goal in  conversations  (Rosebury 1997, pp.15-16; Kiefer 2005,
p.277; Dickie 2006,  p.73; Huddleston 2012,  p.253). Another objection is that  a
person’s  interaction  with  an  artwork  can  hardly  be  called  a  conversation:  by
reading a book one does not really converse with the author, and in cases where
the artist and recipient  are both present (e.g. the performance of a theatre play)
artistic  conventions  differ  from  conversational  ones,  for  instance  in  how  they
prevent  the audience from communicating with  the performer (Rosebury 1997,
p.26; Wilson 1997, p.311; Currie 2004, p.111, p.127; Livingston 2005, p.151; Kiefer
2005,  pp.273-4,  p.277;  Dickie  2006,  p.80;  Stecker  2006,  p.433;  Trivedi  2015,
pp.705-6;  Levinson  2016,  p.142; Stock  2017,  p.90).  Differences  between
conversations and artworks have been acknowledged to some extent by actual
intentionalists, and although they diverge in opinions on the utility of the analogy,
they nevertheless emphasize the authority of the creator (Carroll 1992, pp.117-18;
Livingston 2005, pp.151-2; Stecker 2006, p.433; Stock 2017, p.95).
There are two scholars who explore this argument in more depth. Andrew
Huddleston criticizes Carroll’s  defence of the conversation analogy and asserts
that  because of  the  one-dimensional  nature  of  engagement  with  artworks  one
does not converse literally with an author, which leads him to the conclusion that if
Carroll’s defence is to be cogent, Carroll  ‘would need to find a way of construing
the  encounter  between  author  and reader  that  makes it  interactive  enough to
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warrant being thought of in conversational terms’ (Huddleston 2012, p.248; original
emphasis). He also notes that by reformulating interpretative endeavours to render
them sufficiently interactive so as to respond to accusations of one-dimensionality,
one  risks  diverging  from  the  actual  intentionalist’s  approach  to  interpretation
(Huddleston 2012, p.248). It would follow, he explains, that any contribution from
the reader not corresponding to the author’s intention would be  ‘hermeneutically
inappropriate’ and irrelevant to the work-meaning, which hardly merits being called
a conversation (Huddleston 2012, p.249-50). Huddleston’s solution is not to refute
Carroll’s  conception  of  the  conversation  analogy  entirely,  but  to  regard  an
encounter  with  the  text  as  a  ‘meta-level  discussion’ with  the  author  about  the
optimal interpretation. Huddleston retains the intentionalist goal of uncovering the
author’s  intentions  –  doing  otherwise,  he  says,  would  preclude  possibilities  of
having a metaphorical conversation – but suggests that this is not the end of our
interpretative endeavour, and he adds the step where we respond with our own
interpretation  (2012,  pp.250-1).  This  need  not  amount  to  a  deliberate
misunderstanding of the actual author’s intentions, he explains, because actual
conversations do not  consist  exclusively of  uncovering  the  speaker’s  intention;
instead, one may make suggestions of improvements whilst fully aware of what
the  interlocutor  actually  meant,  such  as  when  a  professor  has  a  ‘meta-level
conversation’ with  a  student  on  how  an  essay  could  be  interpreted  and/or
improved (Huddleston 2012, p.252n28, p.253). Huddleston explains that discovery
of the student’s initial intentions is not the ultimate goal, but to  ‘come up with a
good  interpretation  of  the  ideas  in  the  essay,  even  when  that  construal  goes
beyond what the student first meant’ (2012, p.253), which he asserts is equivalent
to  the  reader’s  suggestion  of  an  interpretation  different  from  the  author’s
intentions. He is also sceptical  of  how Carroll’s  application of the conversation
analogy seems to have evaluation of an artwork and the artist’s achievement as its
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goal, and of how Carroll does not provide a satisfactory defence of why this should
be the goal of interpretation, arguing that it seems odd to presume that this would
mirror the goal of conventional conversations (Huddleston 2012, pp.254-5).
Anthony  Jannotta  objects  that  Huddleston’s  view  builds  on  a
misunderstanding of  Carroll’s  conception of  the conversation analogy.  Jannotta
explains that Carroll does not defend interpretation as exclusively uncovering the
intentions of the author; other interests should not be replaced by but reconciled
with conversational interests, and when the artistic intentions are discovered the
interpretative activity does not stop, one has to  ‘work with’ said intentions (2014,
p.373).  Jannotta  shows  this  with  reference  to  Carroll’s  assessment  of  The
Mysterious  Island  (Verne,  1874):  Carroll’s  interpretative  activity  is  not  finished
when he has ascertained Verne’s intentions, he uses these intentions to reach an
interpretation  ‘opposed diametrically  to  the  one Jule  Verne intended’ (Jannotta
2014, p.374). Drawing on Carroll, Jannotta argues that ‘interpretation need not end
with the identification of the creator’s intentions (that is the starting place) and […]
interpreters can bring their independent interests, ideas, or agenda to bear on the
artwork (so long as they work with  rather than ignore those intentions)’ (2014,
p.374). He asserts that the conversation analogy as presented by Carroll cannot
be  reduced  to  a  monologue:  Carroll  complies  with  the  interpretive  policy  of
discovering  the  intentions  of  the  author,  but  this  does  not  mean  that  his
‘conversation’ with Verne becomes less open and mutual (Jannotta 2014, p.374).
Jannotta  is  aware  of  the  fact  that  Verne  cannot  answer,  but  he  nevertheless
maintains that the communication is mutual, open, and interactive, since Carroll’s
interpretation is independent and diverges from the one intended by the author
(2014, p.374).
Jannotta  further  argues  that  Huddleston’s  monologue  objection  is  not
successful since it builds on the assumption that comparisons with conversations
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cannot be reconciled with constraints imposed by artistic intentions, and claims
that  his  own  conception  of  an  intentionalist  metaphorical  conversation  is  both
mutual and open, meaning that intentionalists can still compare interpretation to a
conversation  (2014,  p.376).  He  contends  that  Huddleston’s  meta-level
conversation is not necessarily superior to  the conversation analogy,  since the
latter satisfies the same requirements to the same extent (Jannotta 2014, pp.376-
7). 
Jannotta  also  criticizes  Huddleston’s  meta-level  dialogue  since
Huddleston’s analogy about  a professor  and a student  concerns instruction on
how  to  improve a  given  work,  whereas  an  interpretation  is  concerned  with
clarifying it (Jannotta 2014, p.379, 379n35). Jannotta’s view is that the interpreter
works  with  artistic  intentions  whilst  incorporating  her  own  interests,  and  that
intentionalists can appeal to the conversation analogy insofar as the meta-level
dialogue is a  ‘cooperative attempt between artist and interpreter to arrive at the
best interpretation’ (2014, pp.379-80).
To  reiterate  the  questions  relevant  for  this  section:  is  the  conversation
analogy appropriate  in  video game interpretation? If  so,  does it  have different
ramifications for video games than other media, which render video game stories
interactive? I first scrutinize the general validity of the conversation analogy before
moving on to whether it is valid when applied to video games. These questions are
crucial  for  the  interactivity  of  video  game stories,  because  if  the  conversation
analogy allows for stories in other media to be interactive, video games are not
unique, and if the conversation analogy is fundamentally flawed it may not be able
to support interactivity in any medium, let alone video games.
4.2.3 Moderate intentionalism and the conversation analogy
Huddleston  speaks  only  of  cases  where  artistic  intentions  are  successfully
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realized, and therefore neglects a crucial difference between EAI and MAI: MAI
allows  for  passages  with  unintended  meanings,  where  authorial  intentions  are
either absent or not realized, possibly making the conversation more mutual (since
the  ‘conversation’ with the artist would not be limited to understanding authorial
intentions).  In games,  this would mean that  players could add content through
gameplay as long as it is not contrary to the designer ’s intentions. A consequence
of this, however, is that the same reciprocity that allows for artworks to be more
like mutual conversations also entails that games are not fundamentally different
from other media, since readers/spectators are also allowed to ‘speak their minds’.
Does this mean that MAI turns readers/spectators into contributors to the
same extent as players? No. Although Huddleston does not elaborate on this, his
allegations do apply to both EAI and MAI in the sense that this conversation would
ultimately  be  just  as  one-sided,  but  what  Huddleston  does  not  realize  is  that
according to MAI it would also be futile. Not only does the artist have no way of
correcting our interpretations, MAI readily admits that parts of the artwork do not
successfully convey artistic intentions. According to EAI we have nothing to add to
the artist’s monologue; according to MAI, we have nothing to add  and we most
likely  misunderstand  some  intentions  because  of  the  monologue’s deficient
conveyance of them. Furthermore, since MAI concedes that some meanings are
not  intended by the author,  we have to  ‘leave’ the conversation  whenever  we
interpret passages not conveying artistic intentions and instead direct our attention
to the linguistic meaning the author did not intend, which defeats the very purpose
of having a conversation. If a person misspeaks and cannot clarify what she meant
we do not direct our attention exclusively to the linguistic meaning of her utterance
regardless  of  what  it  conveys,  we  still  try  to  grasp  what  she  attempted  to
communicate. If the designer failed to implement something in the game the player
would not therefore be able to add any content of her own, but would have to
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‘make do’ with what ended up in the game contrary to the designer ’s intentions.
Ultimately this means that Huddleston’s criticism still obtains, but for reasons he
fails to acknowledge: MAI potentially opens up for a conversation, but a deficient
and pointless one.
4.2.4 One-dimensionality of interpretation
Moreover, the problem of one-sidedness does not reside, as Huddleston implies,
in  the  focus  on  one  person’s  intentions,  but  in  the  inherent  limitations  of
interpretive  activities:  a  crucial  problem  with  the  conversation  analogy  is  that
literary/cinematic narratives do not allow for any genuine reciprocity. Huddleston’s
point is that readers only focus on the author’s intentions, mine is that they could
not do otherwise.
Jannotta contends that the ‘conversation’ is already mutual; as an example
he mentions how Carroll replies to Verne by presenting his own interpretation. This
sounds, in principle, like what Thabet says about the player being able to produce
a  counter-discourse  as  a  response to  the  one presented by the  game,  which
indicates that the conversation analogy is appropriate in video games. However,
this  hardly  seems  like  a  mutual conversation,  because  if  fictional  truth  is
determined by artistic intentions, Carroll’s reply is no more than a mere rejection of
the intended (and, ex hypothesi, correct) interpretation. Verne presents a story he
intended to be anti-racist, Carroll replies that he does not think it is; this is not a
conversation as much as a monologue and an unheard rejoinder.  If  there is a
fictional truth independent of artistic intentions, and there is a clear discrepancy
between the two, the conversation is no less futile than before: Verne erroneously
thinks  that  his  story  is  anti-racist  but  Carroll  replies  that  it  is  not.  This  is  a
conclusion Carroll must reach  before ‘speaking’ to Verne, and the story remains
racist regardless of whether Verne is informed about it; Carroll ’s reply  does not
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alter the truth-value of any fictional proposition, and therefore does not render the
‘conversation’ mutual.
Initially it may seem as though the conversation analogy obtains in video
games in a way different from other media: the designer presents a narrative and
players can offer interpretations through gameplay. However, the aforementioned
argument still applies. Suppose we played a game with content we find repulsive.
Players may object to this content (perhaps by ceasing to play), but the designer
does not hear or respond. This is no more a conversation than the example with
Verne and Carroll.
Nevertheless,  the  example  with  Carroll  and  Verne  is  too  limited,  as  it
focuses only on moral aspects of a narrative. Whether Mysterious Island is racist
depends on how we relate fictional propositions to actual moral doctrines, which is
beyond the assessment of fictional truth. As opposed to the moral dimension of a
fiction, when speaking of fictional truth it could be argued that games are more
conversational.  In a novel/film the author/director tells us what occurs, but in a
game like Ocarina of Time the designer may suggest what Link should do and the
player suggests what should happen by controlling him. There is a full exchange,
and the mutuality is preserved.
The same problems reappear, however, insofar as the player is limited by
the designer’s intentions in the same way that Huddleston argues that the reader
is limited by the author. For instance, in one mission of Perfect Dark the player has
to accomplish certain tasks before reaching a lift  where a cut-scene is played,
marking the end of the mission. Should the player enter the lift  without having
carried out all tasks, the cut-scene will not play and the mission will not end. Thus,
the player may offer her own interpretation and the designer rejects it indirectly by
programming the game in such a way that it cannot be realized. If anything, this
mutual  communication  makes  games  even  less open,  since  the  programmer
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actually  does  respond  indirectly  by  rejecting  ‘incorrect’  interpretations.  If  the
designer does not endow the player with the power to ‘speak her mind’ we could
hardly call it a conversation.
A more fundamental problem is that one does not actually  speak with the
author. Like Huddleston, Jannotta is aware that the author ‘can offer no rejoinder’
(2014, p.374), but he maintains that this nevertheless constitutes a full exchange
satisfying the demand for mutuality and openness. Jannotta could have been right,
had Verne actually heard what Carroll said. If Carroll answers Verne, we do not
need  Verne  to  comment  upon  Carroll’s  reply;  requiring  every  utterance  to  be
commented upon in  order  to  satisfy  the  conditions  of  openness and mutuality
would  lead  to  an  infinite  chain  of  comments  and  replies.  The  problem  here,
however, is that Jannotta has rather low requirements for his definition of a  ‘full
exchange’;  Verne, being absent, cannot offer a rejoinder, raising the question of
how this counts as a conversation. The conversation analogy has been criticized
for such reasons, that the so-called conversation is more of a monologue (Wilson
1997, p.311; Dickie 2006, p.80; Huddleston 2012, p.249). Even if Verne had been
present, it has been argued that artists may not comment upon the work and/or
adjudicate between interpretations once it is finished, that it should speak for itself
(Rosebury 1997,  p.26; Levinson 2016,  p.142). What Carroll does is to  react, he
does not respond, and if a hypothesized reaction counts as a response it becomes
unclear when we do not converse with someone. Likewise, a player who thinks of
ways of improving a game does not respond to the designer’s ‘monologue’ that is
the  game,  but  merely  reacts  with  a  hypothetical  reply  which  is  not  uttered.
Huddleston (and others) seems to be right in the objection that if the interpretation
of a novel is a kind of conversation, it is a unidirectional kind of communication.
Readers  and  spectators  have  no  means  of  communicating  with  the  author  or
director,  nor  can a  player  communicate  with  the  designer,  so they are,  in  this
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sense,  passive  recipients.  The  activity  of  readers  and  spectators  can  be
underestimated  –  interpretive  endeavours  can  require  great  efforts  –  but  it  is
important to distinguish between activity and reciprocity: the fact that readers and
spectators  are  engaged  on  a  cognitive  level  when  attempting  to  decipher  the
meaning  of  a  work  is  unrelated  to  the  extent  at  which  they  are  allowed  to
contribute to said meaning.
4.2.5 Meta-conversation
Does this mean that we can retain the conversation analogy by ‘converting’ it into
a  meta-conversation  in  the  way  Huddleston  does?  Jannotta  even  admits  that
Huddleston’s  meta-conversation  is  inescapable  to  some  degree,  since  our
comments  will  be  about the  artwork  (2014,  p.380).  It  is  correct  that  any
conversation with an artist will be a meta-conversation since the work is the object
of conversation, not the means through which a conversation is held; writing on a
novel’s pages or inserting images on a film-strip will not elicit a response from the
creator. One can compare it to mail-correspondence, where replying to a letter is a
kind of conversation but a letter commenting upon the content is more of a meta-
conversation. The difference between a conversation and a meta-conversation can
be distinguished if we imagine a third person and what she cannot say in response
to the given letter which its intended recipient can; the third person can only speak
of  the given letter as an object  in  a meta-conversation,  but  not  engage in  the
conversation herself, as its content is not directed at her.
However, this does not mean that the meta-conversation is a better model,
because we are still unable to communicate with the author for practical and/or
conventional reasons: even if she were physically present she may still refuse to
answer  (since  it  would  be  an  inappropriate  engagement  with  the  work).  Like
Jannotta, Huddleston is aware of this limitation, but he defends it by saying that ‘at
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least on this construal of the conversation metaphor, our voices, as it were, stand
a chance to be heard, when it  comes to the interpretation to be given’ (2012,
p.251). In which way our voices are heard is left unexplained, so the conversation
analogy seems to be renamed, not improved. Huddleston and Jannotta attempt to
solve the problem in almost identical and therefore equally deficient ways. Like the
conversation analogy, Huddleston’s meta-conversation has no full exchange and
therefore no mutuality insofar as our reply consists of what we would like to say
but are unable to communicate. Nothing is changed by Huddleston’s addition of
the prefix ‘meta’.
Even if we accept Huddleston’s analogy of the professor and the student we
still would not influence the fictional truth, but not entirely for the reason presented
by  Jannotta.  As  already  mentioned,  Jannota  objects  that  the  professor’s
instructions  are  not  analogous  to  an  interpretation  as  they  aim  at  improving
content, not illuminating it, but Jannotta does not elaborate enough on this point.
Huddleston sees an interpretation as  ‘an attempt to make sense of the work’s
features’ (2012,  p.245),  which  raises  the  question  of  what  purpose  a  meta-
conversation serves and indicates that Jannotta is right in his objection (a meta-
conversation is not an interpretation), because suggesting how to improve a work
presumes comprehension of the work, it does not ameliorate it. Whilst playing we
may try strategies we think would improve the game, but whether they can be
carried out is up to the designer.
Moreover, we can connect this specific criticism to one offered by Currie,
directed  at  intentionalism in  general.  Huddleston  is  right  to  say  that  our  own
contributions  are  hermeneutically  inappropriate,  but  he  does  not  realize  how
irrelevant such a discussion is. As mentioned earlier, Currie argues that when we
look for the artist’s intentions, we are seeking a hypothetical work which the author
failed to create, insofar as authorial  intentions deviate to some extent from the
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completed work. Similarly, if we engage in a meta-conversation about a work, we
do not speak of the actual work, but a hypothetical one which we would have
wanted instead. Thus, a crucial problem here is that such a meta-discussion not
only has a different  goal  than  ‘genuine’ interpretations  (amelioration  instead of
comprehension/evaluation), it also concerns a different work (a hypothetical one,
not the actual one), and therefore has no bearing on the truth in the given fiction,
nor  our  comprehension  of  it,  but  rather  presupposes  both.  Jannotta  criticizes
Huddleston for focusing too much on the aesthetically best interpretation and says
that the interpreter  ‘can always dream up a more pleasing interpretation’ (2014,
p.377),80 but his criticism focuses too much on Huddleston’s potential  aesthetic
maximization. Huddleston asserts that aesthetic value need not be our primary
interest, and mentions cognitive and moral goals as reasons for diverging from
artistic intentions (2012,  p.244n11), so Jannotta’s criticism may be void. A more
problematic aspect of this value maximization is not that it disrespects the artist’s
intention,  but  that  it  neglects  fictional  truth  altogether,  putting  interpreters  in  a
position  where  they allow the  artist  to  ‘speak’ as  long as  it  pleases them but
discard anything they dislike without cooperating with the speaker (since the artist
cannot reply to the interpreter’s comments). This flaw, however, permeates both
Huddleston’s and Jannotta’s lines of reasoning.
More  importantly,  regardless  of  whether  we  endorse  the  conversation
analogy or Huddleston’s meta-conversation, it would still have no bearing on truth
in  fiction,  and  in  this  respect  mutuality  is  compromised  even  further  in  both
Huddleston’s and Jannotta’s models. Even if we were able to converse with the
author in Huddleston’s meta-conversational way, that would only make the meta-
conversation mutual, because it is only there a reader/spectator can get some kind
80 Stock similarly objects to selecting an interpretation on the grounds that it is 
morally pleasing (2017, p.101).
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of  response,  but  if  we accept  the intentionalist  definition of  truth in  fiction (i.e.
equating fictional truth with the intentions of the creator at the time of creation), it
follows that the only thing that changes as a result  of  this conversation is our
understanding of the fictional truth, not the fictional truth as such; we can never
influence the intentions Fleming had when writing the Bond-novels, so the fictional
truth, being equivalent to those intentions, remains unaltered.
4.2.6 Independence and relevance of interpretations
Jannotta  further  criticizes  Huddleston’s  conception  of  an  independent
interpretation  for  not  being  clearly  defined  and  implying  that  independence  is
assessed in terms of its relevance to artistic intentions, running the risk of making
an independent interpretation both non-intended and irrelevant (2014, pp.375-6,
p.376n22).  This  means  that  the  ‘independence  of  an  interpretive  claim  is
presumably a matter of degree, with the slavish reporting of artistic intentions at
one  extreme  and  the  unrestrained  imposing  of  one’s  own  ideas  at  the  other.
Huddleston does not indicate where on the continuum his view falls ’ (Jannotta
2014, p.376n22). Jannotta contends that if an interpretation needs to be unrelated
or irrelevant to artistic intentions in order for the conversation to be open it would
mean that open conversations consist of non sequiturs (2014, p.376). Jannotta, on
the  other  hand,  asserts  that  contributions made to  a  conversation  are  usually
related/relevant  to  what  the  other  person  said  (2014,  p.376).  Jannotta  further
contends that Huddleston’s model is too competitive, whereas Jannotta himself
emphasizes how the artist and interpreter cooperate (2014, pp.379-80). 
Jannotta is right, because neither slavish reporting of the author’s intentions
nor  unrestrained imposing of  one’s ideas would count  as a conversation.  One
problem is that by examining each conjunct of a given conjunction that make up an
interpretation the complexity and fluidity of interpretations vanishes, along with the
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possibility  of  creating  independent  interpretations  still  relevant  to  the  artist’s
intentions. Hence, there is no cooperation à la Jannotta, but rather competition à la
Huddleston. To illustrate why an interpretation cannot be both independent and
relevant, take the interpretative claim that, in the Harry Potter-books, Dumbledore
is heterosexual, a claim to which Rowling objects, saying that he is not. This would
not qualify as an example of a conversation where the reader has worked with the
author’s intentions to produce an independent interpretation not disconnected from
authorial intentions, because our interpretation F(p)81 and the authorial intention
F(~p) are mutually exclusive. This illustrates how Jannotta’s suggestion of ‘working
with’ intentions does not differ in principle from the practice he criticizes himself: if
an  interpretative  proposition  is  to  be  independent  of  but  related  to  the  artist’s
intentions the only option is for it to be opposed to these intentions; in other words,
if the artist’s intention is F(~p) ours would have to be F(p) (or one of the other two
options). Since  Jannotta  renounces  unrelated  interpretations  promoting  non
sequiturs we cannot avoid this issue by formulating an interpretative statement
which does not decide on F(p) v F(~p), but the only remaining option is no more
appealing, as it would amount to opposing/ignoring authorial intentions.82 The only
possible response would be for Jannotta to outline to what extent and in which
aspects  an  interpretation  may  deviate  from  the  author’s  intentions  whilst  still
remaining  relevant  to  them (so  the  interpreter  works  with  rather  than  ignores
authorial intentions), but since each interpretative proposition can be approached
as a dichotomy – i.e. F(p) v F(~p) – we lose the interpretative ‘leeway’ which would
create the continuum to which Jannotta appeals. This applies equally across the
81 We could also state ~F(~p), i.e. it it is not fictionally true that Dumbledore is not 
heterosexual, or potentially ~ ~F(p), i.e. it is false that it is not fictionally true that
Dumbledore is heterosexual. My argument does not hinge on which specific 
alternative one endorses, as long as it contradicts the author’s intention.
82 Jannotta does address the problem of how moderate intentionalists are to treat 
interesting interpretations not intended by the author, but does not go into detail 
on how to resolve this matter (2014, p.380n36).
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arts, but in games our interpretative limitations are all the more palpable. In novels
and  films  interpreters  can  think  of  an  interpretation  contrary/unrelated  to  the
author’s/director’s intention (the novel/film does not control their imagination), but
interaction  in  games  is  limited  by  parameters  implemented  by  the  designer;
players cannot play in a way contrary to the designers intentions, nor in a way
completely unrelated to them, since the game’s code simply does not allow for it.83
If  we  instead  evaluate  a  given  interpretation  holistically,  judging  all
interpretative propositions together in a single conjunction, Jannotta would have to
answer  which  of  the  conjunction’s  constituents  may  deviate  from  authorial
intentions, to what extent, and what determines these matters. If the interpretation
is  permissible  because  the  author  approves  of  interpretative  propositions  that
diverge from her intentions we end up with a monologue with an almighty author
regardless, since authorial intentions ultimately control the interpretation insofar as
they restrict interpretative liberties: in vague passages the author can intend the
readers  to  fill  in  details,  but  they  can  only  do  this  once  they  have  assured
themselves  that  this  was  intended  by  the  author.  However,  this  does  not
necessarily  grant  us  any  creative  power,  as  both  actual  and  hypothetical
intentionalists have argued that a proposition is not true in the fiction only because
we imagine it (Currie 1990, p.72; Stock 2017, p.103).
George  Wilson  has  criticized  Carroll  for  not  explaining  how  authorial
intentions constrain interpretations (1997, p.310), and the same criticism applies to
Jannotta:  his  distinction  between  working  with  and  uncovering intentions  is
spurious.  Jannotta  seems to  agree with  Huddleston that  an open conversation
‘involves  taking  seriously  the  ideas  of  those  participating  in  the  conversation’
(2014, p.374). How does Jannotta conceive of openness in a conversation? He
83 Utilizing bugs and glitches in the code arguably count as opposing authorial 
intentions.
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claims  that  Carroll’s  interpretation  does  not  stop  at  uncovering  the  author’s
intentions, since he (Carroll)  proceeds to create his own diametrically opposed
interpretation  (Jannotta  2014,  p.374).  Thus,  interpreters  can bring  independent
ideas insofar  as  they work  with  the  intentions instead of  ignoring  them,  but  if
Carroll’s interpretation is diametrically opposed to Verne’s intentions it is unclear to
what extent he is still  taking them seriously and working with them rather than
ignoring  them  in  order  to  produce  something  aesthetically  superior.  Further,
Carroll’s interpretation is hardly constrained by Verne’s intentions if Carroll outright
rejects them.  If  his  interpretation  on the  other  hand is  constrained by Verne’s
intentions,  it  would  lead  to  the  above-mentioned  paradox,  i.e.  that  Carroll’s
interpretation is constrained by the intention insofar as Verne’s intention was that
one’s  interpretation  should  not be  constrained  by  said  intention.84 Either  way,
readers/spectators/players  either  discover  artistic  intentions or  create  their  own
version, neither of which counts as a conversation.
Alternatively, it could be that the only interpretative propositions not refuted
by the author are those with no bearing on central events and characters, yet it is
hardly a conversation when the only matters one is allowed to speak of are of no
importance.  Moreover,  this  still  leads  to  the  aforementioned  paradox:  we  may
interpret the work in a way not intended by the author, because she intended us
not to adhere to her intentions. We could also appeal to a fictional truth external
from and independent of authorial intentions, but then we yet again abandon the
project of conversing with the author.
Furthermore, it is questionable to what extent Carroll’s reply counts as an
interpretation.  Jannotta  criticizes  Huddleston’s  analogy  with  the  student  and
professor on the grounds that such a conversation has instruction as a goal, not
interpretation (2014, p.379n35). Carroll’s  ‘conversation’ with the author, however,
84 Nathan has also noted this paradox (2005, p.39).
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does not differ in principle from that between the student and the professor, since
Carroll does not illuminate the content anymore than the professor does. Carroll’s
reply is evaluative rather than instructive, and presupposes comprehension in lieu
of  leading  to  or  altering  it.  In  a  conventional  conversation,  evaluating  what  a
person says in this way does not count as a response to it. 
Now that we have established the difficulty (if not impossibility) of creating a
relevant, independent interpretation, it becomes more clear why games do not fare
better  as  examples  of  open,  mutual  conversations,  though they may give  this
impression. In many games, the designer allows the player to try a multitude of
strategies with an immense variety, at least in terms of details. It does not matter
exactly what players do, as long as they comply with the roughly outlined intention
of the designer; when we encounter a group of enemies in Vice City it matters little
in which order we kill them or which weapons we use. Thus, it seems as if games
offer  the player  a chance to  respond in a way that  a reader/spectator  cannot.
However, from the fact that the designer has no  specific intentions regarding a
given (set of) fictional truth(s), it does not follow that she lacks intentions entirely,
just that players are offered several options, all of which must be included by the
designer. That is, instead of saying that the only legitimate interpretation is ‘enemy
X is killed before enemy Y’ the designer communicates ‘either X is killed before Y,
or Y is killed before X.’ By killing enemies in either of these possible orders players
do not  present  their  own interpretation,  they merely accept  one of the several
options offered by the designer. The very same thing can be said about novels and
films  where  vaguely  outlined  events  offer  many  possible  but  equally  valid
interpretations.
There is, however, an aspect of gameplay that is more conversational in
nature than anything to be found in novels and films. Modern games are often
altered  after  release  through  the  addition  of  updates  that  modify  certain
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parameters of the game. As flaws are discovered, the designer can ‘converse’ with
players by correcting the ‘utterance’ that is the game, and so gameplay becomes
more like a conversation. This, however, does not mean that games open up for a
mutual, open conversation. On the contrary, the artist’s control is reinforced, so
players who successfully realize their  ‘interpretations’ by playing in a certain way
may be ‘corrected’ by the designer in the next update. Players may refuse to install
the update in order to preserve the preferred interpretation/playthrough, but this
would  be  to  ignore  artistic  intentions  in  the  very  same  way  Jannotta  deems
impermissible. Hence, there is no full exchange between players and designers
except in the sense that players may offer numerous possible interpretations (by
playing) until finally one is approved of by the designer. Thus, either a game is not
updated, and then it  is  as much of a monologue as a novel  or a film, or it  is
updated, making it even  less of a conversation. Conversely, the player can alter
the  game’s  code  and  create  so-called  ‘modifications’ (or  ‘mods’)  where
appearances and mechanics are different from the original version, but this is yet
another  kind  of  rejection of  the  game-author’s  intentions and a creation of  an
entirely new work, in principle no different from a reader adding his own pages to a
book, or a spectator editing adding images to a film.85
This  cannot  be  resolved  by  renouncing  intentionalism,  because  the
consequence of doing so would only be that the author does  not define truth in
fiction, from which it does not follow that the reader  does.  Fictional truth would
remain  independent  of  the  reader’s  interpretative  activities,  limiting  readers  to
discovering a meaning they are in no position to influence. It is only by adopting
value maximization that readers potentially get to speak their minds, but then we
must also do away with the conversation analogy.
85 Kania similarly argues that altering the code would be to violate the ‘prescribed 
way’ of engaging with the game (2018, p.188).
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Ultimately, the conversation analogy does not allow for the interpreter to be
more active in the creation of the story, not even in video games. The so-called
conversation is more of a monologue where the designer has the final word and
players  converse  in  the  sense  that  they  attempt  to  find  out  the  designer’s
intentions. The meta-conversation fairs no better. It is still a monologue, but one
where interpreters cherry-pick what they want and then construct something they
find to be more appealing, and it mirrors common conversational practice to an
even lesser degree than the ‘conventional’ conversation analogy.
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Conclusions
In this thesis I have shown that although several game scholars contend that video
games provide the interpreter (i.e. the player) with the opportunity to interact with
the story in the sense that the player is able to alter fictional truth, video game
stories are not fundamentally different from stories in other media. Naturally video
games, as a medium, have their own unique properties, but these do not radically
alter the nature of fictional truth; they allow for no more interaction on the part of
the interpreter than do novels or films.
Temporality is one factor often cited by game theorists as a reason why
games are more interactive, the argument being that game stories take place in
the present, which I have called the Claim of Presentness (or CoP). I have shown
in the thesis that advocates of the CoP provide no good reason to assume that
temporal properties of video game stories differ from those of novels and/or films.
One  reason  cited  in  defence  of  the  CoP  is  that  the  temporality  of  the
representation and that of the story are automorphic, i.e. that the presentness of
the  representation  purportedly  conveys  the  presentness  of  the  story,  but  it  is
arbitrary to posit this only with regards to video games and no other media. This
assumption is not even valid in real life, as some real events display a discrepancy
between their metaphysical properties and the visual experience of them, such as
the experience of seeing stars that disappeared long ago, where the present visual
experience is of a past event; if one cannot assume that presentness of the visual
experience correlates with presentness of a real event, one certainly cannot do it
in fiction. Moreover, this assumption becomes more counterintuitive when fictional
content indicates that the story took place in the past, or when the representation
itself shows obvious signs of coming from the past (e.g. aged special effects and
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actors  no  longer  alive  in  films,  aged  graphics  in  the  case  of  games).  The
concession  that  any  temporal  property  can  potentially  be  conveyed  by  the
representation  undermines  the  assumption  that  presentness  is  the  standard
property conveyed by the narrative, and to assert that this is unique to games is
question-begging.
I have also demonstrated that the CoP necessarily entails consequences
neglected by game scholars, all of which weaken their claims. Firstly, if the CoP
obtains, it  would mean that flashbacks are impossible in game stories, as they
would necessitate  temporal  relocation.  It  has been argued that  games for  this
reason contain few flashbacks, but I have presented several examples of games
where they are prevalent, and I have shown that flashbacks are not problematic as
long as one does not adopt the CoP. I have also presented potential solutions that
could make it possible to reconcile flashbacks with the CoP, but these were all
shown to be deficient. A flashback could be seen as the memory of the narrator,
but not all anachronies are associated with a character ’s act of remembering, and
some could not possibly be memories (as when the person supposed to possess
the  memories  is  amnesiac).  Even  when  a  given  flashback  is  a  memory  of  a
character,  it  is  unlikely  that  its  duration  corresponds  to  that  of  the  act  of
remembering, as this would mean that a game taking ten hours to play would
entail that the character was talking uninterrupted for this length of time. A more
fundamental problem is that if the narration is in the present, the flashback must
convey past events, from which it follows that the player cannot interact with the
events  portrayed  (since  presentness  is  the  very  property  allegedly  making
interaction possible). Another fundamental problem is that the CoP would render
all anachronies impossible, so that a rearrangement of scenes would automatically
entail a rearrangement of events, and I have argued that it would be arbitrary and
counterintuitive to posit this only in relation to video games and no other medium,
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given that this would entail that temporal relations between fictional events would
automatically be altered if a video game narrative is conveyed in another medium.
Another problem entailed by the CoP is that it would require each game to
be played only once in one continuous playthrough, since the temporal alignment
between game story and real life would be disrupted if  the game is paused. It
would also lead to the paradox that if two players play the same game at different
times, the same moment would be present for one player but past for another. It
also introduces the question of why time does not pass in the fiction when we are
not engaged with it. These problems could be resolved either by saying that each
gaming-session, no matter how short, is its own story, alternatively that the fictional
temporality  is  ‘reset’  at  each  gaming-session,  but  both  solutions  are
counterintuitive and  ad hoc: we are not prescribed to interpret game stories this
way, and there is no reason why these solutions could not be applied to literary
and cinematic narratives as well. It would also preclude the possibility of speaking
of a playthrough as a single story, and would fragment it into an infinite number of
stories instead.
Furthermore, if interaction requires that the game story take place in the
present, it would entail that the duration of the story corresponds to the duration of
the narrative – that the amount of time it takes for the story events to transpire is
equal to the amount of time required by the narrative to convey them – since the
fictional and actual present must move at the same speed. This phenomenon I
called the Duration Assumption, and it is problematic for several reasons, the first
one being that this principle has already been defended in cinema, where it has
been shown to be prevalent but by no means necessary; fictional time is usually
equivalent to narrative time, but there are numerous exceptions (slow- and fast
motion probably being the most common ones). Secondly, it would require story
time to  move invariably in  the  same direction as  narrative  time,  but  there  are
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games which  include segments  played ‘in  reverse’,  which  therefore refute this
principle. Thirdly, several games include discrepancies between fictional time and
narrative  time,  such as  Vice City,  where  an in-game clock  indicates  that  time
passes sixty times faster in the fictional world than in reality, which would entail
that  fictional  and  actual  time  are  only  aligned  briefly  before  the  temporal
discrepancy appears and grows incrementally. This discrepancy could potentially
be resolved by stating that the progression of fictional time remains synchronized
with actual time and that the difference lies in the use of temporal units (i.e. the
term ‘hour’ denotes a shorter time-span within the fiction even though fictional time
does not actually move faster), but that argument is refuted by games that use
different  temporal  units  for  the same amount of  time,  such as when  Vice City
indicates that twenty actual seconds corresponds to both twenty fictional minutes
and twenty fictional seconds. It also leads to odd consequences concerning the
fictional world, e.g. that days only last for a matter of minutes, even though this is
never mentioned in the fiction. Moreover, the Duration Assumption is made even
more problematic  by games where  temporal  manipulation is  possible,  allowing
characters to  speed up and/or slow down time and thus create a discrepancy
between the rate at which narrative and fictional time progress. Ultimately it seems
impossible to separate the CoP and the Duration Assumption, and since equal
duration of the narrative and the story is a necessary consequence of the CoP, a
refutation of the Duration Assumption by extension also refutes the CoP.
Finally I have refuted the very concept of a fictional present, i.e. of there
being a moving, metaphysically privileged point in time. It is intuitive to presume
that the fictional world resembles the real one, a principle that has been called the
Reality Principle, so if there is an actual present there should be a fictional one as
well. However, I have shown that one cannot presume that any property is shared
by the fictional and actual world unless this is indicated by the fiction in question.
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Moreover, if there is a metaphysically privileged point in time there has to be
something which sets it apart from other points in time, and I considered whether
the interactivity of the game would motivate and make it possible to locate such a
point,  i.e.  if  the interactive moment could be thought of  as the present.  I  then
presented four reasons why this conclusion is not viable. 
First  of  all,  the argument is  circular:  the moment of  interaction is  in  the
fictional  present  because  the  fictional  present  is  the  moment  of  interaction.
Furthermore, one could also argue that the moment currently screened/read in a
film/novel differs from other moments in that it is this moment which is currently
represented, meaning that there is a fictional present in those media as well, which
in turn entails that  there is no significant difference between video games and
other media. 
Secondly, the possibility to return to previous parts of the game undermines
any potential difference between various moments in the story and, by extension,
any possible metaphysical privilege. 
Thirdly, on a related note, there are interactive flashbacks in many games,
and if  interactivity  is  not  limited  to  the  present  one cannot  locate  the  fictional
present only with reference to interactivity.
Fourthly, it is not possible to separate video games from film and literature
in as clear-cut a fashion as is necessary for this argument, since many games
contain  both  film-sequences  and  text-segments.  If  film  and  literature  cannot
possess the same temporal properties as video games, it would render most game
stories unnecessarily complex and counterintuitive in terms of temporality, since
their intermittent use of film and text would entail  that sequences consisting of
segments which seem to follow one another actually do not; a cut-scene following
an interactive sequence would hence not depict  events temporally posterior to
those depicted by the interactive  sequence,  but  actually events in  the fictional
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past,  only because of  purportedly inherent  properties  of  the  respective  media,
irrespective of the plausibility of this interpretation.
A more fundamental  problem appears in narratives with  anachronies, as
there is no reliable way of ascertaining the temporal properties of any scene, save
in relation to one another. If the first scene is temporally posterior to the second
one, one can either claim that the first scene is a flash-forward or that the second
one is a flashback, but these interpretations are equally plausible. Moreover, there
is no reason why either of the scenes must be identified as the fictional  present,
one could just as well posit that both are located in the fictional past or future. If so,
one  cannot  say  that  game  stories  are  interactive,  since  presentness  is  a
prerequisite for interactivity. In addition, our inability to ascertain the location of the
fictional  present  translates,  by extension,  to  an inability to  assess whether  the
fictional timeline has a present at all. This inability becomes more evident in the
light of the fact that A-series properties supervene on B-series properties, so that
in narratives where the latter cannot be assessed – when we cannot say how
fictional events are structured temporally in relation to one another – the mere
existence  of  an  A-series  cannot  be  assessed  either,  let  alone  which  A-series
property is ascribed to which point in time. Said supervenience also shows the
futility of speaking of A-series properties at all, seeing how B-series properties are
sufficient for narrative comprehension. More importantly, even if there is a fictional
present, it does not follow that it is ever represented, which would in turn obviate
opportunities to interact with the story.
In the second half of the thesis I  have shown that although many game
scholars speak of the player as some kind of author, this conception is flawed and
untenable. Both extreme and moderate actual intentionalism are problematic when
applied to other media, and their issues and deficiencies become more salient and
are aggravated when applied to video games. Since game scholars themselves
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fail to expound intentionalistic theories, I have done so to show what alternatives
are available and why they are flawed.
Extreme intentionalists argue that work-meaning is equivalent to authorial
intentions,  but  I  have  shown  that  the  requirements  presented  by  them  are
problematic.  If  any  conceivable  content  is  sufficient  in  and  of  itself  for  the
intentions to be realized we end up with so-called Humpy-Dumptyism, where an
author  can  arbitrarily  ascribe  any  meaning  to  any  narrative  content,  and  her
intentions thus become infallible. One can instead argue that meaning obtains on
the condition that the author can reasonably expect the interpreter to infer it, but
this  endows  the  author’s  expectations  with  too  high  an  importance,  possibly
rendering a comprehensible narrative incomprehensible, not because of any flaws
in the narrative, but because the author lacks the necessary expectation; it could
also  go  back  and  forth  between  being  comprehensible  and  incomprehensible
depending  on  the  author’s  expectations,  in  spite  of  remaining  unchanged.
Moreover, the issue of Humpty-Dumptyism persists, since an author producing a
nonsensical work could still  endow it  with meaning, provided that she sincerely
expects that it be understood by its recipients. One could add the caveat that such
irrational agents are irrelevant exceptions, but this leads to the circular argument
that agents are rational because they can be understood and that they can be
understood because they are rational. Just as circular is the distinction extreme
intentionalists  make between  intending and merely  wanting a work to  obtain  a
given meaning, where only the former results in endowing the work with a given
meaning. The author is thus said to intend the meaning if it can be inferred, and if
it cannot be inferred the author did not truly intend it, so authorial intentions once
more become infallible, since all intentions will either be realized or discarded as
mere  volition  (i.e.  not  intentions).  If  one  accepts  this  definition,  it  follows  that
players cannot intend much when playing (especially not compared to what the
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designer can intend),  which in  turn raises the question of why they should be
considered authors at all.
The  requirement  for  authorial  intentions  also  creates  several  problems,
such as potential gaps in the fictional truth following from the author ’s failure to
form intentions regarding a given proposition. The fact that players lack intentions
regarding most of the content in a game during their first playthrough exacerbates
this problem, especially since much of what happens is contrary to their intentions
(e.g.  losing) which further  reinforces the conception of  the designer as author.
Another  problem is  that  the  author  may vacillate  between intentions regarding
work-meaning,  which introduces the question of which intentions are meaning-
defining and why.  In  games this  problem is  even more  prevalent,  seeing how
players constantly revise their intentions throughout the playthrough. 
It  has  been  argued  by  intentionalists  that  one  can  utilize  realized
instrumental intentions in order to ascertain unrealized ultimate intentions, but this
kind of interpretation presupposes knowledge about the ultimate intentions, and
once  more  risks  rendering  the  success-condition  so  minimal  that  authorial
intentions become infallible; one could always refer to the last step to be realized
in the chain of intentions and appeal to this as evidence of the ultimate intention.
Moderate actual intentionalism (MAI) does not fare better than the extreme
kind. First of all, it is difficult to formulate criteria for when intentions obtain: mere
compatibility is not sufficient, but by adding the criterion that intentions must enrich
the text one excludes marginal  but possible meanings whilst  allowing for more
absurd but unlikely ones.
According  to  one  version  of  MAI,  parts  that  do  not  correspond  to  the
author’s intentions are void of meaning, but this means that a passage may seem
to be meaningful when, in fact, it is not (since authorial intentions are necessary
for meaning to obtain). In games this problem is more acute, since the player ’s
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intentions are less likely to be realized in games of a higher difficulty. This problem
persists but is diminished considerably if the designer is regarded as the author.
MAI is also problematic when a work is ambiguous, insofar as authorial
intentions are invoked to adjudicate between multiple possible meanings. If a work
is ambiguous in the sense that its possible meanings are equally plausible and
compatible  with  the  work  the  author  arguably  failed  to  create  the  work  she
intended to, i.e. a work in which her intended meaning is the most plausible one,
which in turn undermines the reason why her intention should be invoked to begin
with. Further, by allowing for consultation of extratextual sources in order to verify
her intentions the latter become infallible, since said sources in themselves make
her intended meaning the most plausible one. 
The use of partially realized intentions has its issues as well. By arguing
that  partial  success  only  applies  to  the  work  as  a  whole  one  has  to  answer
whether qualitative or quantitative success is the most important. If it is the latter,
one has to specify how many intentions that have to be realized, but any number
may  seem  arbitrary.  If  the  evaluation  is  qualitative,  one  has  to  state  which
intentions are crucial for the realization of authorial intentions, but this is in itself an
interpretative  statement  (which  requires  comprehension  of  the  work),  and  this
issue is rendered even more complicated by how some intentions in games cannot
be realized if  others are not;  failure in an early part  may prohibit  realization of
intentions pertaining to later parts. More generally, the interdependence of fictional
propositions makes it difficult to evaluate them separately, since their importance
emerges partially from their relations to other fictional propositions.
MAI  has  been  criticized  for  advocating  an  arbitrary  vacillation  between
work-meaning and authorial  intentions: if  the latter  are not  compatible with the
former, the former obtains, but then authorial intentions seem superfluous. Video
games introduce yet another, similar dichotomy, consisting of the player ’s and the
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designer’s respective intentions,  where the former are invoked initially and the
latter if the first ones do not obtain (and finally the work-meaning is invoked if both
fail). Since player intentions are so fallible and transitory, it seems more worthwhile
to  focus exclusively on the designer’s  intentions,  especially since she sets the
limits for what the player can and cannot intend.
Finally, I have demonstrated that there is not much reason to believe that
players  are  even  coauthors of  video  game  stories.  By  defining  ‘coauthor’  as
someone who was in  any way involved in  the production of  the narrative one
makes the notion too broad and neglects the artistic and aesthetic significance of
each person’s contribution. One could compare the player to an actor, but if an
actor’s  performance  does  not  change  the  fictional  truth  in  a  play,  there  is  no
reason to assume that the player’s performance would do so in a game, instead of
merely saying that some aspects are left indefinite.
Several scholars also note that being included in the production of a work is
not sufficient for granting a person the status of author. If one person supervises
others and has the authority to decide what is to be included in a work, she is the
true author. With this definition in mind I argued that it is more reasonable to see
the game designer as the author,  because she sets up the limits  within which
players may act, and their volition cannot override hers. 
The  conclusion  that  the  designer  is  the  author  is  further  reinforced  by
considering an artwork as an expression of the author’s attitudes. A person may
participate in the production of a work, yet one can argue that she is not an author
insofar as her contribution aims at expressing someone else’s attitudes. This is
instantiated  in  gameplay  where  the  player  discovers  and/or  expresses  the
attitudes of the designer, but since this is not reciprocal – i.e. the designer does
not also intend to convey the player’s attitudes – the player is not an author, even
if their attitudes happen to be identical. If their intentions diverge, it is the player
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who has to yield to the intentions of the designer. Sometimes the player is offered
much freedom in terms of what contributions to make, but to presume that this
amounts to authorship remains question-begging.
Another  conception  of  coauthorship  emphasizes  the  importance  of
membership in the authorial group. Although this allows for coauthors to dissent on
some  matters  without  vitiating  their  authorship  –  whilst  preventing  a  potential
saboteur from becoming a part of the authorial team even if she believes that she
shares the intentions of the coauthors – it leads to the awkward consequence that
a person can be a coauthor regardless of what intentions she possesses and in
spite of making no actual contribution. Membership in the authorial group seems
neither necessary nor sufficient for making a person a coauthor; it appears rather
to be a consequence of that person already being one.
Coauthorship can also be defined in terms of responsibility, but this would
not allow players to be coauthors, since it is the designer who is held responsible
for the game’s content. Even if one were to argue that the player is responsible for
her  actions  within  the  game,  this  can  only  apply  to  gameplay  but  cannot  be
extended to noninteractive parts, such as cut-scenes, which are exclusively the
responsibility of the designer. This, however, would make most games incoherent,
as gameplay and cut-scenes would be unrelated due to the fact that no single
agent is responsible for both. 
Related to questions of coauthorship is the so-called ‘conversation analogy’,
that the interpreter ‘converses’ with the creator of a work through engagement with
it.  This  analogy  has  primarily  been  applied  to  non-interactive  media  such  as
literature, and has been used by some to argue that the interpreter is not restricted
to the interpretation intended by the author, but can enter a ‘conversation’ through
which the meaning is altered. In the thesis this analogy is applied to video games.
However, it is shown to be fundamentally flawed and not applicable in general – let
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alone in the case of video games – from which it follows that the interpreter cannot
alter fictional truth. The interactive nature of video games as a medium even works
against any possible interaction with a game’s fictional truth in a more palpable
fashion: the player may attempt to offer her own interpretation through gameplay,
but the designer prevents any such alterations by programming the game in such
a way that this gameplay is precluded.
Moreover,  in  all  media  the  interpreter  is  able  to  articulate  a  potential
response  to  the  author,  but  this  amounts  to  no  more  than  a  reaction;  as  the
speaker never receives the response it  would be more appropriate to call  their
communication  a  monologue,  which  prevents  the  listener  from  becoming  an
interlocutor. Even in artforms where the interpreter could potentially communicate
her thoughts, artistic conventions mostly prevent her from doing so.
One proposed way of salvaging the conversation analogy is to conceive of
interpreting as having a kind of  ‘meta-conversation’; nevertheless, this fares no
better than the conventional version, and differs from it primarily in name, not in
nature. The author is still unable to receive the interpreter’s ‘reply’, and even if the
interpreter  does  communicate  with  the  actual  author,  the  conversation  has  no
bearing on the work’s fictional truth. It is questionable whether this would count as
an interpretation at all, since it does not necessarily have as a goal to discover and
comprehend the work’s meaning, but seems to be restricted to amelioration of the
work (which presupposes comprehension of it). This in turn means that one has, in
some sense, ceased to discuss the work in question and directed one’s attention
to a hypothetical work one thinks the author should have made.
A more fundamental problem is that it  is  unclear what it  would mean to
‘work with’ the intentions of the author to produce an interpretation independent of
– but still relevant to – authorial intentions. For any given fictional proposition, the
only way to make a relevant interpretation not identical to the one intended by the
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author is to assume the inverse truth-value of that proposition, which would be to
oppose authorial intentions, not work with them. Alternatively, one could conceive
of an interpretation which does not treat propositions presented by the author, but
this would render the interpretation irrelevant. In neither of these solutions does
the  interpreter  make  a  relevant  contribution;  there  is  no  cooperation,  only
competition  and/or  redundant  additions.  If  the  interpretation  is  to  be  judged
holistically with all the propositions constituting it – instead of one proposition at a
time – we get the problem of ascertaining which propositions may be altered in the
interpretation, how many and to what extent, but that assessment would still be
restricted  by  the  intentions  of  the  author,  thus  reducing  the  reciprocity  of  the
purported  conversation  between  her  and  the  interpreter.  In  video  games  this
‘interpretative leeway’ may be comparatively broad, with numerous details varying
from  one  playthrough  to  another,  but  the  principle  still  stands,  and  all
interpretations made by the player (through playing) have to be  ‘assented to’ by
the designer. In modern games, the conversational aspect is diminished further,
since updates remove  ‘interpretations’ discovered after the release of the game,
and refusing to install said updates would amount to ignoring authorial intentions.
Future research
Scholars within both philosophy of fiction and game studies will  be able benefit
from the results of this thesis. Philosophers of fiction can build on my conclusions
about time in fiction and examine temporal properties of stories and how fictional
truth relates to time; my conclusions can potentially also contribute to philosophy
of time in general, regarding questions of temporal metaphysical privilege and the
relation between separate time-lines. Moreover, my conclusions regarding actual
intentionalism – both moderate and extreme – are of value for discussions about
these  modes  of  interpretation  in  all  media,  as  my  discussions  of  authorial
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intentions in video games illuminate their general and fundamental issues. Future
research on the philosophy of games can also use my conclusions as a point of
departure and/or develop them when examining topics overlooked by the thesis,
such as hypothetical intentionalism, constructivism, pluralism etc.
Game scholars can also benefit from my results, and can relate conclusions
presented here to their theories about the nature of game fiction. My conclusions
regarding temporal  aspects of  games may be useful  not  only to  scholars who
discuss the temporality of games, but also scholars whose theories presuppose
that  games possess  unique  temporal  properties.  Furthermore,  scholars  whose
theories relate to authorship in games may also find my conclusions useful when
exploring this topic in further detail and in which ways authorship in games differs
from other  media.  In  general,  all  theorists  who claim or  imply that  games are
unique in terms of fictional truth may find the results presented here to be useful
as  these  claims  require  a  more  cogent  defence  or,  alternatively,  have  to  be
abandoned.
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Appendix – Key games discussed in the thesis
The Legend of Zelda: Ocarina of Time
The evil wizard Ganondorf wants to take over the kingdom of Hyrule. Link, a young
boy, must find a way to stop him from acquiring the Triforce, a relic which would 
grant Ganondorf an immense power. The player controls Link and must travel 
around Hyrule, battle monsters, find treasures, explore dungeons, and solve 
various puzzles. One noteworthy feature of the game is that the player can travel 
back and forth in time by visiting the Temple of Time; when Link travels forward in 
time, he wakes up as an adult, and by travelling back in time he ‘reverses’ back to 
a kid.
The Legend of Zelda: Majora’s Mask
In this sequel to Ocarina of Time, Link reaches the land of Termina, which will be 
crushed by the moon in three days. Link once more has to explore the land and its
dungeons, fight monstrous creatures, and solve puzzles in order to save the 
kingdom. Similar to Ocarina of Time, time travel is integrated into the story: Link 
can travel back in time, and has to relive the same three days over and over and 
complete all tasks necessary for stopping the moon from destroying the kingdom.
Grand Theft Auto: Vice City
Tommy Vercetti has just been released from prison and is sent to Vice City by his 
boss to carry out a drug deal. The deal goes wrong and Tommy loses the drugs 
and the money, and has to get both back to please his infuriated boss. He makes 
many acquaintances in the criminal underworld and slowly acquires more money 
and power. Most missions concern various kinds of criminal activities, for instance 
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assassinations, illegal street racing, blackmail, assault, delivering drugs, etc. The 
player decides when to start a given mission, and when not currently on a mission 
she is free to roam the streets of Vice City.
Max Payne
NYPD detective Max Payne comes home one day to find his wife and daughter 
killed by drug addicts. Max infiltrates the mafia in order to find the person 
ultimately responsible for his loss and soon realizes that the murder of his wife 
involves some of the most powerful people in the city. The story is indebted to film 
noir, and employs tropes such as a stereotypical ‘hard-boiled detective’ narrating 
events through voice-over. The game is noteworthy because of a mechanic called 
‘bullet-time’: the player has the ability to slow down time to such an extent that 
bullets can be seen and dodged. The majority of gameplay consists of gun-fights 
where the player is encouraged to utilize bullet-time as much as possible, resulting
in stylized shoot-outs in slow-motion, making the game reminiscent of Hong Kong-
action à la John Woo.
Prince of Persia: The Sands of Time
When the prince of Persia (whom I refer to as the Prince, as his name is never 
mentioned) loots the palace of an Indian Maharaja he finds the magical Dagger of 
Time and an hourglass containing the Sands of Time. When the hourglass is 
opened the sand turns everyone but the Prince himself to monsters, and he has to
find a way to return the dagger to the hourglass and thus restore the kingdom and 
its inhabitants. The game alternates between battles with monsters and acrobatic 
traversal of various kinds of environments, where the Prince has to advance by 
jumping between pillars and platforms, climbing and/or running on walls, and 
bypassing deadly traps. The Dagger of Time endows the Prince with some control 
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of the flow of time and allows the player to, among other things, rewind time in 
order to rectify mistakes.
Metal Gear Solid 3: Snake Eater
A CIA-agent with the codename Naked Snake has to infiltrate military facilities in 
the Soviet jungle in order to stop scientists from building a tank equipped with 
nuclear weapons. The player is encouraged to adopt a stealthy approach and 
sneak past enemies when possible. If detected, she can resort to using firearms to
kill guards if necessary, but can usually run away and avoid combat altogether.
Resident Evil 4
US government agent Leon S. Kennedy is sent to the countryside of an unnamed 
Hispanic country to save the president’s daughter. It turns out that the farmers 
inhabiting the village have been turned into zombie-like creatures by a parasite, 
and are controlled by Saddler, a cult leader residing in a nearby castle. The player 
accesses a wide range of firearms and mostly has to kill zombie-villagers and 
various monsters.
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